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Abstract 
The transition process to ICT (Information and Communication Technology) has had 
significant influence on different aspects of society. Although the computerisation 
process has motivated the alignment of different technical and human factors with the 
expansion process, the technical pace of the transition surpasses the human adaptation to 
change. Much research on ICT development has shown that ICT security is essentially a 
political and a managerial act that must not disregard the importance of the relevant 
cultural characteristics of a society. 
Information sharing is a necessary action in society to exchange knowledge and to enable 
and facilitate communication. However, certain information should be shared only with 
selected parties or even kept private. Information sharing by humans forms the main 
obstacle to security measure undertaken by organisations to protect their assets. 
Moreover, certain cultural traits play a major role in thwarting information security 
measures. Arab culture of the United Arab Emirates is one of those cultures with strong 
collectivism featuring strong ties among individuals. Sharing sensitive information 
including passwords of online accounts can be found in some settings in some cultures, 
but with reason and generally on a small scale. However, this research includes a study 
on 3 main Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, namely, Saudi Arabia (KSA), 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman, showing that there is similar a significant level 
of sensitive information sharing among employees in the region. This is proven to highly 
contribute to compromising user digital authentication, eventually, putting users’ 
accounts at risk. The research continued by carrying out a comparison between the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in terms of attitudes 
and behaviour towards information sharing. It was evident that there is a significant 
difference between GCC Arab culture and the UK culture in terms of information 
sharing. Respondents from the GCC countries were more inclined to share sensitive 
information with their families and friends than the UK respondents were. However, UK 
respondents still revealed behaviour in some contexts, which may lead potential threats to 
the authentication mechanism and consequently to other digital accounts that require a 
credential pass. 
It was shown that the lack of awareness and the cultural impact are the main issues for 
sensitive information sharing among family members and friends in the GCC. The 
research hence investigated channels and measures of reducing the prevalence of social 
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engineering attacks, such as legislative measures, technological measures, and education 
and awareness. The found out that cultural change is necessary to remedy sensitive 
information sharing as a cultural trait. Education and awareness are perhaps the best 
defence to cultural change and should be designed effectively. Accordingly, the work 
critically analysed three national cybersecurity strategies of the United Kingdom (UK), 
the United States (U.S.) and Australia (AUS) in order to identify any information security 
awareness education designed to educate online users about the risk of sharing sensitive 
information including passwords. The analysis aimed to assess possible adoption of 
certain elements, if any, of these strategies by the UAE. The strategies discussed only 
user awareness to reduce information sharing. However, awareness in itself may not 
achieve the required result of reducing information sharing among family members and 
friends. Rather, computer users should be educated about the risks of such behaviour in 
order to realise and change. As a result, the research conducted an intervention study that 
proposed a UAE-focused strategy designed to promote information security education for 
the younger generation to mitigate the risk of sensitive information sharing. The results 
obtained from the intervention study of school children formed a basis for the information 
security education framework also proposed in this work. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of ICT systems pose high demands on availability, confidentiality and 
integrity when extensive data sets are stored and transacted, including sensitive data 
remotely accessed at any time over the Internet. With information security being virtually 
at the heart of all core ICT (Werner 2004), it must complement technical and 
organisational measures by providing new and customised security solutions.  
The Internet transcends any time and location boundaries; this feature has attracted an 
ever growing number of online users to form communities and this constitutes an 
additional aspect of ICT. This results in difficulty in introducing trusted online identity 
and achieving global security standards, leading to an increasing number of e-crimes and 
phishing attacks in almost every IT sector (GTIC 2009). 
Setting aside the technical details of the security measures needed to protect valuable 
information resources, one can perceive the human factor as a major contributor of data 
exposure to unauthorised access. This argument is borne out by the increasing number of 
social engineering attacks and internal threats in organisations. Social engineering is a 
technique that aims to compromise a system by which the attacker manipulates people 
instead of technology to bypass security mechanisms (Hadnagy, 2010).  
Culture has an influential impact on people’s conduct and behaviour and certain cultures 
are more vulnerable to information security threats than others. This vulnerability is 
based on several factors including openness and sharing. In cultural studies, these cultures 
are referred to as collectivist. According to Hofstede (2003), the Arab World is a 
collectivist society as compared to individualist culture and is manifested in a close long-
term commitment to the member group, that being a family, extended family, or extended 
relationships. Loyalty in a collectivist culture is paramount, and overrides most other 
societal rules. Hence, adopting an information security standard without cultural 
customisation is unlikely to yield the intended results. 
Information security education is one of the main approaches that have been suggested to 
increase user awareness. Different studies present information security education in 
different contexts such as public awareness, industry awareness and academic awareness. 
For example, Aloul’s (2012) research on information security in the UAE maintains that 
users should be educated against the risk of information sharing which can be exploited 
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by social engineering attacks. Aloul (2012) also asserts that schools should offer security 
awareness courses as part of their computer course curriculum. Bishop (2000) asserts that 
educating the public is a primary procedure and should focus on making the public aware 
of the threats associated with activities on the Internet. Another reason why information 
security is a concern particularly for the academic field is due to the breaches rising from 
cultural backgrounds and lack of security awareness among university students (for 
example Rezgui & Marks, 2008; Hjelmås & Wolthusen, 2006; Shaikh, 2004; Kruger et 
al., 2011; and Bogolea & Wijekumar, 2004). Studies have been limited however to 
alerting to the importance of increasing information security awareness by education. 
Designing appropriate material and adopting suitable learning methods is another area of 
concern. For example, Logan & Clarkson (2005) assert that teaching hacking activities is 
one approach to improving a graduate’s employability as a network administrator charged 
with protecting valuable corporate assets. Similarly, to address national needs for 
computer security education many universities targeting undergraduate and graduate 
students have incorporated computer and security courses in their curricula (Sharma & 
Sefchek, 2007). 
As opposed to common studies in information security education, which incorporate 
education in university courses or in employee training programmes, this study argues 
that school education is more relevant especially in the cultural context of the study. The 
study targets school students in the UAE and assesses their information security 
awareness based on course material designed to raise awareness of information security 
risks arising from cultural-based behaviour of Arab people. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
The United Arab Emirates comprises seven emirates: Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras Al 
Khaimah, Sharjah Umm Al Quwain and the capital Abu Dhabi. The authorities in Abu 
Dhabi recognise the importance of developing an eGovernment strategy that conforms to 
information security standards which can ensure smooth and safe transactions between 
the government and its citizens. However, this has not yet been achieved to a satisfactory 
standard, as the sources cited below indicate. This work claims that neither a single 
standard nor a group of customised standards, if adopted by Abu Dhabi, can sufficiently 
satisfy the security requirements of the unique nature of the Emirate. While there has 
been development of international standards and guidelines, it is important to recognise 
that implementations are often in a local context. In order to be effective, standards, 
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policies and guidelines should be sensitive to local culture and context. This thesis 
involves the development of standards, policies and guidelines for Abu Dhabi Emirate 
and considers two aspects: cultural and developmental (Höne & Eloff, 2002). 
1.1.1 The Cultural Aspect 
The Arab culture is of a special nature, where privacy is something that Arabs share. In 
certain circumstances, individual privacy may take second place to the needs of the 
community or family (Chadwick, 2002). Furthermore, Arab culture respects elders and 
seniority (Koocher, 2009); private details may be divulged in circumstances involving 
seniority requests for these details. 
1.1.2 The Contextual Development 
Abu Dhabi is still under the development phase of its IT infrastructure and has not 
reached an advanced level of maturity to implement standards that may have worked with 
other countries. 
1.2 Motivation 
The General Secretariat of the Executive Council of Abu Dhabi is committed to 
establishing a service-oriented government. Through its end-user focus it aims to deliver 
systems that provide a high degree of performance, offering services on a global level for 
the benefit of all customers (UAE E-Council, 2010).  
In order to create an environment of trust between the government and users of its 
systems, the Government of Abu Dhabi has made efforts to educate users about safe ways 
to use the Internet and data provided through its web sites (UAE E-Council, 2010). 
In Abu Dhabi, international standards and global best practices, most notably ISO 
27001:2005 and ISO 27002:2005, have been customised to develop national policies for 
security (ADSIC [1], 2010). These policies have been developed by the Abu Dhabi 
Systems and Information Centre (ADSIC). In particular, ADSIC has developed guidance 
and documentation including: 
 An Information Security Policy Programme; 
 Unified Information Security Standards; 
 A series of Procedural and Technical Manuals; 
 An e-literacy programme that aims to identify the digital gap and improve the 
capacity of ICT in all segments of society (ADSIC [2], 2010). 
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One of the problems that concern the UAE government is cybercrime. There have been a 
number of incidents reported in the past years for example: 
 402 cybercrimes in Dubai and Abu Dhabi in 2009 according to the Ministry of the 
Interior (Alkhaleej News, 2010);  
 62 cybercrimes in the UAE within a period of two months targeting security 
bodies, ministries, government bodies and private sector companies (Emarat 
Alyoum [1], 2010); 
 80% of all cyber-attacks on UAE organisations are launched from within the 
organisation itself (Emarat Alyoum [2], 2010). 
The government has undertaken a number of initiatives to combat the problem including: 
 Launching official calls for establishing a cybercrime court (ITP, 2009); 
 Establishing a new department under the federal courts to combat cybercrimes 
becoming a significant security threat to public and private institutions (UAE 
Interact, 2009); 
 Launching the Salim initiative for protection against the risks of electronic 
information threats and working towards attaining a culture of safety in the UAE 
(CERT, 2009). 
The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) is responsible for the management 
of every aspect of the telecommunications and information technology industries within 
the UAE. The TRA established a Computer Emergency Response Team (AECERT) to 
act as the cybersecurity coordination centre in the UAE and on 21 October 2010 
AECERT obtained the ISO (ISO 27001:2005) standard for establishing a system for 
managing information security. The team has been, and will be, using the standard to 
develop internal procedures and to access global best practices that ensure business 
continuity and minimise threats (Zawaya, 2010). 
However, standards alone are ineffective in preventing specific attacks. This inability to 
prevent attacks is discussed by Madan & Madan (2010), who stress that a single standard 
or a combination of standards fail to address vulnerability to attacks, which 
knowledgeable attackers can exploit with great effect. Additionally, Cheremushkin & 
Lyubimov (2010) have identified weaknesses in ISO/IEC 27000 series concerning Risk 
management, Asset, Information security policy and Certification documents. 
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1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
1.3.1 Aim 
This research investigates culture as a key factor in ICT development, particularly in 
information security. The aim of the work is to develop a strategic framework to 
minimise information security risks in the UAE. This strategy is to be implemented in the 
long-term by targeting the younger generation, beginning with school students. The study 
provides the decision makers with a strategic information security framework, 
accompanied by guidelines, in order to have a comprehensive program relating to 
implementing information security education with effective outcomes. 
1.3.2 Objectives 
The following objectives are put forward: 
1. Conduct a comprehensive literature review on Arab culture (GCC countries) and 
its current ICT practices, security standards and policies;  
2. Investigate behaviour particular to Arab culture that could be pertinent to privacy 
sharing (surveys, literature review) in the UAE; 
3. Investigate behaviour and attitudes towards information security in GCC 
countries; 
4. Investigate behaviour and attitudes towards information security in a different 
culture other than the Arab Culture; 
5. Investigate and critically analyse information security strategy initiatives taken by 
the UAE authorities to minimise the risk of sharing sensitive information; 
6. Devise a strategy for privacy sharing in Arab culture, which comprises a solution 
or a set of solutions to reduce the overall information security risks; 
7. Implement the strategy (taught material) on samples of students in different 
schools and of different age groups (11-17) and sex groups; 
8. Conduct a series of surveys to test applicability and assess the results of the 
implementation before and after the taught material is delivered 
1.4 Scope 
The scope of the research covers three main topics: information security, culture and 
strategic security awareness to minimise the risk of sharing sensitive information. The 
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cultural aspect is used to investigate certain behaviour within a country in order to 
differentiate the selected countries. The type of culture (collectivist, individualist, etc.) is 
the only basis used in the research to compare people’s behaviour and attitudes towards 
information security. Analysis of the cultural norms and psychological attributes and their 
potential impacts are beyond the scope of this research. 
Statistical analysis tests are used to compare and analyse people’s behaviour and attitudes 
towards information security. Other countries’ cybersecurity strategies contribute to 
designing the sensitive information sharing security framework. According to best 
practices around the world, the guidelines recommend educating online users about the 
safe ways to use internet services.  
1.5 Research Process/Methodology 
In order to achieve the aim and objectives of this research, the author used both 
quantitative and qualitative methods (Likert scale and open ended questionnaire) in order 
to cover the target area. Likert scale measures were used as a quantitative approach to 
people’s perceptions towards information security. The qualitative approach was used to 
reveal computer users’ knowledge of information security awareness and how to respond 
to some scenarios and incidents. 
The developed questionnaires targeted both adults and children. Details of the ethical 
form for the adults’ survey are found in the appendices (2 & 3). Further requirements 
were considered in the ethical approval for the children’s survey. The following are the 
additional points added to the ethical form for the children’s survey: 
  Neither your teachers, nor your parents or your classmates will have access to 
your answers; 
 Your answers are very valuable to the researcher for further studies; 
 Your answer is protected and secured; 
 The researcher will not obtain any information about you (your personal 
information, your school name, etc.); 
 If you do not wish to participate in the research study, please decline participation 
by clicking on the "disagree" button.  
The research process was conducted in a number of stages as follows: 
Stage one: Extensive work was conducted throughout the research period to identify 
information security best practices worldwide which have been designed to reduce the 
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impact of culture on information security. Information security best practices were 
targeted in this thesis to analyse initiatives to reduce the cultural attributes that are 
considered a hurdle to information security compliance. 
Stage two: A cultural investigation process was instigated to identify the social 
contribution to computer user behaviour towards information security. The investigation 
process considered different countries with different attitudes to the phenomenon of 
sharing sensitive information.  
Stage three: Different information security initiatives were analysed in order to minimise 
the risk of security and privacy attacks that are inherent due to the cultural attributes 
identified in this research. 
Stage four: Cybersecurity strategies for several countries that consider information 
security awareness and education were critically analysed in order to find an effective 
solution that contributes to reducing the effect of cultural behaviour in information 
security. 
Finally, in order to design a strategic information security education framework that 
considers cultural background, an intervention study was conducted to cover certain 
aspects that contribute to minimising the information security risks in the digital world. 
1.6 Thesis Contributions 
The main contribution of the research is the development of a framework for information 
security education that can be utilised as a strategy for the UAE for reducing the 
information security risk arising from cultural and social relationships among family 
members and friends. The framework also includes information security education 
guidelines that provide different scenarios of information sharing and the impact of these 
activities followed by some mitigation and education strategies.  
Secondary contributions of the thesis are: 
 A critical analysis of the human factor in information security systems and 
the limitations and weaknesses of the current practices for reducing 
information security risks; 
 A detailed analysis of the role of culture in human behaviour and its impact 
on information security and identification of the risks of sharing sensitive 
information; 
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 Design of a questionnaire to investigate the impact of sharing sensitive 
information among family members and friends on information security. This 
questionnaire was designed to focus on areas such as: personal belongings, 
work belongings, and trust and social influences of family members and 
friends. The design also reflects the risk and impact of such activities and the 
relationship between the work and home environments; 
 A critical assessment based on a quantitative approach of school students 
before and after being taught on information security. The analysis test 
revealed a significant difference between the two assessments; 
 A critical assessment based on a qualitative approach to analyse the 
differences between a group before and after being taught on information 
security.  
 A comparative study of sharing sensitive information among friends and 
relatives between the UAE and other GCC countries (KSA, Oman). The study 
revealed cultural similarities of sharing sensitive information with friends and 
family members, which can lead to compromising digital authentication; 
 A comparative study of sharing sensitive information among friends and 
relatives between GCC counties and the UK. The study revealed a significant 
difference between the two groups. 
Based on an analysis of information security strategies for the U.S., the UK and Australia, 
the thesis also arrived at the following recommendations: 
 In the U.S. advising the end user not to share their access control with anyone 
is not sufficient. Rather, educating the end user about the risks and impact of 
sharing sensitive information in all environments (home, work, school, etc.) is 
necessary for a national security;  
 Although sensitive information sharing happens in the UK on a smaller scale 
in comparison to the GCC countries, the UK cybersecurity strategy 2011 may 
also need to consider the education of sharing preferences of citizens among 
their friends and family members; 
 The Australian cybersecurity strategy 2009 should focus on the design of 
security awareness tools and consider the sharing of sensitive information 
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among family members and friends in both home and work environments. It 
is also worth investigating the sharing phenomenon and how it is related to 
the cultural norms, behaviour, attitudes and trust; 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
Chapter One: Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief introduction to information security and the cultural 
influence on ICT. The chapter also provides a background of the United Arab Emirates’ 
information security and security initiatives towards local cybercrime incidents. The aim, 
objectives and scope of the thesis are clearly presented in this chapter. 
Chapter Two: Human Behaviour in ICT Services 
This chapter provides an introduction to information security as part of Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) services as well as the security controls used to secure 
data. The chapter also covers information security issues worldwide and the protection 
initiatives developed to reduce the impact of human behaviour.  
Chapter Three: The Role of Culture in ICT Services 
This chapter presents some elements of culture in ICT in several countries. It also 
provides analysis of the organisational culture and its role in creating an information 
security culture that aims to enhance information security awareness. 
Chapter Four: Culture and Information Security 
This chapter consists of two parts. The first part contains the pilot study of this research 
that investigates the privacy sharing preferences among family members and friends. This 
part also aims to build a further understanding of the cultural impact on information 
security in the UAE. The second part considers three other countries: Saudi Arabia 
(KSA), Oman and the UK and aims to establish the extent to which cultural attitudes and 
behaviour can impact information security. The overall aim of the chapter is to present a 
clear picture of the cultural influence on sharing sensitive information among family 
members and friends. 
Chapter Five: Social Engineering Attack Mitigation 
This chapter considers several potential mitigation measures for further implementation 
that respond to both issues of cultural influence and lack of information security 
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awareness. 
Chapter Six: National cybersecurity Strategies: Response to Password Sharing 
This chapter provides a critical analysis of the cybersecurity strategies of several 
countries with a particular consideration given to password sharing. The aim of this 
chapter is to find a possible solution to the problem of sharing sensitive information 
among family members and friends. The chapter also analyses the governmental 
initiatives of the GCC countries to respond to sharing of sensitive information. 
Chapter Seven: Strategic Information Sharing Security Framework 
This chapter covers the intervention study that has been designed to reduce the impact of 
sharing sensitive information amongst others. The intervention study considered several 
aspects in its design, such as devising taught material to address sensitive information 
sharing, the implementation of the taught material and a series of surveys to test 
applicability and assess the results of the implementation. The chapter further provides a 
strategic framework based on the intervention study.  
Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Further Work 
This chapter provides a summary of the results obtained from this research. It also 
includes the information security education framework designed to reduce the likelihood 
of sharing sensitive information with family members, friends, employees, and even with 
strangers. The chapter includes recommendations based on the findings and aspects of 
further work. 
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CHAPTER 2: HUMAN BEHAVIOUR 
IN ICT SERVICES  
This chapter provides an introduction to information security and the security controls 
that are used to secure data. The chapter also covers information security issues 
worldwide and the protection initiatives developed to reduce the impact of human 
behaviour.  
Sharing sensitive information with others is an end user issue in ICT. This chapter 
includes a detailed analysis of the issues with sharing sensitive information and the 
associated threats and impacts on both individuals and organisations. 
2.1 Information Security 
Throughout history information has always been a valuable commodity. It ensures the 
security of nation-states, empowers people, spreads education and advances businesses 
around the world. In today’s society, information must be properly secured to prevent it 
from becoming vulnerable to criminals and hackers via the Internet. The spread of 
information technology and the corresponding security of that information are critical to 
governments, businesses and cultures around the world. The influx of information and 
communication technology to developing areas of the world increases literacy rates, 
women’s education, and political stability and helps the economy. 
Societies have attempted to secure information for thousands of years. The first attempts 
to secure information involved basic cryptography to obscure a message so it could be 
passed from originator to receiver without fear of interception. The first attempts 
involved a simple substitution system; other letters, numbers or symbols replaced a 
counterpart letter. With the key, or some critical thinking and time, one could decipher 
the message easily. As time progressed, the methods of information security grew in 
complexity. Perhaps the most famous encryption device is the Enigma Machine used by 
the Germans during World War II. The machine worked by an advanced three to five 
rotor scrambler. After a message was typed, the rotors would be set to a three to five 
letter code and then the message would be scrambled. The recipient of the message would 
set their machine to the same three to five letter code and decrypt the message (BBC, 
2014). The methods are similar to those used today to encrypt information, trade secrets 
and military information (SANS, 2001). 
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Our modern system is much more advanced than the early methods of encryption and has 
a language all of its own. Definitions are broad but information technology can 
encompass anything from educational information to the most critical national security 
information. Information and Communication Technology is generally considered to be 
technologies that provide access to information through technology. This includes the 
Internet, wireless technologies, telephony technologies and other communication 
mediums. Information Security is any method used to restrict access to information. 
Information security is present in almost every aspect of daily life. Passwords are the 
most common method of security but they do present problems. Poorly selected 
passwords, reusing passwords, incorporating easy to identify or guess elements in 
passwords, as well as not changing passwords frequently enough, result in reduced 
security (OUCH, 2013). 
The most extreme method of information security is the use of an “air gap” between a 
computer or a computer network and the Internet. This lack of connection means 
information is less susceptible to information attacks or theft via the Internet. The system 
is, however, not fool-proof, as the Iranian nuclear programme at Natanz was infected with 
the Stuxnet virus without a connection to the Internet. The advanced virus code was able 
to replicate itself through emails, USB devices and computers that were then taken into 
the standalone system. The virus mostly operated on its own with the first sign of success 
being the shutting down of the reactors in the Natanz facility (Lagner, 2013).  
Information can be protected in a number of ways beyond encryption methods. Physical 
security is arguably as important. Physical security can be anything from separate rooms 
with keyed or biometric access, restricted facilities or guards.  
Many systems rely on passwords to gain access but passwords can be broken or stolen, 
allowing unauthorised users access to the information. One method of verifying the user 
is genuine is utilising unique biological signatures of users by way of biometric security 
systems. Biometric systems are those that rely on a biological signature to allow access to 
information. This could include DNA, ear, face, fingerprint, gait, body motion, hand 
geometry, vein pattern, iris, retina and odour. Biometric data could also include non-DNA 
based information such as keystroke patterns or signatures. Since the biological 
signatures of a human are fairly unique, this can provide a good measure of security. 
Fingerprint scanners are the most common biometric device available. Outside of 
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computer technology, fingerprints have been used as identification since the turn of the 
20th century, when fingerprints were first used to gain a conviction in a murder case 
(History.com, 1905). Nowadays, the process of comparing fingerprints is done 
automatically by scanners. The technology has become increasingly common even for 
consumer electronics such as the iPhone 5 (Apple, 2014). Fingerprint scanners do present 
some security problems, however, as they can be easily spoofed. A simple photocopy of a 
fingerprint which was enhanced only by using a magic marker to make the finger 
impression lines dark enough for the scanner to read was enough to fool a high-end 
fingerprint scanner (Boneh & Shaw, 1998; Shubinsky & Sobel, 2013). 
Iris scanners identify and compare over 200 points on the iris and are one of the fastest 
and most secure biometric systems available. In high-stakes businesses such as banking 
or government, iris scanners are gaining popularity and will continue to do so as eye 
scanners become more affordable and integrated into hardware (Havenetidis, 2013).  
Given the ability for any of the biometric systems to fail through one of their weaknesses, 
there is a good argument for combining methods to achieve enhanced security. This 
would achieve higher security although it would come at a price, both financially as well 
as the time needed for a user to pass multiple authentication procedures. 
Authentication tokens are another, less high-tech, method for identity verification and 
controlling access to information. It is a physical object the user must have to verify their 
identity for the system. It could be a key fob, magnetic strip card or USB stick. Often, it is 
paired with a pin number, much like an ATM card used at a bank (Rouse 2005). These 
are often used as they are both secure and inexpensive to make for employees or others 
who need to access the materials.  
2.1.1 Vulnerability of Information Security 
Information technology is penetrating the entire value chain in each of its points, 
transforming the way activities are performed and the nature of the interconnections 
between them. It is also affecting the competitive landscape and reshaping the way 
products and services meet customer needs. These effects explain why Information and 
Communication Technology has acquired strategic significance and why it differs from 
many other technologies. 
ICT is well known for being increasingly linked to technological advancement. Advances 
in technology, while necessary, often need to focus on a particular area of expertise to 
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meet the specialised needs of different industries, whereas ICT is concerned with every 
aspect of organisational behaviour. Moreover, this new emphasis on the specialisation of 
different industries has led to the creation of new positions in the IT field. 
As we move forward, the need for and dependence on ICT grows tremendously. This 
tendency toward the omnipresence of ICT is elevating the necessity, yet difficulty, of 
information security. There are more threats than ever before; the main aim of 
information systems is to be secure rather any other functionality. Although information 
security is growing, the number of websites with information and tools that can be used 
even by novices to attack systems and their information is also increasing (Denning, 
2003). 
A security breach that has been in the news most is the theft of information from Target. 
It is estimated that 70 million customers were affected. There were early indications of a 
breach from the FireEye security system used to monitor the network (Finkle, 2014). 
These warnings were not acted upon by those in charge of Target’s information security 
because it was only one of hundreds of alerts received by the team and the information 
trail left behind was negligible. A US Senate report on the investigation of the breach was 
not forgiving of the Target information security department. The corporate offices of 
Target have apologised and attempted to gain back the trust of its customers by offering 
credit monitoring services at no charge to customers (Reuters, 2014).  
Banks are particularly vulnerable to information security attacks. There has been a long 
history of bank breaches which bring a high cost to the industry and consumers. In 2012, 
Citibank’s UCard system was attacked and information about its users was stolen. The 
personal information of 465,000 users was compromised. This type of information can be 
used for identity theft or manipulating the information to steal directly from the banks in 
a scheme similar to the one perpetrated by a network of hackers targeting ATMs. The 
hackers were able to find vulnerabilities in the security practices of credit card processing 
companies, remove the limits, and use reproduction cards to withdraw $45 million in a 
matter of hours (JPMorgan Chase Cyber-attack, 2013). 
Other banks have also been targeted with success. Barclay’s investment branch was 
targeted by hackers who successfully stole entire customer dossiers in 2013. This 
included names, addresses, loan information, medical history, passport numbers and other 
critical information. With this wealth of information available to them, criminals would 
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have an easy task of stealing the identities of Barclay’s clients (Van Doom, 2014). 
As a result of these attacks, banks have taken precautionary measures in information 
security practices. Expanding the importance of security practices across the entire 
company culture rather than leaving the brunt of the effort focussed within the IT 
Department has been an important move. Making all employees aware of security 
practices and motivating them to become an active part of the information security of the 
company has led to faster identification of information security threats (Denver Business 
Journal, 2013).  
Banks and private corporations are not the only targets for information security attacks. In 
2006, the Department of State suffered a large-scale intrusion from an unknown source. 
The intrusion began as an email sent from a legitimate-looking email address. Upon 
opening the attachment, a programme was executed that allowed outside access to user 
accounts and passwords.  
The intrusion was detected quickly and only the non-classified systems of the Department 
were compromised, but the resulting security measures did force restricted Internet access 
and required new accounts and passwords for many of the system’s users (Wright, 2006). 
The Department also had to disable its Secure Socket Layer system which allowed the 
transmission of encrypted data (State Department Suffers Computer Break-in, 2006). At 
the same time, the Defense Department and other US agencies were also experiencing 
difficulties, attempts and intrusions. China was the most obvious suspect as they are 
focusing large efforts on hacking as part of their military programme; however, the 
source of the Department of State intrusions was never identified (Lagorio, 2006). 
Technology has introduced complex capabilities for information sharing, yet has brought 
complexity in protecting that information (Anderson 2006). According to Ko & Dorantes 
(2006), information security breaches have been increasing in recent years. The impact of 
such breaches affects different prospects of the financial, reputational and private natures 
of an exposed organisation and may lead to further vulnerability issues (Anderson 2006). 
Cavusoglu et al (Cavusoglu 2005) also suggest that there have been dramatic increases in 
the number of IT security breaches in recent years, making ICT security a major concern 
in ICT management. Consequences may include data corruption, data loss, privacy loss, 
downtime, fraud and loss of public confidence (ITU, 2003).  
A security risk occurs when a security vulnerability is associated with an exploit. For 
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example, buffer overflow in an operating system application is a vulnerability that can be 
associated with a hacker’s knowledge strengthened by appropriate tools to generate 
access (i.e. an exploit to compromise a Web server) (ITU, 2003). 
Associated with the growing threats, increased security measures have become the 
primary concern in the internal development of organisations over any other information 
technology related field (Luftman, 2004), triggering a set of preventive considerations 
that need considerable time and effort on the part of the organisation in order to protect its 
assets as much as possible. 
According to NIST (NIST 2002) an effective risk management process should protect not 
only the organisation’s ICT assets but also its ability to perform its mission. Although 
effective risk management and security processes should involve decision makers in 
information security management and operations, there is little research, as well as lack 
of best practice, on what aspects decision makers should base their security-related 
decisions (Schroeder, 2005). Accordingly, the risk management process must be treated 
primarily as an essential management function of the organisation rather than a technical 
function carried out by the IT experts who operate and manage the IT system in the 
organisation (Stoneburner, 2002). 
After the numerous security breaches over the last decade, businesses are beginning to 
share cyber threat and other data security information but this has been met with some 
regulatory resistance. Regulators had a concern that cyber threat information would be 
similar to competitive information such as pricing and market strategy and would 
therefore violate antitrust regulations. However, the Justice Department recently ruled 
that the ability to share this information would not violate the regulations. Cyber threats 
and information security breaches are becoming more of a concern and allowing 
businesses to share such information should prevent and mitigate attacks and loss of 
information in the future (Wyatt, 2014). 
There is a perception that information security is a task solely for the IT department in a 
major business or government but, with the growing importance of information and its 
parallel growth in importance, more focus needs to be placed on security at the larger 
organisational level. 
2.1.1.1 CIA Loss 
Information security triad Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (CIA) loss is another 
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consequence of sharing sensitive information. Janczewski and Fu (2010) asserted that 
both organisations and individuals have suffered enormous loss from social engineering 
attacks. However, the threat is constantly overlooked because awareness about this loss is 
currently low. As a result, the password sharing problem can potentially lead to 
significant loss of assets for both organisations and individuals. The table below shows 
the potential damage to the information security triad for both organisations and 
individuals (Figure 1):  
 
Figure 1: Password sharing threats against information security 
Password sharing is considered a dangerous habit as it contributes greatly to information 
security violations specifically on confidentiality. The consequences that might result 
from breaching confidentiality are quite drastic and can take the form of identity theft, 
sensitive information disclosure and unauthorised access to confidential information. 
Identity theft is a serious crime that merits due consideration and adequate prevention and 
combating (Chawki and Wahab, 2006). Typically, performing identity theft attacks on 
individuals involves collecting information about the victims over the Internet. 
Aggregation is performed in the second stage and gaining access at the final stage. 
However, conducting social engineering attacks and obtaining the password of the 
targeted person does not require performing the above lengthy procedure in certain 
environments where password sharing is permitted. Similarly, counterfeit or stolen 
vendor or employee ID can give access to a secure location where the attacker can then 
obtain access to confidential information (Newman, 2006) and therefore confidentiality 
of the information security triad is compromised. As a result, people whose identities 
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have been stolen can spend months or years and a lot of money cleaning up the mess 
generated by the thieves’ exploitation of their good name and credit record (Chawki and 
Wahab, 2006). 
The term integrity in terms of information security means that data may be altered or 
modified only by an authorised user. Applying this definition to password sharing will 
demonstrate the huge threat that can result from integrity violation. This can be seen 
when someone with an admin account shares his password with his colleagues. The threat 
of having access privilege may result in the modification of sensitive information that 
should only be accessed by limited and authorised users. In addition, when only 
authorised users store information on some digital devices, that information should 
remain secure and preserved on its integrity, and if that information requires changes or 
modifications, changes are allowed to be done by only those authorised to do so.  
Preventing legitimate users from accessing the system is another primary target for 
hackers. This hacking activity is known as a denial of service attack. Knowing the target 
system password can allow complete control over the system. This can increase the 
chance of changing the legitimate user’s password and consequently prohibiting system 
access. Similarly, triggering the distributed denial of service attack on an organisational 
level could benefit the social vulnerability of sharing passwords. Such attacks, that 
attempt to deny computer and network resources to legitimate users, will have a 
significant impact on the information security triad (Newman, 2006). 
2.1.1.2 Social Engineering Attacks 
Social engineering is a technique that aims to break into a system and is where the 
attacker manipulates people instead of technology to bypass the security mechanism 
(Hadnagy, 2010). This can be illustrated by the ability of a social engineering attack to 
compromise authentication and consequently jeopardise the security triad. 
Researchers suggest that every information system should have deterrence, prevention, 
detection, response, and recovery security measures in order to have a comprehensive 
protection of its assets and avoid cybercrime occurring. It is important, however, that 
security measures should include both social and technical measures (Mwakalinga & 
Kowalski, 2011).This is due to the fact that hackers use both social and technical 
measures in attacking or in gathering information before the attacks (Mwakalinga & 
Kowalski, 2011).  
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Sharing sensitive information, including passwords, is a social vulnerability to a system. 
Social engineering is a highly attractive method of gaining access to sensitive and 
valuable information. The ability to perform such an attack is relatively easy as opposed 
to the conventional methods such as technical vulnerabilities or system penetration 
methods (Hinson, 2008). The Phishing attack is one of the best known attacks in the field 
of social engineering. Phishing involves the use of emails or malicious websites for 
attacking purposes. There are some other attacks under the social engineering attacks’ 
umbrella such as scareware, rogueware, and ransomware attacks (Koch et al, 2012). Due 
to the decrease in the effectiveness of technical-based attacks as technological security 
solutions are gradually being adopted by many users and organisations (Janczewski and 
Fu, 2010), the alternative social vulnerability threat will be further utilised by hackers 
who try to gain unauthorised access to the system. 
Social engineering is a major concern for organisations due to its effective results in 
compromising a system by exploiting users (Newbould and Furnell, 2009). These are 
challenging not only to individuals and organisations but also to the law enforcement 
community. Social engineering attacks are more challenging to manage since they depend 
on human behaviour and involve taking advantage of vulnerable employees. Therefore, 
an exploit may lead to a major breach to an organisation whereby the social engineer can 
have complete control of the system, allowing privilege escalation or launching a denial 
of service attack (Liu and Cheng, 2009). Businesses today must utilise a combination of 
technology solutions and user awareness to help protect corporate information 
(Dimensional Research, 2011). 
The figure below (Figure 2) depicts the potential risk of exploitations and the impacts 
when information is shared: 
 
Figure 2: Potential risk exploitations and impacts when information is shared 
35 
2.1.2 Human Factors in Information Security 
According to numerous studies in this field (CSFI, 2010), effective information security 
may be impeded by the so-called human factor. Deloitte (2005) maintains that employees 
are the main hindrance to effective information security policies and standards. 
Woodhouse (2007) maintains that the better employees are at applying the controls, the 
more secure the organisation will be, as even the best designed technical controls and 
procedures will be of limited value if the staff involved do not understand why they have 
been implemented and what they aim to accomplish. 
Staff-caused risk is recognised as being high on the list of security risks (CSI, 2006), for 
example in the form of unintentional or malicious misconduct or misconfiguration of the 
organisation’s machines, resulting in mostly (73%) of the unsophisticated cyber-attacks 
according to a recent report by 7Safe UK (2010). Direct losses are usually large, in 
addition to immeasurable indirect damage. 
According to ReedSmith (2010), employees are identified as a major source of identity 
theft risk in two major studies: Kroll Global Fraud Report - Annual Edition 2009/2010 
and Verizon Business RISK Team, 2009 Data Breach Investigations Report. 
Furthermore, ReedSmith has advised on over 150 data breach incidents over the past 5 
years and employees were players and/or victims in most incidents. ReedSmith showed 
that more than 20% of breaches were caused by employees, 50% of whom were IT 
administrators and 50% were end-users. About 2/3 of such breaches were deliberate 
whereas 1/3 were accidental, resulting in: 
 Abuse of system access/privileges; 
 Violation of PC/email/Web-use policies; 
 Violation of other security policies;  
 Embezzlement. 
When the cause of a breach is internal, the number of records compromised almost 
triples, compared to that of external breaches. It also takes much longer and is harder to 
detect internal breaches. The consequences can range from service availability failures to 
leak or loss of confidential data (ReedSmith, 2010). 
2.1.3 Insider Threats 
Although every organisation defines its insider threat according to its own core business, 
the following are some definitions of the insider threat towards information security. 
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“An insider is a trusted entity that is given the power to violate one or more rules in a 
given security policy. Enforcement mechanisms are not applied against those trusted 
users. The insider threat occurs when a trusted entity abuses that power” (Bishop, 2005, 
p. 78). 
 “The threat is attributed to legitimate users who abuse their privileges, and given their 
familiarity and proximity to the computational environment, can easily cause significant 
damage or losses” (Chinchani, 2005, p. 1). 
Insider threat is one of the biggest issues that information security systems face today. An 
organisation’s employees can pose a threat where they have almost a complete 
knowledge about the network design and security measures used, as well as the sensitive 
information that they access to accomplish their routine job. The threat is apparent and 
the security measures applied become weak as long as a human being is involved. The 
loss that results from the insider threat can have a big impact on the organisation in terms 
of finance, plans and strategies, disclosure, reputation, and sensitive information sharing 
(Munshi, 2012) but the insider threats remain inadequately addressed by organisations 
and hence it will be a growing concern over coming years (Potts, 2012).  
Of course, information security can never be completely effective. Someone working 
from within the system has a unique opportunity to steal information from behind many 
of the security protocols. Edward Snowden is a prime example of this type of threat. 
Whether history will label him whistleblower or traitor remains to be seen but, regardless, 
he worked from behind NSA’s considerable security to take information and make it 
public. Due to his assignment to create backups of immense amounts of data, he had 
almost a free reign to make copies of the information and hand them over to the press. No 
amount of computer or physical security can safeguard information from someone who 
has a legitimate access to it. Developing better background check procedures and 
employee outreach has been put forward as the most effective method to deal with 
insiders (NPR, 2014). 
Insider threat is differs from the outsider threat where the opportunity to access the 
network assets is legally authorised for the insider. However, the insider threat plays a 
significant role to build up the outsider threat by using its privileges to access any 
sensitive information that seem interesting to the outsider. The damage can also exist 
when an ex-employee has background knowledge about the network design which 
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increases the chances of a breach by an outsider (Li, 2005). 
There are different approaches that can reduce the occurrence of the insider threat 
according to several researchers (Pfleeger &Stolfo, 2009), (Guido & Brooks, 2013), 
(Alawneh, 2012) and (Colwill, 2009). Those approaches vary according to domain and 
are shown in the table below (Pfleeger &Stolfo, 2009). 
Table 1 - Applying a framework for responding to insider threats (Pfleeger &Stolfo, 2009) 
 Organisation System Individual Environment 
Detection  
Embedded 
decoys, Watchful 
Monitoring 
  
Prevention 
Create 
organisational 
policy 
Embed 
organisational 
policy 
User training, 
incentives, 
reminders, 
access control 
Remind users of 
legal implications 
of their actions 
and of costs to 
organisation 
Mitigation Update related policies    
Punishment    Apply legal punishments 
Remediation Update related policies    
One of the biggest issues that affect information security protection from the insider 
threat phenomena is the cultural behaviour background as it is difficult to mitigate this 
threat (Crossler et al, 2013). According to Colwill (2009) in order to examine the insider 
threat, national and regional culture should be taken into consideration as it is has an 
impact on attitudes and effectiveness of levels of information protection. This is apparent 
when conducting business since every region has its own style for doing business. He 
also asserts that practices prohibited in the Western world, for instance the giving of 
substantial gifts (namely bribes), may be a normal activity and accepted behaviour in 
some regions where the wheels of business have to be “oiled” (Colwill, 2009) As a result, 
culture can impede the security measures applied and hence can damage the organisation. 
2.1.4 Privacy Issues in ICT 
Advances in ICT infrastructures have opened up new dimensions in communication and 
virtual connectivity. It is now easy to access, share, store, replicate and even manipulate 
information and images using ICT. The technologies involved in ICT have reduced the 
effort and time needed to communicate, and this is no doubt a welcome development for 
many people. Yet, and as Olanreqaju et al. (2013) observe, authentication and protection 
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of much of the information shared through ICT services remain a concern not only to 
individuals but also to corporate bodies, non-governmental organisations and 
governments. The risk of hackers and intruders is ever lurking, and there is a possibility 
that they can access confidential information, use it, alter it or even delete vital 
information. The effectiveness of ICT services therefore calls for effective technology 
whose security and privacy can be guaranteed. Yet, in a world where any security issues 
are being challenged, it is unclear if absolute privacy in ICT services will ever be 
achieved. The absence of privacy guarantees is even worse considering the absence of a 
legal framework which would provide detractive or punitive measures to perpetrators 
who breach people’s privacy.  
The concept of privacy has been defined variously as “an individual condition of life 
characterised by exclusion from publicity” (Britz, 1996); “the right to be let alone” 
(Moore, 2008), or “the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions, 
which include decisions about intimate access, intimate information, and intimate 
actions” (Inness, 1992). A right to privacy, therefore, can be understood as a person’s 
right to control inner spheres of their personal information, body, powers and capacities. 
As Moore (2008) indicates, “it is a right to limit public access to oneself and to 
information about oneself. In the United Kingdom (UK) today, the right to privacy is 
represented in the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, which has its basis in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) article 8 (Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC), 2011).Despite the existence of the Human Rights Act (HRA), there 
have been concerns in the UK that the law has lagged behind, especially in the wake of 
changes and advancements in ICT services (EHRC, 2011). Consequently, is has been 
argued that the state, which has the mandate to uphold people’s and organisation’s right 
to privacy, is failing in fulfilling that mandate.  
2.1.4.1 Sensitive Information Disclosure 
People and institutions can share sensitive information either knowingly or unknowingly. 
The sharing of sensitive information (e.g. name, address, financial information, health 
records etc.) is commonplace, particularly when dealing with institutions such as banks, 
government agencies, hospitals, institutions of learning or insurance companies. Once a 
person gives out their confidential information, they do so with the expectation that the 
recipient body will not disclose such information to third parties. Yet, it has been seen 
that such institutions are prone to breaches of privacy, where some of the information 
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stored in their computer databases is lost, compromised, or altered. Olanrewaju et al 
(2013) for example note that Medical Identity Theft (MIDT) is one of the most common 
crimes in the healthcare sector. MIDT is defined as a specific type of identity theft that 
occurs when a person uses someone else’s personal health identifiable information. Such 
identifiable information includes the names, addresses, birthdates, security numbers and 
healthcare providers of patients. MIDT (especially in the US) has been conducted by 
organised and sophisticated hacking groups who access electronic medical records stored 
in hospital or insurance company servers. The hackers then use MIDT to obtain 
prescription drugs and medical drugs, amongst other things, using patients’ names and 
details (Olanrewaju et al, 2013). 
Governments also lose confidential information entrusted to them by private citizens and 
organisations. In the UK, for example, in October 2007 HM Revenue and Customs lost 
two computer discs (EHRC, 2011). The discs contained names, addresses, bank details 
and national insurance numbers of families who had filed benefit claims. Unlike hacking, 
which is often an external criminal attack, the discs were lost through the negligent 
practice of officers who had sent the discs via a courier service to the National Audit 
Office. It later turned out that the officer was neither authorised to access the files nor 
send them. It was argued that the loss of data was not only negligence on the officer’s 
part, but also by senior management (EHRC, 2011).  
Ways through which involuntary revelation of information and passwords occur include 
theft or loss (where unsecured paper files, electronic media, portable electronic devices 
and computers are lost or stolen) or through unauthorised access to insecurely transmitted 
or stored personal identity information (PII) and sensitive information (this can happen if 
files are stored in a publicly accessible ‘place’). Additionally, passwords can often be 
hacked because hackers are able to take advantage of missing operating system updates 
or security patches. In some cases, users make their passwords too simple thus making 
hacking an easier undertaking. Furthermore, virus infection on computers can make PII 
inaccessible, meaning that even important information about people stored in computer 
databases is rendered unusable. Additionally, insecure disposal of data-containing devices 
is also a major way through which people and institutions inadvertently share sensitive 
information (UC Santa Cruz, 2014). A case in point is when an institution of learning 
sold two hard drives on eBay without wiping the data. In the UK, cases of lost 
Universal Serial Bus (USB) discs containing sensitive information about people in 
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several institutions have been reported (EHRC, 2011). It is also possible that a 
compromise of contractors’ computers can expose PII.  
In addition to the involuntary disclosure of information and passwords, UC Santa Cruz 
(2014) observes that people unintentionally reveal their passwords by replying to 
phishing emails or clicking on links in emails. An example is when a faculty physician 
“unknowingly provided the user name and password of his email account in response to 
an email message that appeared to come from the university’s internal computer servers” 
(Miaoulis, 2009). Other scenarios that may involve sharing of sensitive information 
include online shopping (where the identity of the purchaser needs to be verified) and 
registering or subscribing to specific online services (usually a person’s email address and 
screen name are required). Some sites may also ask for personal information that includes 
age, nationality, gender, physical address, photos etc. There are also competitions that 
require the competitor to fill in their demographic details, personal interests and other 
types of personal data. Other examples include virtual worlds (including online games), 
which require a person to provide personal details during registration (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2014).  
2.1.4.2 Password Sharing 
A study on banking and security (Singh et al, 2007), conducted in Australia, has shown 
that the practice of password sharing does not conform to standards. The study reveals 
that password sharing occurs in different scenarios, such as with family relationships as 
an expression of trust, remote indigenous populations as the only feasible way of getting 
banking services that are far from major population centres, and with people with 
disabilities who need the help of others with their banking. The authors recommended 
using user-centred security approaches and emerging work on security in the 
organisational context. They argue that security design should consider the social and 
cultural practice. Otherwise, users would have to be individually kept under surveillance 
in the workplace, which is not feasible. Ignoring the social and cultural design of security 
solutions may lead to a reduction in security. 
In a similar study in the US by Stanton et al (2005), sharing account information with a 
friend is one of the ten most extreme end user behaviours. The same study showed that 
23% of respondents sometimes reveal their passwords to members of their work groups, 
7% share their passwords with someone in their company but outside their work group, 
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and 4.1% share their passwords with someone outside their company. Stanton et al (2005) 
considered that user behaviours are crucial for any user-related information security 
policy. The authors maintained that end user behaviours intertwine inextricably with the 
overall effectiveness of security. They therefore suggested having a systematic view of 
end user behaviour in order to allow accurate auditing and assessment of this behaviour in 
order to be considered in effective security. 
A study in a Swedish public nursing centre (Harnesk and Lindström, 2011) showed that 
users at the nursing centre had a record of jeopardising privacy of care takers by sharing 
passwords. This eventually led to other users developing harmful security habits over a 
long period of time and avoided taking responsibility for their own user credentials; 
instead they used the competencies and skills of others to log on to domain-specific 
applications. The authors argued that discipline and ability control the main aspects of 
behaviour in an organisation as a result of the existing culture and the selected security 
management approach. They suggested that security managers better recognised how 
different security behaviours affect the outcome of inscribed security. They maintained, 
however, that further research into the domain of security behaviours was needed. 
Chryssanthou et al (2011) propose that organisational culture may need to be addressed in 
security management procedures. The authors argued that an organisation with a culture 
that allows its staff to share confidential information amongst each other, without proper 
authorisation, would certainly find it extremely difficult to prevent its staff from sharing 
their usernames and passwords. The authors suggest making sanctions in order to prevent 
and control the information sharing issue in such organisations. 
In a survey study, Alarifi et al (2012) showed that information security awareness in 
Saudi Arabia is relatively low, causing a high level of information security attacks in the 
country. The authors referred that to the tribal nature of Saudi culture. The study showed 
that the general public was either unaware of the recommended security procedures or 
deliberately chose not to abide by them. The study concluded that the most appropriate 
methods of disseminating information security awareness were through web portals and 
newspapers because these methods address the problems of distance and strict cultural 
controls. 
Al-Hamar et al (2010) cites several incidents of Qatari citizens who fell victim to 
phishing attacks because of different factors such as culture, country-specific factors, 
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interests, beliefs, religion and personal characteristics. The author also asserts that 
information security awareness was imperative in order to mitigate the risk of a social 
engineering attack.  
2.1.4.3 Impact of Sharing Sensitive Information 
The impact of sharing sensitive information can range from harmless (but nevertheless 
disturbing), to costly consequences which may affect one’s financial wellbeing, personal 
integrity, and some may even lead to criminal charges. 
2.1.4.3.1 Spam 
One of the most harmful consequences of sharing sensitive information is spam mail 
being delivered to one’s inbox (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014). Spam is a generic 
name used to refer to electronic junk mail. This kind of mail can be delivered to one’s 
email inbox, through instant messaging, Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) or Short 
Message Service (SMS). The latter two are delivered to a person’s mobile phone 
particularly in cases where their mobile phone numbers have been revealed to third 
parties. Spam messages can contain information related to marketing of products or 
services, while some may contain fraudulent or offensive material; others can contain 
computer viruses or phishing content (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014).  
2.1.4.3.2 Fraud 
Internet-based fraud is another consequence of sharing sensitive information. Fraudsters 
seek personal details from targets and those details are later used for deceptive 
undertakings, including obtaining money using their targets’ PII. Closely related to 
Internet-based fraud is identity theft, which the Commonwealth of Australia (2014) 
defines as a “type of fraud that involves stealing money or gaining benefit by the 
perpetrator pretending to be someone else” (p. 6). The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD, 2008) defines ID theft as occurring when “a party 
acquires, transfers, possesses, or uses personal information of a natural or legal person in 
an authorised manner, with the intent to commit, or in connection with, fraud or other 
crimes” (p. 2). Some of the ways through which ID theft is committed include the use of 
malware, spam, phishing and hacking. After obtaining PII, the perpetrators then misuse 
the victims’ existing accounts (e.g. credit card accounts, Internet accounts such as email 
accounts, Facebook and other social networking sites), medical insurance accounts, bank 
accounts, and telephone accounts amongst others. The perpetrator could also open new 
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accounts using the victims’ personal details. When this happens, all the billing for the 
new accounts are placed in the victims’ account. That means that they lose money. It is 
also possible for perpetrators to use stolen identities to commit other frauds, which 
include obtaining government benefits, medical services or supplies, or even giving it to 
the police if stopped for a crime (OECD, 2008).  
2.1.4.3.3 Scam 
Another consequence of sharing sensitive information is that people can become a target 
of many scams. Scams are often disguised as lotteries, for example the targeted person 
receives an email stating that he or she has won a prize and, to claim the prize, they are 
required to pay a small fee. Scams can also be implemented as advance fee schemes (also 
known as Nigerian 419). Here, the scammer offers to leave a substantial amount of 
money to the target, but he or she is first required to pay some fee to transfer the claimed 
money from a foreign account. Another type of scam is mule, which is a form of money 
laundering activity where victims are involved in transferring huge amounts of money 
between accounts. The victim, if caught by the authorities, may face criminal charges. 
Perpetrators of such crimes also use phishing (emails sent from spoofed or falsified 
emails). Phishing is a major source of identity theft (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014). 
Industrial espionage is also a likely consequence of disclosure of sensitive information 
especially when the perpetrator is able to access trade secrets or competitive advantage 
information about a corporate entity (Granger, 2010). 
2.1.4.4 Law Enforcement 
The challenge of identity theft (which is assumed to be performed by exploiting the social 
vulnerability of passwords and sensitive information sharing) can be extended to law 
enforcement too. The investigator must provide rigorous evidence to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the suspect was the person who was in control of the device when 
the actions took place. This can be highly contestable, particularly when the case is 
related to passwords and tokens as they could have been obtained and used by someone 
else (Jones & Martin, 2010). 
 Although laws concerning digital security and authorised access to systems are available 
in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region, the difficulty arises from ability to apply 
these laws. This is based on that information-sharing leaves little evidence when 
associated with cybercrime. As an illustration, the UAE Federal Law No. (2) of 2006 on 
44 
The Prevention of Information Technology Crimes states that unauthorised access to a 
system results in imprisonment and a fine or either (UAE, 2006). However, Abu Dhabi 
Police Department has been recently faced by a case of fraud, theft and seizure of a police 
sergeant who was made redundant in 1999 after being diagnosed health-wise unfit to 
service. The prosecutors accused the former policeman of breaking into the electronic 
system of the Ministry of Interior as an official and promoting himself to captain and to 
major eight months after using the brigadier’s password. Having no evidence of breaking 
into the system, the judge could not reach a verdict to accuse the policeman of being 
guilty on the grounds of the abovementioned law. The defence lawyer has pleaded the 
defendant not guilty and someone else set him up by tampering with his details in the 
system (Alkaabi & Maple, 2013). 
Overall, the sharing of sensitive information makes people all the more prone to scams, 
fraud and other major security breaches on their person or the institutions they represent. 
It makes privacy harder to achieve because hackers and identity thieves are often on the 
lookout to find weaknesses that exist in ICT infrastructures or social weakness in their 
environments. The targeted population (albeit unknowingly or ignorantly) also share their 
information by replying to phishing emails, carelessly storing or discarding data, or 
simply not taking enough precautions. Organisations, charged with guarding people’s 
private information, also have infrastructural weaknesses, which sometimes lead to the 
sharing of information belonging to thousands of people whose personal information is 
stored in their databases. 
2.1.4.5 Information Security Standards and Guidelines 
With the fast incorporation of technology comes the responsibility for the security of all 
of this data. Customer data is perhaps the most vulnerable as the risk of identity theft is a 
major concern for most individuals who entrust their information to a business. 
Information security standards have been adopted by information technology 
professionals to provide uniform methods. This has become increasingly important as 
sharing information over the Internet has become more commonplace, as well as vital, for 
business and government. There are different information security standards and 
guidelines worldwide which have been developed to reduce information security risks 
and maintain acceptable levels of information security compliance. In order to provide an 
acceptable security level, security standards address the minimum mandatory rules that 
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should be followed by organisations (Al-Azazi, 2008).Below are some of these standards 
(these standards have been customised by ADSIC to a develop national policy for the 
UAE) and their ability to secure the organisation’s assets:  
2.1.4.5.1 GAISP 
The Generally Accepted Information Security Principles (GAISP) was developed after a 
1990 report written by the National Research Council on computer vulnerability (GAISP, 
2003). The report, entitled “Computers at Risk”, suggested a Committee be formed to 
provide overarching guidance to public and private organisations and professionals akin 
to those provided by the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. GAISP introduced 
three levels of information security principles: pervasive (few, rarely changing) such as 
those of ethics and awareness; broad functional (more detailed); and most detailed 
(Siponen & Willison, 2009). The GAISP consists of the following pervasive principles:  
 Accountability Principle  
 Awareness Principle  
 Ethics Principle 
 Multidisciplinary Principle  
 Proportionality Principle  
 Integration Principle  
 Timeliness principle  
 Reassessment Principle  
 Democracy Principle 
2.1.4.5.2 COBIT 
The Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) was another 
early Information Technology framework and was first developed in 1996. The focus of 
this set of rules was to fully integrate the overall business plans with the IT standards 
necessary (Hardy, 2006). This is primarily important for those businesses or government 
agencies which rely on up-to-date information on a consistent basis (FAQ, 2014). COBIT 
provides metrics and models by which to measure the effectiveness and security of the 
business goals (Von Solms, 2005). COBIT is used by a number of businesses including 
ORACLE, Sun Microsystems, and several US government agencies as well as 
governments around the world (Case Studies, 2014).  
COBIT has 34 objectives, which have been arranged under four groups (Lainhart, 2001; 
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Hadden, 2002; Abu-Musa, 2009): 
 Planning and Organisation  
 Acquisition and Implementation 
 Delivery and Support 
 Monitoring 
2.1.4.5.3 ISO 27000 
ISO 27000 consists of several information security best practices such as: information 
security management, risks, controls etc. These are designed to reduce the information 
security risks based on global perspectives.  
ISO 27001 consists of 11 domains (ISO/IEC-27001:2005) as follows: 
 Security policy  
 Organisation of information security  
 Asset management  
 Human resources security  
 Physical and environmental security 
 Communications and operations management 
 Access control  
 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance  
 Information security incident management  
 Business continuity management  
 Compliance  
The above domains are also listed in ISO/IEC 27002 code of practice, however, the 
ISO/IEC 27002 only provides guidance and uses words like “may” and “should”, 
whereas the ISO/IEC 27001 is a set of requirements of information security management 
systems (ISMS) and uses words such as “must” and “shall” (Calder, 2006). 
ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 are designed for use in organisations of all sizes 
targeting the managerial parts of information security (Calder, 2009). 
Many of the testing and auditing procedures measure the information security compliance 
against standards such as the ISO 27000 series. The most recent version, ISO 27002, 
recommends information security system designs. The goal is to prevent “gaps” in 
security. An assessment against ISO 27002 standards can help businesses identify and 
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plan for remediation steps to comply with the ISO standards (Layton, 2006). 
2.2 Discussion 
A general consideration of information security is the ability of organisations to protect 
their information. International information security standards such as ISO/IEC 27001 
and ISO/IEC 27002 noticeably neglect the role of culture in information security and do 
not allude to any culture-related considerations. Furthermore, the ISO certification does 
not necessitate the implementation of the standard. The IT Baseline Protection Manual, a 
security standard for IT systems, also does not refer to culture in its descriptions of 
security measures. BITS (The Framework for Managing Technology Risk for IT Service 
Provider Relationships) does not scrutinise any cultural impact on information security 
(Glaser, 2009). Andrew Jaquith (2010) of Forrester Research asserts that successful 
protection of sensitive data cannot be accomplished only by following a standardised set 
of guidelines (Search Security, 2010). Moreover, the ISO standard (ISO 27005) does not 
offer any specific methodology for information security risk management but leaves the 
organisation to decide on the suitable approach to risk management depending on the 
scope of its industry sector, ISMS and context of risk management (ISO 27005). Ross 
(2010) recognised these weaknesses in risk management methodology of the ISO 27005 
standard and suggested using fuzzy mathematics theory to overcome these weaknesses. 
Siponen and Willison (2009) analysed BS7799, BS ISO/IEC17799: 2000, 
GASPP/GAISP, and the SSE-CMM. The paper claimed that BS7799, BS ISO/IEC17799: 
2000, GASPP/GAISP and the SSE-CMM were too generic and they had universal scope. 
The authors proposed that these standards do not consider the differences between 
organisations as they normally have different security requirements. 
Furthermore, although the availability of several standards provides organisations with a 
wider margin of choice, it brings difficulties to the organisations in understanding and 
selecting which one to use (Al-Azazi, 2008). Tejay (2005) asserted that having many 
standards and the need for the organisation to adopt a minimum set of standards to cover 
its maximum IS security needs, defies the concept of their efficiency. 
Kluge and Sambasivam (2008) researched several IS standards, namely, the ISO 27000 
family, COBIT, Information Security Forum and the IT Baseline Protection Manual by 
the German Federal Office for IT security. The authors claimed that ISO 27001 had a 
process approach to security that defined operational procedures instead of describing 
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security technology. Höne and Eloff (2002) stated that the organisation should not 
exclusively rely upon security standards for guidance because of their lack of 
comprehensive coverage and their tendency to address the processes needed for 
successfully implementing the information security policy. 
2.3 Conclusion 
Information security issues are manifold. The lack of information security awareness 
represented in end user behaviour and the cultural and social impact lead to a breach to 
both organisations and individuals. 
Confidentiality of account details and the privacy of the users are significant for 
protecting against identity theft. Credential privacy is an integral part of authentication, 
and that should remain private to the account owner in order to remain secure and 
protected. 
Privacy is considered one of the most important needs of people in the West (Feng & 
Hughes, 2009). However, it is given less importance in other cultures, such as Arab 
culture, which is characterised by trust and loyalty (Obeidat et al., 2012). Arab employees 
give more loyalty to their managers than to the organisational goals (Obeidat et al., 2012). 
A user might share his or her account password without even realising the threat. 
Information security standards and guidelines have failed to consider the role of culture in 
information security, Therefore, a wider scope, which considers culture, is needed in 
order to recognise its importance. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF 
CULTURE IN ICT SERVICES 
As seen in the previous chapter a wider consideration of culture is needed in order to 
realise its importance in information security. This chapter provides an overview of 
culture and ICT across different countries including the Arab World. The chapter also 
provides an analysis of the organisational culture and its role in creating an information 
security culture that aims to enhance information security awareness. 
3.1 Culture and ICT 
Security of information is meaningless without an understanding of how the information 
and communication technology (ICT) affects countries and cultures around the world. 
The United States and the West in general have been leading the adoption of information 
and communication technology for a long time but the rest of the world is catching up. 
Countries around the world are seeing extraordinary benefits in their culture from 
information and communication technology. 
Global integration has been happening for years but the widespread use of information 
and communication technology, such as the Internet, has advanced this at a frenetic pace. 
Countries once separated by oceans are now instantly connected using wireless video 
conferences. Beyond the business and economic benefits, this interconnectedness has had 
a dramatic impact on society in general. Supporters of the increase in information and 
communication technology have called it a non-return economic pathway (Ramos & 
Ballel, 2008). 
The growth of the Internet has had the greatest impact of all the information and 
communication technologies. Recently, social media has been the darling of the Internet 
and it shows no signs of disappearing anytime soon. Twitter, Facebook, and the other 
hundreds of social media websites now available estimate one out of every four people in 
the world are active users, leading to an 18% increase over the past year alone (Web 
Users in the Middle East Emphasize Social Networking, 2013).  
Culture may impede IT growth, whereas inappropriate consideration of the cultural 
aspects may result in unfortunate outcomes of IT adoption (Glaser 2009). Dutta et al 
(2003) argue that IT development faces significant intangible challenges of cultural 
attributes. In this respect, studies have shown that countries with high information 
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dissemination capacities are those with high uncertainty avoidance, high collectivism, 
high future orientation, low in-group collectivism and low gender equality practices. In 
addition, national culture values seem more appropriate predictors of information 
dissemination capacity than national culture practices (Glaser 2009).  
The powers of the Internet and the ability to crowdsource are not only used by law 
enforcement and business in the Western World. With a complex scam of promising 
people money to work from home or in the “import/export” business, criminals are able 
to dupe innocent victims in the United States and other western countries into doing one 
of the most dangerous aspects of the job—receiving stolen goods and laundering them 
back into the system through a legitimate service such as Western Union. Other reports of 
criminals using crowdsourcing techniques involve tricking unwitting accomplices in the 
United States, Britain and Europe to solve CAPTCHA puzzles in return for access to free 
pornographic material. The puzzles were presented as a type of contest but, in fact, the 
puzzles were being used to break into Yahoo email accounts (Goodman, 2011).  
Criminals around the world are also taking advantage of the increasingly easy access to 
technology. The criminals send out countless emails to get a few respondents. The story 
is usually something along the lines of a wealthy family, politician, or businessperson is 
stuck in troubling circumstances and wishes to leave the country with as much money as 
possible. They need a partner outside the country and, if you are willing to help, they will 
give you a large portion of their wealth. Reports vary on how much the criminals are 
making but a recent article in the United Kingdom estimates some scammers are making 
up to £250,000 (about $400,000) a year (Jones & Hill, 2010). 
In February 2014, six British citizens were charged with a new version of the scam 
targeting dating services (Six charged in connection with alleged Internet dating scam, 
2014). Scammers create fake profiles on dating services and develop relationships with 
targets. Once they have an established relationship, usually some type of tragedy happens 
- a medical bill, a sick relative or a serious accident that they cannot pay themselves. Or 
perhaps they simply need the money to book a trip to visit the target. The target sends the 
money willingly since they believe they are in a real relationship (Dating and Romance 
Scams, 2014). Only after the target has sent large sums of money and the relationship 
ends do they suspect a scam. 
Information technology and security has become a major element of our daily life. We 
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shop online, email, pay bills and send other personal information over the Internet on a 
daily basis. We trust that the businesses on the other side of that transaction have 
embraced security measures that incorporate the international standards such as ISO 
27000. However, this is not always the case and our information could be compromised.  
3.1.2 The United States 
The United States has seen tremendous growth in the use of technology over the last three 
decades. Computers went from a novelty item to an item that is present in most homes, 
with 76.5% of all households having at least one computer (File, 2013).  
This growth in Internet connectivity in the United States has not been an even 
distribution. The discrepancies in computer ownership and Internet access reflect the 
racial and poverty level breakdown in the United States. In 2011, 76.2% of non-Hispanic 
White households, 82.7% of Asian, 58.3% of Hispanic, 56.9% of Black households 
reported accessing the Internet from home (File, 2013). The lack of infrastructure is the 
main hurdle to expanding Internet access in the United States. Broadband Internet access 
connects 2/3rds of Americans but the lack of infrastructure leaves just 10% of tribal lands 
connected and the high cost leaves those with household incomes of less than $20,000 
with low connectivity rate (Rosen, 2011).  
The increasing use of social media has also had an impact on solving crime. Tip lines, to 
inform the police of a potential suspect or share information about a crime, have existed 
for years - even generating TV shows such as America’s Most Wanted. In April 2012, an 
investigation into a fatal hit and run investigation hit a roadblock. The vehicle could not 
be identified and, without that piece of information, solving the crime was impossible. 
The police department released a photograph of the only piece of the vehicle that 
remained at the scene—a small piece of metal. A popular automotive blog wrote about 
the story and the contributors were able to identify the piece of metal as part of an early 
2000’s Ford F-150 pickup truck. The breakthrough was the key to law enforcement being 
able to identify the suspects who were later convicted (Glynn, 2013). 
Such uses of social media reached a new level during the aftermath of the bombing at the 
2013 Boston Marathon. With a greater scope of both information available from photos 
and videos taken by the crowd as well as a larger population from which to draw both 
time and talent, crowdsourcing was able to add valuable information to the criminal 
investigation. The appeal sent out to the public to send in videos and photographs of the 
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event garnered 13,000 videos and 120,000 photos (Pepitone, 2012). In addition to 
providing police with more evidence, websites like Reddit drew thousands of users to 
compare information presented in photographs of the scenes to identify the paths and 
activities of crowd members. With almost unlimited resources, every lead could be 
followed through the photographic trail (Glynn, 2013).  
In addition to the ability of crowdsourcing to add to criminal investigations such as the 
Boston Marathon bombing, businesses have also turned to social media and 
crowdsourcing for new ideas. One company, Goldcorp, experienced immense benefits 
from allowing free access to its private information (Goodman, 2011). 
The growth of communication technology has also had other societal benefits in the 
United States. The rise of online education has extended university education 
programmes to more non-traditional students than ever before (Moloney & Oakley, 
2010). Enrolment on online courses continues to rise, albeit at a slowing rate for some 
degree programmes. The reputation of online courses and degree programmes is also on 
the rise as they gain a larger foothold in academia. Sixty-seven percent of academic 
professions stated that online courses were the same or superior to traditional classroom 
instruction and 65.5% of Chief Academic Officers see online education as critical to the 
long term strategy of their institution (Lytle, 2011).  
3.1.3 The United Kingdom 
Information and Communication technology has also strengthened its hold in the United 
Kingdom. Connectivity rates in the UK are slightly better than those in the United States 
with just 17% of homes without Internet access. The racial and poverty issues are less 
severe in the connectivity breakdown. A poll of those without access found that 59% of 
those without the Internet at home stated they simply did not feel the need: only 10% 
cited cost as the barrier to connection. The government is active in trying to expand 
coverage to all households, pledging to have at least 2 megabits per second in all homes 
by 2015 (BBC News, 2013). Even without such extension of Internet service, the UK still 
ranks as the eighth most connected country in the world according to the United Nations 
(Kelion, 2013). 
Britons are using the Internet for much the same reasons as Americans. With close to one 
in five non-food items purchased online in the UK, a 19.2% growth in Internet purchases 
in a year (Record online sales over Christmas, 2014). Smartphones are leading the surge 
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in online purchases; there has been a 150% increase in shopping via iPhone and other 
smartphones in the UK. With same day delivery offered by many retailers, online food 
and grocery sales are growing. Twenty one percent of families in the UK have shopped 
online for groceries compared to less than 10% in the rest of the world (Poulter, 2013).  
In 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron announced new plans to require a filtering 
system for those accessing the Internet from an Internet service provider in Britain. The 
system is an “opt-out” filter, which means the default option is for the filter to be 
implemented for all new subscribers. To remove the filter, you must actively opt out by 
calling your Internet service provider to regain full access. While the government has 
stated this was done for the safety of children on the Internet, some have argued this is 
government censorship of the Internet, especially with non-committal answers from 
government officials such as Cameron who stated that he “didn’t think” the filter would 
block access to Fifty Shades of Grey (Taylor, 2013). 
The Internet and other communications technologies are not only used by shoppers in the 
UK, London boasts one of the most sophisticated surveillance systems anywhere in the 
world (Monahan, 2006). The reception to technology has not all been positive however. 
There has not been an appreciable change in crime rates around the city and privacy 
proponents fear the intrusion in the lives of innocent citizens. That being said, the CCTV 
system has aided in solving some crimes; the suicide bombers who struck London’s 
transit system were identified via the CCTV system which aided in the investigation 
(WSJ, 2014). It is estimated that the average Londoner is captured on closed circuit 
television 300 times per day but this is only an estimate as the total number of cameras in 
the city is unknown (Evans, 2012).  
In the information and communication technology realm, is not only the Internet and 
closed circuit videos that have had a major impact on the United Kingdom. In 2006, the 
News of the World, a popular newspaper, came under investigation for illegally tapping 
and pinging the phones of citizens in order to gain information for printed stories. 
Celebrities, the Royal Family and politicians were all targeted via illegal means. As the 
investigation progressed into 2009-2011, even more victims came to light, the telephones 
of family members of fallen soldiers, high-profile news cases such as the murder of a 
young girl, as well as the victims of the London Bombings (discussed above). Telephones 
have, in the main, been considered to be secure—with access to them only given with 
proper warrants and legal paperwork but the evidence from the News of the World 
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scandal shows that stealing information from telephones or pinging a mobile phone to 
track an individual can be done by anyone. Some government officials have called for 
additional regulation but, as of yet, no new laws have been passed in the UK (Halliday, 
2012). 
3.1.4 Australia 
Australia was a relative latecomer to the Internet. Geographical isolation kept the country 
without Internet until 1989 when a satellite connection linked the University of 
Melbourne and the University of Hawaii. Today, Internet connectivity has grown to 
almost universal access. A national survey showed 98% of respondents had Internet 
access and the majority of those people used the Internet on a daily basis. Social network 
usage has a strong foothold in the country with 78% of Australians visiting websites such 
as Facebook (Technology use in Australia, 2013). 
To some degree, the geography of the nation influences the distribution and nature of the 
technology industry, with the majority of industrial production and service industries 
concentrated in the southwest. Agriculture takes place in the temperate zones and in the 
semi-arid regions bordering the large interior desert. Technological communications and 
transportation infrastructure is well developed in Australia, but has not resulted in the 
geographic dispersion of industry and workforce due to the relatively small population 
levels.  
The technological systems that have developed in Australia are the result of management 
and cultural viewpoints inherited from the United Kingdom. In general, the primary 
business influence on Australia until recently was its connection with Britain, which 
remained its principal export market until the late twentieth century. The development of 
British derivative information security systems enhanced the nation’s ability to form trade 
and other types of business relationships with the United States as recent improvements 
in security fostered the process of globalisation. 
Despite the nation’s geographic location, which is far closer to Asia than Europe, the 
technological culture retains primarily a European and American perspective. Until 
recently, there has been significant protectionist legislation to prevent competition in 
Australia from Asian markets. As a result, technological paradigms often focus on the 
perceived benefits of a controlled technological environment rather than on a full free-
market model. In effect, the majority of Australian managers are reluctant to establish 
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ongoing trade and information exchange with Asian markets and businesses due to the 
belief that this will result in a long-term negative effect on their business operations. 
Recent government efforts to end this decades-old management perspective have resulted 
in increased technological contacts with Asia, but the majority of Australian managers 
continue to view Europe, the United States and New Zealand as their primary external 
markets. 
Information security systems structures in Australia are analogous to those in Britain and 
the United States. To a large degree, the information systems that develop in various 
businesses are conditional on their structure, with closer supervisory control retained by 
managers in small businesses than in corporations. Australian corporate managers are 
somewhat responsive to shareholder demands for security in technology, but retain the 
general belief that their primary concern as managers is to ensure that the organisation 
makes a profit. Stakeholder theory, which requires managers to consider the social impact 
of their actions, has not taken hold in Australia, although government regulations often 
place a degree of limitation on managerial decisions when they involve a security concern 
regarding informational infrastructures. As in other industrialised free market nations,as 
businesses grow in size, they are often faced with the difficulty of legacy information 
systems that are inappropriate for the change in circumstances.In many of the long-
established manufacturing businesses in Australia there is a higher degree of resistance to 
altering existing information systems than in the newer and more technologically oriented 
businesses. As a result, the newer industries, which incorporate more recent technologies 
into their business operations, often have more flexible management systems due to the 
lack of legacy management systems. 
Australian management systems inherited the British operational paradigm of a 
hierarchical management structure, which was common throughout the British 
Commonwealth until the middle of the twentieth century. This model was applied to 
larger manufacturing operations such as mining and steel production, with operational 
departments for various tasks and centralised decision-making processes. In this model, 
upper management was responsible for making all decisions. Middle management acted 
as the supervisory intermediary between upper management and workers, and the general 
attitude toward workers was paternalistic. Due its geographic and cultural isolation, 
Australia has been slow to abandon this model in favour of more modern information 
security concepts. 
56 
In the past two decades, the organisational model of many businesses in Australia has 
started to shift away from vertical control towards a more horizontal system that provides 
a greater degree of lateral communication and more direct connections between upper 
management and workers. To some degree, this is in response to the management trends 
in the United Kingdom and the United States for industries using innovative technologies, 
which emphasise new types of organisational structures in order to enhance productivity. 
In this model, the workforce operates as task-oriented teams, with the teams participating 
in setting organisational goals based on their perceived capabilities and the resources 
available. The team leader largely replaces middle management as the supervisory and 
communications nexus between upper management and the workforce. The attitude 
towards workers is based on a partnership perspective, which assumes that all employees 
of a business, regardless of their position, share responsibility for the firm’s success. 
While the majority of Australian managers are willing to embrace these types of 
fundamental management system changes, they are more often found in newer 
information-intensive businesses such as banking, communications and electronic 
commerce rather than in the more traditional types of manufacturing and production 
firms. To some degree, this is the result of inertia in the traditional production sectors, 
which are slow to respond to new management paradigms and perspectives. 
Despite the slow pace of altering management systems, almost 90% of Australia’s 
organisations have experienced significant internal restructuring since the mid-1980s 
(Light, 1999). The management perspective of the nation has shifted away from the 
centralised model of operations to a process that is described as “managed 
decentralisation.” The intent of managed decentralisation is to increase productivity 
without having a negative effect on the workforce. It is the outcome of a combined effort 
of government and key industry leaders to alter management practices in order to make 
Australian business more competitive in the global marketplace. 
In addition, the management system has developed various types of internal incentive and 
award programmes that involve recognition and sometimes merit pay increases or 
bonuses. In industry sectors that involve rapidly changing technologies such as IT, 
Australian businesses also focus on continuous retraining of personnel in order to ensure 
that their skills are commensurate with current technology, which research indicates is an 
important factor in retention. In the IT sector, personnel believe that the opportunity for 
ongoing training in new technologies is more important than a competitive salary. As a 
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result, it is commonplace for Australian management to emphasise training for the 
majority of their workforce, even those that are not deemed to be in critical positions 
(Brave, 1999).  
While access in Australia has grown, Internet censorship has become more commonplace 
in the country. In 2010, plans were announced for a broad Internet filtering of all data 
coming into the country. The legislation would “introduce amendments to the 
Broadcasting Services Act, which will by 2011 require all ISPs to block refused 
classification-rated material hosted on overseas servers.” The “refused classification list” 
was still a work in progress at that time (Tung, 2009). These broad filtering plans were 
abandoned due to criticisms of Internet censorship. However, the idea has been 
transformed into a new “opt-out” Internet filtering system for all Internet service 
providers in the country—much like the one already adopted in the UK. The filtering will 
now be directed at blocking the Interpol list of the “worst of the worst” child abuse 
websites. There is still some tension in Australian politics however, as more conservative 
groups continue to push for mandatory filtering of all pornographic material (Taylor, 
2012). 
Another Internet issue gaining momentum in Australia is the “right to erasure” which 
would give citizens the ability to remove posts to social networks they have made or that 
others have made about them. However, most experts and critics note that unfeasibility of 
enforcement (Right to rub out embarrassing pictures and data posted online floated by 
The Australian Law Reform Commission, 2013). 
3.1.5 The Arab World 
Different aspects of ICT have been widely implemented in developing countries on 
different scales and in different areas. These implementations are mainly adoptions with 
no genuine adaptations to their new environments. These undertakings can be compared 
to the industrial revolution that began in Britain in the 18th century, which was later 
exported to developing countries but still couldn’t be regenerated (Thoburn, 2009). It is 
believed that there were a number of factors, such as population and working capitals, 
which had matured by that time, which contributed to the revolution’s success in the 
West. The same factors were not available to some other, then developing, countries 
including the Arab world, which settled with being industry exporters instead. 
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3.1.5.1 Arab Culture 
It is important to consider the limitations of generalising about 21 states spanning over an 
area of 5.25 million square miles and inhabited by over a 200-million population. 
However, there are a number of characteristics that critical theorists in social sciences 
believe are inherent in Arab culture and society. 
According to Barakat (1993), the apparent features of Arab cultures and society are as 
follows: 
 Social diversity summarised as a three dimensional framework on a homogeneity-
heterogeneity continuum, processes of conflict-accommodation-assimilation, and 
social class splits; 
 Pyramidal class structure based on communal splits, socioeconomic structures, 
and lack of political power; 
 Social complementarities, i.e. the "likeness" of Arab people, including the family, 
social class structure, religion, political behaviour, patterns of living.; 
 Transition and the Arab renaissance, i.e. the perpetual change that has always 
been a characteristic of Arab society; 
 Patriarchal relations, particularly in the family, which have been the basic 
economic and social unit for all three Arab patterns of living - Bedouin, rural, and 
urban; 
 Primary group relations; 
 Spontaneity and expressiveness in social interactions; 
 Alienation and the lack of civil society for the masses; 
 Continuing dependency and underdevelopment, which increases disparities 
between the rich and poor, creates marginal ruling families and classes, and a 
distorted development directed toward consumption rather than production. 
Regardless of the level of development reached by a certain culture, it will comprise the 
following components: Language, Norms, Values, Religions and Beliefs, Social 
Collectives, Statuses and Roles, and Cultural Integration (Wingens et al, 2011). The more 
advanced the culture is, the more integrated these components are. Arab culture is one of 
the richest cultures in the world with a long history, during which Arabs have contributed 
to its development. The level of development of Arab culture can be based on the above 
components. 
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Religion is intrinsic in Arab culture and does not need to be changed or updated. This 
does not mean that the door to development has been closed, but it is needed at the level 
of interpretation which is supposed to be commensurate with the circumstances of the 
time and take into account the evolution that occurs in the elements of knowledge at the 
international level. 
Historically, Arabs contributed a significant amount to the development of scientific 
knowledge. Although the scientific development attained by Arabs has benefited the 
civilised world on occasion, the circumstances witnessed by the Arab community 
contributed to the relative backwardness of it. This backwardness can be eliminated or 
decreased in theory, particularly after the wide spread of education. However, this is not 
happening for a number of reasons, including the core system and the components of the 
educational process, especially regarding the use of the Arabic language, adopting the 
scientific approach in thinking and the nature of the relationship with other cultures. 
3.1.5.2 Sharing of Private Information 
Arab culture is of a particular nature in which information is something that Arabs share 
and matters that should be considered private in other cultures are not so in Arab culture. 
A Lack of research can be seen in the literature on privacy in Arab culture. Chadwick 
(2002) conducted research on 9 communities in Australia, some of which were Arabic 
communities. This work involved a review of the literature on the subject of data privacy 
and attitudes towards the collection and storage of personal information. The author met 
leaders from three of the Arabic communities for round-table discussions of issues 
important to their communities and included their feedback in the research findings. 
Chadwick noticed that in certain circumstances, individual privacy may take second place 
to the needs of the community or family. Koocher (2009) presented research based on 
psychological investigations. He maintained that Arab culture respects elders and 
seniority. He further asserted that learning the background of a person can increase their 
cooperation; effective rapport flows from quid pro quo, commonalities, fairness, and 
mutual respect. Koocher alluded to the basis of social engineering and argued that private 
details may be divulged in circumstances involving seniority or friendship. 
3.1.5.3 History of ICT adoption in the Arab World 
According to Hamade (2009), the major problems negatively affecting the flourishing of 
ICT in most Arab countries are of two natures: Problems relating to basic infrastructure 
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and economy and problems relating to governmental policies and regulations. 
Arab countries vary in their wealth, economic conditions and statute systems. For 
instance, some countries are oil producers and therefore have more wealth that positively 
contributes to their ICT development. However, there are several problems affecting 
these countries in different ways and at different levels, such as cost, education and 
language (2009). 
It can be seen that Internet access in Arab countries seems to increase more slowly than 
that of the rest of the world due to the economic, political and social aspects in the region 
(Checchi et al, 2002) (Fergany et al, 2002). While the Internet has developed in the 
Western world, its presence as part of everyday life in the Arab World is relatively new. 
The first Internet connections in these countries date back to the early 1990s. Tunisia was 
the first Arab country to have an Internet connection in 1991, and Kuwait established its 
Internet services in 1992 as part of its reconstruction after the Iraqi invasion. In 1993, 
Egypt and UAE established Internet connection, while Jordan joined the Internet 
community in 1994. Other Arab countries did so in the late 1990s (Wheeler, 2004). 
Most Arab countries have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and are adapting 
their legal and regulatory systems to accommodate trademark, patent and intellectual 
property rights (IPR) protection (Dutta & Coury, 2003). A recent study on Arab human 
development by the United Nations Development Programme (Fergany et al, 2002) 
reported that Arab countries generally lag behind other parts of the world in ICT, even 
when compared to other developing countries.  
Although the Arab world is mainly constituted of developing countries, some Arab 
countries have already tried to move on from this characterisation.  
Adopting a leadership position within the Arab world, Egypt began to pay attention to the 
importance of ICT policies in the early 1980s with the formation of the Cabinet-level 
Information and Decision Support Centre (IDSC). In 1999 the government established 
another ministry-level policy group, the Ministry of Communication and Information 
Technology (MCIT).  
A crucial, high level research question emerges from contemplating such evolutionary 
processes in developing countries. Specifically, what bearing do culture, implementation 
factors, and government ICT policy have on the transfer of ICT and the associated 
diffusion of computing (e.g., hardware, software, telecommunications, applications) and 
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the Internet? A related issue is the benefit in social change and economic development 
afforded by such technology diffusion. In each case, the first challenge in studying such 
phenomena is developing an appropriate instrument of measurement that can capture the 
critical aspects of the phenomena (Checchi et al, 2002). 
Mohamed Ali (2005) indicates 5 main causes of ICT lag in the Arab world, summarised 
in the following factors: 
 The belief that there is no urgent need to implement ICT (Abu Bakr, 2001): 
The impression is that the right environment for the application of ICT is the private 
sector because it seeks profit and works in an environment characterised by rapid changes 
and unpredictability. In addition, it is not subject to political constraints and social 
governing bodies which make it freer to move and change the direction of its areas of 
operation at any time. In government agencies however, it is a different story, as these 
agencies operate in a more stable environment where customers mostly seek its services, 
especially in developing countries. Therefore, the belief that there is no need or necessity 
for the application of the foundations and principles advocated by the information 
systems has prevailed in many Arab countries. 
 Lack of coordination and money and effort squandering (Yusuf, 2003): 
Most of the state bureaucracies in the Arab countries, concerned with the development of 
ICT and the application of information systems, ignore the importance of coordination 
with neighbouring countries and still implement their plans in isolation from their 
neighbours, despite the similarity of social and economic conditions. Some Arab 
countries have created centres of large scientific research, bringing together many 
technicians and specialists and have tried to achieve several accomplishments in the field 
of software inventions and information systems. These centres did not, however, 
coordinate with each other, resulting in a waste of money and effort due to conflicting 
projects. For example, several Arab companies worked at the same time on the 
completion of Arabic optical character recognition (OCR) system, but they did not 
benefit from each other’s efforts, and ended up abandoning their attempts after Sakhr had 
achieved a leading step in this project.  
 Deficiencies in the government administrative bodies (Jaafari, 1983): 
The government administrative bodies in the Arab world face administrative challenges 
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especially in service-oriented organisations such as municipalities. The ancient city is the 
same city that must provide twenty-first century services and which is facing a steady 
increase in population and a rise in the needs of the different services. In addition, there is 
the industrial outskirts challenge, which adds to the environmental problems. 
Municipalities in the Arab world do not use the best information resources available to 
the best means to achieve the results they were intended for. They also do not benefit 
from the application of IT and information systems, as well as the scientific principles of 
modern management needed to face new challenges and obstacles in order to push 
forward the process of administrative development in these vital institutions. 
3.1.5.4 Internet Revolution in the Arab world 
In the Arab world, the Internet has been a revolutionising force. In terms of time online, 
although the region lags behind the worldwide average, the benefits of access are still 
astounding. The use of social media dominates time spent online at 29% of the total 
online time. In Bahrain, the average user spends 4.1 hours per day on social networks; the 
average for the region is 3.2 hours per day for users over 18 (Web Users in the Middle 
East Emphasize Social Networking, 2013). 
The Arab world region has had a long history of disregarding the importance of women’s 
rights but the spread of information and communication technology is helping to diminish 
the gender gap in some of the most conservative countries. Only 10% of all Internet 
entrepreneurs are women but that number changes drastically when focusing on the Arab 
world region. As of 2012, 40 start-ups had been launched by a small business incubator 
programme in Gaza—more than half of which were begun by women. In total, estimates 
put the percentage of women Internet entrepreneurs in the Middle East and North African 
region at 23%. The Gulf countries have an even better rate of 35% of start-ups created by 
women. The ability to work over the Internet affords well-educated women in 
conservative countries such as Saudi Arabia to begin a career without the social stigma of 
working outside the home (Rosbrow, 2014). With less community and family support, 
women entrepreneurs in the region are supporting each other and encouraging women to 
enter the information and communication technology field where they are able to more 
easily find equality with men (Rosbrow, 2014). 
Another example of the spread of information and communication technology in the Arab 
world is the use of social media during the recent Egyptian revolution to oust President 
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Mubarak from power. Facebook and Twitter led the way, as protesters used them to 
organise and distribute messages and information and spread the word across the world 
about the conditions in the country. The use of social media was so important to the 
activists that some have termed the Arab Spring the “Facebook Revolution” (DW.DE, 
2013). 
Today, the use of social media continues but the protesters are no longer the only ones 
active. Government officials and agencies are also turning to social media to spread their 
own message. This could prove to have positive results by opening up debate and 
dialogue between the population and the government. This open political discourse could 
help maintain political stability in the country (DW.DE, 2013).On the other hand, social 
media has shown a darker side since the revolution, when it has occasionally been used to 
incite violence (Morrow, 2013). 
3.2 Organisational Culture 
Businesses and government are using technology like never before. Corporate culture has 
changed to embrace the convenience of technology. Executives of major corporations 
discuss the necessity of having video conferencing, team collaboration, cost savings, and 
more frequent meetings between team members who are located in different countries. 
The collection of data on consumers, markets, competitors, etc. is also important. All of 
this must be both stored and easily accessible (UT Dallas News, 2013). 
In advanced countries, organisations resort to organisational culture to mitigate the 
impact of security threats and to support decision makers, by providing a framework of 
values and customs that executives can use when making their security-related decisions. 
Organisational culture governs the performance of businesses and individuals. Schein 
(2004) defines organisational culture as a set of basic shared assumptions learnt by the 
organisation’s endeavours to solve its internal integration and external adaptation 
problems, which have proven to work well and have been considered valid. These are 
taught to new members as the correct ways to perceive, feel and think in relation to these 
problems. 
3.2.1 Information Security Culture 
As part of organisation culture, information security culture represents the way an 
organisation reacts to information security problems and the way its people act towards 
information security. Experts have recognised that different approaches based on policy, 
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awareness, training and education assist organisations in establishing its information 
security culture (Lichtenstein & Swatman, 2001; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003; Furnell et al, 
2000). 
Security culture combines different sociocultural attributes that support the conventional 
technical security measures and aim to incorporate information security in the employees’ 
professional aspect of practising daily tasks. The definition of information security 
culture given by Dhillon (1995) is widely accepted (Le Grand & Ozier 2000), namely 
“the totality of human attributes such as behaviours, attitudes, and values that contribute 
to the protection of all kinds of information in a given organisation”. 
The holistic or totality nature of information security is stressed in the literature by 
several authors (Connolly 2000), (Khalil, 2009), (Andress, 2000), (Koocher, 2009), (Ko 
& Dorantes, 2006) and (Ramachandran, 2008). 
Information Security Culture (ISC) is therefore an intrinsic part of organisational culture 
that reflects the organisation's values and customs and includes training personnel, 
processes and communications (Ko &Dorantes 2006), suggesting that ISC is not a 
definite project but a sustained endeavour that must be constantly analysed, encouraged 
and adapted. 
The qualitative nature of ISC yields an inability to directly and precisely measure it, yet it 
still has a significant effect on the behaviour of the workers, management style and the 
technological level. Organisations create and develop appropriate policies and adequate 
human and financial resources, effective management structures and control mechanisms 
to undertake the responsibility of establishing and sustaining ISC. 
Although the positive impact of an effective information security culture is hardly 
disputable (Da Veiga 2007), Schlienger and Teufel (2003) considered that further 
research in the field of sociocultural security measures is still needed to improve the 
overall security level of an organisation, hinting at more intrinsic factors influencing 
information security. Woodhouse (2007) believed that achieving ISC required more than 
an annual awareness training initiative but involved an overall cultural awareness.  
3.2.2 Cultural Impact on Information Security 
Organisational culture does not often provide for the business requirements of 
information security which are reflected in confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
These can be related to a fundamental difference between the organisational information 
65 
security culture and the cultural impact on the organisation’s information security. This 
was illustrated by Glaser (2009) where he argued that security culture is a measure of 
security used by managers to control human behaviour in their endeavour to attain a 
certain security level, whereas understanding the impact of human behaviour requires 
analysing the impact of culture on information security. Accordingly, implementing an 
organisational security culture needs a suitable understanding of the particular culture, as 
it exerts a powerful influence over information security. Sociology and cultural studies 
can provide further understanding of human behaviour which is necessary to implement 
effective and efficient security measures (NIST, 2002) and (Furnell 2000). Merely 
understanding employee behaviour and attempting to overcome major information 
security threats, only by cultivating organisational security culture and deploying 
technical measures, is unlikely to yield the desired results. Zhao et al (2010) referred to 
studies by Leidner and Kayworth (2006) which reviewed a wide range of literature on the 
relationship between IT and culture to highlight the significant impact of culture on IT at 
both the organisational and national levels. Chaula et al (2006) considered ICT security as 
being about people and their motivations to cause security breaches. They recommended 
examining culture as the main interpreter of people and motivations. 
Both business and government would benefit from a more holistic approach to 
information security. There has been a long history of information security lapses over 
the last few decades and the lessons learned from these can be a powerful tool for the 
field of information security in the future. The biggest threats to information security in 
the United States are foreign government sponsored hacking attempts, 
terrorist/fundamentalist groups, as well as individual hackers.  
Information security attacks are also posing a difficult legal situation for businesses. To 
combat this, information security professionals will be required to work closely with 
other departments in a company, particularly legal departments. Retailers who have been 
the victim of attacks are now facing large scale lawsuits from those whose information 
has been stolen. Litigation has been successful in the past; several banks were able to 
recover $74.6 million dollars after a T.J. Maxx breach (Tracy, 2014). A lawsuit has 
already started in the Target case with banks attempting to recover the $200 million 
expended on replacement cards (Bjorhus, 2014). 
Increasing organisation preparedness through unifying the culture of security throughout 
an entire organisation is a critical step in increasing the overall preparedness. With rising 
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threats from state-sponsored hacking, corporate and organisational culture will have to 
place a greater emphasis on information security to keep pace with the increasing risk to 
sensitive data. On a similar note, information security specialists will need to work more 
closely with other corporate departments such as legal and public relations to obtain the 
best information on breaches and risks to the public as well as their business. 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the cultural impact on ICT in developed countries 
as well as an insight into Arab culture and the history of ICT adoption in the Arab world.  
Although this chapter showed that there exist security initiatives to raise awareness, the 
cultural impact on information security requires analysing human behaviour in practice. 
The need for analysing the cultural behaviour towards information security is essential to 
enable a solid understanding of security issues related to human behaviour. The practice 
of sharing sensitive information amongst family members and friends is addressed in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: CULTURE AND 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a build a deeper understanding of the cultural impact 
on information security, particularly in sharing sensitive information including 
passwords. For this aim, the chapter describes a pilot study conducted to investigate the 
preferences of sharing private information among family members and friends. The study 
aims to acquire knowledge of the role of culture in information security in the UAE. The 
pilot study is followed by further investigation to identify the extent to which cultural 
behaviour can have an impact on information security in other countries. The other 
countries considered are Saudi Arabia (KSA), Oman and the UK. 
4.1. Methodology 
The chapter discusses how data collection was carried out in the two phases of the study. 
Phase One was a pilot study conducted using two approaches: Questionnaires and 
interviews in major organisations the in Abu Dhabi Emirate. The aim of conducting this 
phase was to identify the extent that culture can have an impact on preferences of private 
information sharing, as well as establish how intense the issue of culture is present in 
information security in certain settings. Phase Two was a comparative study to 
investigate the role of culture in information security further. The study was conducted in 
several countries to identify user attitudes towards information sharing over digital 
services. A quantitative approach was used due to the research defined problem of 
targeting the public sharing preferences while using the digital resources and social media 
interactions. A quantitative evaluation was used to assess the privacy sharing preferences 
among family members and friends. The evaluation was conducted for the UAE, Oman, 
KSA and the UK to identify user attitudes towards sensitive information sharing. The 
analysis was based on t-test statistics. These types of tests have been used in earlier 
research studies to investigate cultural difference in terms of behaviour and attitudes 
towards Internet usage, as well as the mixed-method research (qualitative and 
quantitative) (for example Li & Kirkup, 2007 and Dinev et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
mixed-method research offers a number of advantages over the quantitative or qualitative 
approaches alone. For example, Creswell and Clark (2007) maintain that mixed-method 
research provides more evidence of investigating the research problems and answer 
68 
research questions that cannot be answered by either quantitative or qualitative research 
alone. Moreover, the mixed method bridges the gap between the sometimes adversarial 
divide between quantitative and qualitative researchers, and provides a more practical 
sense to the research as the researcher becomes free to use all methods possible to address 
the problem. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) highlight various benefits of using mixed 
research over individual quantitative or qualitative research for analysing human 
behaviour and attitudes. Similarly, Kelle (2006) argues that qualitative and quantitative 
methods should be combined in order to compensate for their mutual and overlapping 
weaknesses. 
The questionnaires and interviews of both phases can be found in Appendix 1.  
4.1.1 Phase One - Pilot Study 
A large amount of research on ICT development claims that ICT security is essentially a 
political and a managerial act and the importance of the relevant cultural characteristics 
of a society should not be disregarded. Phase One’s study investigates culture as a key 
factor in ICT development, particularly in information security and looks into 
organisational culture as a way of addressing cultural issues in information security. The 
pilot study consists of two approaches that have been used to provide a solid foundation 
about the cultural issue on information privacy in order to proceed to the next stages.  
Based on the literature review, the pilot investigation strategy was focused on the 
following research hypotheses in order to commence with a rigorous research 
methodology that answers the research hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Arab culture is of a special nature where privacy is something that Arabs 
share  
Hypothesis 2: There is a fundamental difference between organisational information 
security culture and the cultural impact on the organisation’s information security 
4.1.1.1 Quantitative Approach 
In an attempt to determine the extent of privacy sharing within the Arab culture in Abu 
Dhabi Emirate, a survey questionnaire was used. The questionnaire was used by Olson et 
al. (2005) in the U.S. to capture respondents’ views and willingness to share certain 
information with certain people. 
The survey asked respondents to rank from 1 (least likely to share) to 5 (most likely to 
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share) information with certain people. The questionnaire was distributed to 90 people 
(49 male and 41 female) in different job positions and age categories (22-53) in major 
government institutions based in the UAE. 
The pilot testing necessitated tailoring some questions from the original Olson 
questionnaire to better fit Arab culture. Given the number of questions (39) and the 
variety of options (19) to be ranked, respondents were allowed to take the questionnaire 
home and complete it later. The questionnaire was given in Arabic in order for 
respondents to clearly understand the questions and the corresponding options. 
The answers were collected, tabulated and then rank for each question was averaged. 
These averages were included in a resultant table summarising the overall preferences of 
privacy sharing. The table utilises a visualisation colour-coded reflecting the likelihood of 
sharing information. The information most likely to be shared (3.5 to 5 inclusive) is 
coloured in white whereas the least likely to be shared (1 to 2.5 inclusive) is coloured in 
black. Cells ranging from greater than 2.5 to less than 3.5 reflect the ambiguous middle 
and are coloured in grey.  
4.1.1.1.1 Results 
Based on the calculated arithmetic means of the 90 participants for each question, the 
table below (Table 2) shows that Arabs are willing to share (in white) 69.91% of their 
information with certain people, while they preserve (in black) 24.97% to themselves. 
They are not sure about either sharing or preserving (grey) 5.13% of their information. 
 
Figure 3: Arabs willingness to share information 
Transgression is the only piece of information Arabs refrain from sharing with absolutely 
anyone. Examples of other presumably critical information that Arabs may share with 
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their family and close friends, are email content, credit card numbers or even a potential 
transgression. They are not sure, however, if they would share certain information, for 
example about salary or a significant personal failure, with extended family members. 
This is visually depicted as the small black region concentrated in the upper-left corner 
and which diminishes in the right and bottom, with very few grey cells in the middle. 
However, Arabs may share most of the information regarded as private and non-sharable 
in other cultures, with almost anyone. These results reinforce an important point of 
privacy sharing as an intrinsic aspect of Arab culture; yet reflect a genuine vulnerability 
to be considered in information security measures applied in organisations operating in an 
environment where Arab culture prevails. 
The collected results below can be compared to a similar study by Olson et al. (2005) on 
30 people who worked at mid-sized companies in the USA and used computers as part of 
their jobs (Table 2). 
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Table 2: U.S. employees are less willing than their Arab counterparts to share information with others 
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As can be seen in the previous table (Table 2), the dark area is much larger than that in 
the following table (Table 3Error! Reference source not found.), reflecting less privacy 
sharing than their Arab counterparts. 
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Table 3: The willingness of workers in the UAE to share information 
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4.1.1.2 Qualitative Approach 
Qualitative research interviews were conducted to provide a deeper understanding of the 
issues of culture in information security. Questions were devised and a schedule was 
prepared and piloted. The questions followed recommended techniques for interviews, 
such as giving examples in the questions to clearly state what is needed (Bell, 2005). In 
accordance with best practice, it was ensured that no leading, presumptive or offensive 
questions were presented. The order of the questions was considered to be from the 
general to the specific. While the interviews were based on an unstructured format, a list 
of items to be discussed and probes into the particular issues to cover were prepared.  
The literature search has identified key issues that require investigation in a local context. 
These centre on: 
 Are standards and policies sufficient to guarantee privacy? 
 What further measures would enhance security? 
 Are employees provided with effective training on the importance of information? 
 To what extent is culture a factor in information? 
Interviews were conducted with two IT executives in Abu Dhabi after obtaining informed 
consent. The questions asked can be found in Appendix1. The interviews were conducted 
in Arabic and transcribed. 
The first is an interview with Lieutenant Colonel Faisal Mohammed Al-Shammari, Chief 
Information Security Officer of Abu Dhabi Police. Al-Shammari considers that internal 
policies and compliance with international standards are not enough to prevent employees 
from sharing sensitive information with each other or to those outside of the organisation. 
He maintains that awareness and sense of ownership of information from the employee 
are needed in order to make them feel responsible for this information. Not only does this 
require awareness, but also a procedural system of retribution. In addition, there should 
be forms of awareness assessment to categorise the level of awareness of the employee, 
for example beginner, intermediate or advanced. In certain ways, this can start by a pre-
assessment prior to hiring and continue as a regular course over the employment period, 
which advances with their job promotion. Although sharing sensitive information is more 
acceptable in some cultures than others, he believes this can be mitigated by devising an 
adaptive punishment-reward system to the particular culture. He stresses that there are 
procedures rather than measures that may be taken along with policies and standards, 
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such as evaluation of employee awareness of information security, which may be part of 
his or her annual assessment. Al-Shammari asserts that there have been some courses at 
Abu Dhabi Police Department delivered by experts on information security, but there is a 
weakness in continuity as courses are more likely to provide discrete events rather than a 
culture of information security. Customs and traditions may affect sharing information 
especially in a collectivistic society such as in Abu Dhabi. This is more noticeable with 
the technological development. For example, some people broadcast over Blackberry 
Messenger the locations of road inspection points, knowing that the broadcasts may have 
originated from the police department itself. The evolution in methods of communication 
has revealed new vulnerabilities that would not have been obvious in the past. Public 
awareness is very important to reach an acceptable level of security. However, he argues 
that the problem is not inherent in Arab culture, rather in the lack of appreciating the 
value of information. He also state that deciding what constitutes sensitive information 
depends on the cultural and educational background and awareness. Al-Shammari 
considers these three factors to be significant in the arbitration of dealing with sensitive 
information. For example, an information security expert who deals with highly 
confidential information in a highly responsible way, driven by his professional 
background, practical experience and his awareness that disclosing such information may 
expose him to expulsion or even prosecution. Reinforcing these factors is the direct way 
of reducing information sharing. 
The second interview was conducted with Mr Mohammed Husein Karmastaji, Standards 
and Governance Manager in Abu Dhabi Systems and Information Centre (ADSIC), the 
centre responsible for information security policy in Abu Dhabi Emirate. 
According to Karmastaji, standards and policies are created to provide guidelines. The 
challenge lies in the adoption of the policies or standards. Policies are clear on the system 
but the implementation is what usually generates problems as it involves people. We try 
to adjust standards to fit culture in order to create awareness of information security 
bearing in mind that the availability of policies are not enough alone. Awareness is the 
most important factor in information security and it has to be continuous and assessed to 
confirm that people are familiar with it. The presence of policies is also important to 
ensure that people implement information security. The value of information in terms of 
sensitivity varies. Hence, there should be a focus on the different groups of people by 
various training courses educating them on information security. Karmastaji maintains 
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that there are courses in his organisation targeting people who handle sensitive 
information. He considers that the cultural background of the employee is important for 
their understanding of the value of information. It has been noticed that employees from 
non-Arab cultures are more aware of the value of information and are more discreet in 
sharing it. This has been witnessed in the organisation. There have been clear examples of 
cultural differences regarding information handling in the organisation. For example, a 
foreign employee would take all his documents off his desk and shut off his PC before 
leaving, while an Arab counterpart would leave some papers on the desk or his PC logged 
on and just leave the workplace. Despite providing courses on information security, along 
with policies and awareness, employee practice has not changed. This change cannot 
even be attained by coercion as it would be a later stage anyway. If the importance of 
information security existed from a young age, the situation would be different from that 
of today. Awareness in childhood would also mitigate the financial burdens of continuous 
yet inefficient training at a later time. A simple example is that in the UAE, house doors 
are left open as people are not frightened by issues of security, whereas in the West, 
people never leave their doors open as they are concerned about security. 
4.1.1.2.1 Summary of Key Issues 
 Internal policies and compliance to international standards are not enough to 
prevent employees from sharing sensitive information; 
 Policies are clear on the system but the implementation is what usually generates 
problems as it involves people; 
 There are procedures rather than measures that may be taken along with policies 
and standards, such as evaluation of employee awareness of information security; 
 Courses by experts have been given to employees but little progress has been 
noticed; 
 The technological development has revealed information sharing in a more 
obvious way than that of the past (e.g. message broadcasts, etc.); 
 Awareness is the most important factor in information security and it has to be 
continuous and assessed to confirm that people are familiar with it; 
 It has been noticed that employees from non-Arab cultures are more aware of the 
value of information and are more discreet in sharing it. This has been witnessed 
in the organisation; 
 There have been clear examples of cultural differences regarding information 
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handling in the organisation; 
 Awareness in childhood would also mitigate the financial burdens of continuous 
yet inefficient training at a later age. 
4.1.2 Phase Two - Further Study 
The results of a previous survey in the UAE to gauge private information-sharing (Al-
Kaabi and Maple, 2012) showed that most respondents share sensitive information that 
people of other cultures (especially in the West) would usually withhold. The results have 
shown that respondents mostly share private information with family and close friends. 
To further investigate to what extent that cultural behaviour can impact on information 
security, more countries of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) area are considered in 
this study. We devised and administrated a questionnaire with municipality staff in 3 
GCC countries, namely, Oman, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
which represent the majority of the GCC population. 
In addition, the UK, as a western culture, was selected to be compared with the GCC 
countries to provide a deeper understanding and comparison of cultural issues on 
information security.  
The above investigations were designed to establish the cultural impact on information 
security as represented in the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Sharing sensitive information in UAE is different than in other GCC 
countries (KSA, Oman). 
Hypothesis 2: Sharing sensitive information in GCC countries is different than in the UK.  
The questionnaire was based on a five-point (from 5 strongly agree to 1 strongly 
disagree) Likert scale. The questionnaire contained 21 mandatory questions about sharing 
information (work and personal) with family and close friends typically regarded as 
private. 90 responses were collected in the GCC, 30 from each country studied. The first 
3 questions asked about the country (i.e. Oman, KSA and UAE), age and gender. The 
other 18 questions concerned sensitive information-sharing. 
4.1.2.1 Questionnaire Design 
Based on social engineering attacks targeting user behaviour, a questionnaire was 
designed particularly to investigate preferences of information sharing that may lead to 
compromising the first security control: the authentication mechanism. The design 
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focused on areas such as: personal belongings, work belongings, and trust and social 
influences of family members and friends. These areas are illustrated in Table 5. 
 
Table 4: Nature of information sharing and vulnerabilities to personal and work assets 
Nature of sharing and 
vulnerabilities 
Personal asset Work asset 
 
 
 
Sharing with family 
members and friends 
 
Access to PC 
Credit card details 
Email password 
Current location 
Mobile phone password 
Social media password 
Email content 
Online banking details 
Access to a mobile phone 
Access to a USB memory 
Access to other mobile 
devices 
Access to a PC 
Access to confidential 
information 
Email password 
Email content 
Work related documents 
Past finished work 
Access to a USB memory 
 
Vulnerability Social engineering attack Social engineering attack 
Impact Loss of Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability 
/digital forensics issues 
Loss of Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability 
/digital forensics issues 
Potential risk to personal 
assets 
Yes Yes 
Potential risk to work assets Yes Yes 
 
Sharing sensitive information, such as the abovementioned, with family members and 
friends may lead to a breach of an information system. In this respect, Orgill et al (2004) 
assert that trusted people can fail to be trustworthy when it comes to protecting their 
aperture of access to secure computer systems due to inadequate education, negligence 
and various social pressures. Social engineering is a known risk to the sharing 
phenomenon which may be overlooked in favour of looking at major security problems 
that often originate from a software bug, a configuration defect or a software design flaw 
(Simon & Cheng, 2009). 
The questionnaire design focused on sharing scenarios represented by the following 
activities:  
Sharing sensitive information and access control: sharing private and sensitive 
information with family, friends and sometimes with strangers over the Internet and 
social media has been discussed earlier as being a real threat to information security. 
79 
Such practices contribute highly to consequences such as identity theft, blackmailing and 
physical stalking (Ralph & Acquisti, 2005). Sensitive information can be passwords to 
online accounts, online banking details, date of birth, home/work address, and access 
details to personal digital devices where sensitive information is stored, amongst others. 
Internet users may post a large amount of personal information in their online profiles 
without realising the risk behind it. Some criminals may be working heavily to 
accumulate such information in order to perform their hacking activities successfully. 
Information gathered by hackers can be put together to allow unauthorised access. 
Furthermore, sharing passwords can mean sharing identity (Ralph & Acquisti, 2005). 
Therefore, if a person shares their password with another person in order to access a 
secure service, this means that the one using this password will be presented to the system 
as the owner of the account. If anything goes wrong with the stored data (through 
activities such as modifying or deleting), standard digital forensic tools may find that it is 
extremely difficult to identify the person responsible, even though these activities are 
recorded. 
Privacy and location information sharing: Posting private information on social media 
websites is widely practised by Internet users. It has also become an ordinary practice to 
update online friends with the current location and activity, and even future plans. This 
phenomenon has resulted in some major privacy attacks such as the structural re-
identiﬁcation attacks, inference attacks, information aggregation attacks and traditional 
attribute re-identiﬁcation attacks. However, some countermeasures have been proposed to 
mitigate such attacks, but only a few of them have been well tested on real data (Yang et 
al, 2012). The risk varies according to each criminal intention (for example home theft, 
property harm and online stalking). The threat is increasing from one day to the next on 
all age groups of social media users and can even lead to kidnapping and murder (Baruah, 
2012). 
Personal information, the current location and daily activities available on social media 
user profiles can pose a real threat to online users where others, including unknown ones 
(i.e. with fake profiles), who appear on their list can make use of this information. Users 
with fake profiles have the ability to mislead people through posted information, resulting 
in victims of, for example, online harassment and cyberstalking (Baruah, 2012; Malagi et 
al., 2013). 
Vulnerabilities: Information system security weaknesses vary according to the nature of 
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the vulnerability. For example, there are some weaknesses in technical application 
designs that lead to a technical vulnerability, which can be exploited technically. In 
certain settings, however, where a lack of information security awareness exists, hackers 
tend to use the weakness of the human factor to obtain information which can lead to 
bypassing the technical measures. Sharing private information among family members 
and friends makes a better basis for hackers to penetrate a system through performing 
social engineering attacks. According to several studies, social engineering attacks are 
rapidly increasing due to the difficulty of alternative technical attacks (Twitchell, 2006; 
Long, 2011; Krombholz et al, 2013). 
Impact: The majority of breaches of information security lead to a financial loss (to 
individuals or organisations) or politically sensitive information disclosure (Verdasys, 
2011; Molok et al., 2010). However, the spread of Internet services and social media has 
extended the impact of cybercrime to Cyberterrorism (Conway, 2007). Cyberterrorism 
has become an issue and has challenged the world due to wide applications of ICT 
facilities and the absence of strict border information security (Goodman et al, 2007).  
Sharing sensitive information including passwords with friends has an impact on 
compromising the information security triad. These three elements are believed to be the 
core protection of information security. However, none of these three facets is attainable 
if there is a weak link in one of the others. It is highly believed that the weak link is 
associated with the human factor (Berti & Rogers, 2004). For instance, identity theft is a 
traditional crime of fraud that results in many issues, such as opening a new bank 
account, taking over an existing credit card, renting properties, amongst many others 
(Chawki & Wahab, 2006). Fraud has become widespread due to issues related to online 
presence, as it is very difficult for law enforcement officers to identify online fraudsters 
who can commit crimes on a broader scale than that of their real-world counterparts 
(Chawki & Wahab, 2006). Identity theft is also an issue for the forensic investigation 
centres. Forensics can help analyse a particular computer or device that has been used to 
commit a crime. However, although it may be relatively easy to identify the computer or 
device used for a crime, identifying who used that device at the time the crime was 
committed may be more difficult, especially if access details are shared or socially 
engineered (Jones & Martin, 2010). 
Risk to Personal/work assets: Attacks on information security systems that lead to a 
breach could have further consequences. For example sharing a work email password 
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with colleagues could have an impact on the Facebook password account if the same 
password is used. Password reuse practices are common with most online users 
(Notoatmodjo & Thomborson, 2009). Almost all social media accounts such as 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc. need password verification. In the work environment, 
employees need to access the work network and different applications related to their 
work. It may be difficult for the user to use a difficult and different password for each and 
every account (Campbell & Bryant, 2010). 
4.1.2.2 Hypothesis 1: Users’ attitudes in Oman, KSA and UAE 
Proposition one relates to a comparison between UAE computers’ users with other GCC 
computers’ users (Oman and KSA). Those countries were selected due to their large 
population compared to other GCC countries (Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain) although all of 
the GCC countries stem from the same cultural background.  
Results and analysis (Oman, KSA, UAE) 
Analyses of ordinal data, particularly as in Likert surveys, are not as straightforward and 
transparent as analyses of nominal, interval and ratio data. Hence, non-parametric 
measures should be used for the analyses (Allen and Seaman, 2007). Ignoring the discrete 
nature of the responses can lead to inferential errors. Since the questionnaire uses Likert 
scales, non-parametric measures will be used for the analyses of the collected data. 
According to Allen and Seaman (2007), any parametric analyses based on the normal 
distribution, such as mean and standard deviation, are invalid for descriptive statistics 
whenever data are on ordinal scales. Therefore, nonparametric procedures, based on the 
rank, median or range, are more appropriate for analysing these data, as are distribution 
free methods such as tabulations, frequencies, contingency tables and chi-squared 
statistics. 
The questionnaire comprises 18 questions targeting different attributes of sharing private 
and sensitive data among relatives, close friends or friends of friends. The respondents 
were all public service employees of different municipalities in 3 Gulf countries: Saudi 
Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. 90 respondents answered the questionnaire 
equally distributed over the 3 countries. The questionnaire was posted online and links to 
it was emailed to respondents. 
The respondents were asked to choose one of 5 answers to the given questions. The 
information they were asked if they would share included a variety of aspects, such as 
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work and personal PC passwords, confidential work-related documents, work and 
personal email contents and passwords, current location, and other data thought to be 
confidential. The respondents had to select their gender and age group while their 
identities are kept undisclosed. All questions required answers. 
4.1.2.2.1 Data Summary 
The following table (Table 5: Sensitive information-sharing in 3 GCC countries) 
summarises the results obtained from the questionnaire: 
Table 5: Sensitive information-sharing in 3 GCC countries 
Are you willing to share the following information with or allow access to people (i.e. relatives, close 
friends or friends of friends)? 
* Please indicate your country, age and sex first 
* All questions require answers 
Location Age Groups Sex 
30 respondents from Saudi 
Arabia (33%) 
30 respondents from Oman 
(33%) 
30 respondents from United 
Arab Emirates (33%) 
0 (0%) below 19 
41 (45.6%) between 19 and 30  
43 (47.8%) between 31 and 42  
6 (6.7%) between 43 and 54  
0 (0.0%) above 54 
71 (78.9%) male 
19 (21.1%) female 
 Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. Access to personal PC 35 (38.89%) 44 (48.89%) 8 (8.89%) 3 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
2. Work email content 30 (33.33%) 48 (53.33%) 8 (8.89%) 4 (4.44%) 0 (0%) 
3. Credit card details 22 (24.44%) 37 (41.11%) 18 (20%) 8 (8.89%) 5 (5.56%) 
4. Work email password 27 (30%) 49 (54.44%) 8 (8.89%) 5 (5.56%) 1 (1.11%) 
5. Personal email 
password 
31 (34.44%) 46 (51.11%) 7 (7.78%) 3 (3.33%) 3 (3.33%) 
6. Confidential work 
information 
27 (30%) 47 (52.22%) 12 (13.33%) 3 (3.33%) 1 (1.11%) 
7. Current location 38 (42.22%) 40 (44.44%) 6 (6.67%) 6 (6.67%) 0 (0%) 
8. Work-related 
documents 
27 (30%) 48 (53.33%) 13 (14.44%) 1 (1.11%) 1 (1.11%) 
9. Personal mobile phone's 
password 
32 (35.56%) 38 (42.22%) 16 (17.78%) 4 (4.44%) 0 (0%) 
10. Access to work PC 26 (28.89%) 55 (61.11%) 8 (8.89%) 1 (1.11%) 0 (0%) 
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11. Past finished work-
related papers/products 
25 (27.78%) 48 (53.33%) 15 (16.67%) 2 (2.22%) 0 (0%) 
12. Social media password 
(Facebook, Twitter) 
20 (22.22%) 47 (52.22%) 15 (16.67%) 8 (8.89%) 0 (0%) 
13. Personal email content 28 (31.11%) 48 (53.33%) 11 (12.22%) 3 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
14. Online banking details 23 (25.56%) 43 (47.78%) 11 (12.22%) 
10 
(11.11%) 
3 (3.33%) 
15. Access to personal 
mobile phone 
29 (32.22%) 42 (46.67%) 13 (14.44%) 4 (4.44%) 2 (2.22%) 
16. Access to personal USB 
memory drive 
34 (37.78%) 40 (44.44%) 11 (12.22%) 4 (4.44%) 1 (1.11%) 
17. Access to a work USB 
memory drive 
29 (32.22%) 50 (55.56%) 5 (5.56%) 6 (6.67%) 0 (0%) 
18. Access to other personal 
mobile devices (laptop, 
tablet, PDA, etc.) 
32 (35.56%) 44 (48.89%) 9 (10%) 3 (3.33%) 2 (2.22%) 
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Figure 4: Sharing information which may lead to information security breach GCC 
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4.1.2.2.2 Descriptive Analysis (Aggregation) 
As noted above, using Likert scales for descriptive analysis is highly beneficial. 
However, central tendency of the scales are best described by mode and median. 
Calculating the mean and standard deviation is not the best or most informative method 
for analysing Likert scales. Therefore, colour coding is more expressive in showing the 
amount of sharing sensitive information for every country. This is shown in the following 
tables and diagrams: 
 
 
 
 
Oman 
Table 6: Sensitive information sharing in Oman 
Oman Strongly Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Q1 15 (50%) 13 (43.33%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q2 7 (23.33%) 21 (70%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q3 2 (6.67%) 17 (56.67%) 4 (13.33%) 7 (23.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q4 6 (20%) 20 (66.67%) 2 (6.67%) 2 (6.67%) 0 (0%) 
Q5 8 (26.67%) 20 (66.67%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q6 6 (20%) 19 (63.33%) 4 (13.33%) 0 (0%) 1 (3.33%) 
Q7 13 (43.33%) 12 (40%) 1 (3.33%) 4 (13.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q8 9 (30%) 19 (63.33%) 2 (6.67%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Q9 10 (33.33%) 15 (50%) 4 (13.33%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q10 9 (30%) 18 (60%) 3 (10%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Q11 9 (30%) 18 (60%) 2 (6.67%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q12 6 (20%) 19 (63.33%) 3 (10%) 2 (6.67%) 0 (0%) 
Q13 7 (23.33%) 17 (56.67%) 5 (16.67%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q14 1 (3.33%) 17 (56.67%) 4 (13.33%) 8 (26.67%) 0 (0%) 
Q15 5 (16.67%) 16 (53.33%) 7 (23.33%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 
Q16 11 (36.67%) 16 (53.33%) 3 (10%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Q17 8 (26.67%) 18 (60%) 1 (3.33%) 3 (10%) 0 (0%) 
Q18 12 (40%) 16 (53.33%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
86 
 
Figure 5: Sharing information which may lead to information security breach (Oman)
87 
KSA 
Table 7: Sensitive information sharing in the KSA 
KSA Strongly Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Q1 14 (46.67%) 13 (43.33%) 2 (6.67%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q2 17 (56.67%) 8 (26.67%) 3 (10%) 2 (6.67%) 0 (0%) 
Q3 15 (50%) 8 (26.67%) 5 (16.67%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 
Q4 15 (50%) 10 (33.33%) 2 (6.67%) 2 (6.67%) 1 (3.33%) 
Q5 16 (53.33%) 10 (33.33%) 2 (6.67%) 2 (6.67%) 0 (0%) 
Q6 15 (50%) 10 (33.33%) 3 (10%) 2 (6.67%) 0 (0%) 
Q7 14 (46.67%) 14 (46.67%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q8 11 (36.67%) 13 (43.33%) 4 (13.33%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 
Q9 13 (43.33%) 13 (43.33%) 2 (6.67%) 2 (6.67%) 0 (0%) 
Q10 10 (33.33%) 17 (56.67%) 2 (6.67%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q11 11 (36.67%) 12 (40%) 6 (20%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q12 8 (26.67%) 15 (50%) 3 (10%) 4 (13.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q13 15 (50%) 12 (40%) 2 (6.67%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q14 15 (50%) 12 (40%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 
Q15 17 (56.67%) 10 (33.33%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 
Q16 14 (46.67%) 10 (33.33%) 3 (10%) 2 (6.67%) 1 (3.33%) 
Q17 13 (43.33%) 12 (40%) 2 (6.67%) 3 (10%) 0 (0%) 
Q18 13 (43.33%) 12 (40%) 3 (10%) 0 (0%) 2 (6.67%) 
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UAE 
Table 8: Sensitive information sharing in UAE 
UAE Strongly Agree Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Q1 6 (20%) 18 (60%) 5 (16.67%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q2 6 (20%) 19 (63.33%) 4 (13.33%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q3 5 (16.67%) 12 (40%) 9 (30%) 0 (0%) 4 (13.33%) 
Q4 6 (20%) 19 (63.33%) 4 (13.33%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q5 7 (23.33%) 16 (53.33%) 4 (13.33%) 0 (0%) 3 (10%) 
Q6 6 (20%) 18 (60%) 5 (16.67%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q7 11 (36.67%) 14 (46.67%) 4 (13.33%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q8 7 (23.33%) 16 (53.33%) 7 (23.33%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Q9 9 (30%) 10 (33.33%) 10 (33.33%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q10 7 (23.33%) 20 (66.67%) 3 (10%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Q11 5 (16.67%) 18 (60%) 7 (23.33%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Q12 6 (20%) 13 (43.33%) 9 (30%) 2 (6.67%) 0 (0%) 
Q13 6 (20%) 19 (63.33%) 4 (13.33%) 1 (3.33%) 0 (0%) 
Q14 7 (23.33%) 14 (46.67%) 6 (20%) 1 (3.33%) 2 (6.67%) 
Q15 7 (23.33%) 16 (53.33%) 5 (16.67%) 2 (6.67%) 0 (0%) 
Q16 9 (30%) 14 (46.67%) 5 (16.67%) 2 (6.67%) 0 (0%) 
Q17 8 (26.67%) 20 (66.67%) 2 (6.67%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Q18 7 (23.33%) 16 (53.33%) 5 (16.67%) 2 (6.67%) 0 (0%) 
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Figure 6: Sharing information which may lead to information security breach (UAE)
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4.1.1.1.1 Inferential Analysis 
Inferential Analysis on the differences among the three groups (Saudi Arabia, Oman and 
United Arab Emirates) 
The table below shows the results of Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA. As can be seen, 
the 3 samples collected show a similar behaviour in almost all questions towards 
information-sharing.  
Kruskal–Wallis One-Way ANOVA Test 
This method is used for non-parametric data as the same data was obtained from the three 
countries (Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates). This method is the most 
suitable one for measuring the significant difference between more than three groups 
(McCrum-Gardner, 2008) 
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Table 9: The Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA test results  
 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA test reveals similarities among the 3 countries in 
most questions, showing similar behaviour towards information-sharing in the 3 GCC 
countries. 
4.1.1.2 Discussion 
Developing advanced hacking methods is the ultimate aim of cyber criminals, which can 
be used to steal money and information. Social engineering is changing the face of 
hacking activities as there is no technology that can prevent a social engineering attack. 
However, user education that leads to the outcome of less social trust will slow the pace 
of social engineering (Warren and Leitch, 2006). 
The attitude of sharing sensitive information shown by the above study is believed to 
have a strong relation to the cultural attitude. Although Arab culture has been visibly 
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influenced by globalisation and, in particular, the West, Islam is still the most prevalent 
religion in the Arab countries and that affects almost every aspect of their behaviour. 
Certain characteristics of Arab culture are strengthened by Islam such as honesty, loyalty, 
flexibility, and trust (Obeidat et al, 2012). 
The issue of sharing sensitive information can only be solved by looking at the root of the 
problem which is human behaviour in this case. Furthermore, the culture of trust needs to 
be examined in depth. Understanding cultural issues is essential in IT management as 
there might be some internal resistance by employees or users. Using foreign companies’ 
services and experts to develop policies and procedures about information security raises 
the risk that these policies may not consider the current organisational culture (Khalfan, 
2004). Encouraging ICT users not to share their confidential information with their 
friends or relatives because it is the wrong attitude (only because this practice cannot be 
seen in developed countries) will not lead to a significant contribution from other 
perspectives. Looking at the root causes of the problem and developing a solution 
according to those causes will significantly reduce the likelihood of risk. 
There are two main drivers of the information-sharing problems: the first one is the 
cultural factor and the second one is the lack of information security awareness. The 
cultural factor resulting from the trust phenomena makes the user share his or her private 
information with friends and relatives. It is clearly recognised that privacy and security 
are difficult to manage from the technical perspective since they are entangled in larger 
collective rhetoric and practices of risk, danger, secrecy, trust, morality, identity. 
Consequently, dealing with these issues individually produces an incoherent and weak 
outcome (Dourish & Anderson, 2006). Concerning the lack of security awareness, the 
high Internet penetration growth rate in the Arab countries and the limited security 
awareness among users renders online resources attractive for cyber criminals (Aloul, 
2012). In this connection, Aloul (2012) asserts that education on user privacy is 
imperative for Arab Internet users due to the lack of knowledge of social engineering 
attack techniques. Furthermore, the continuous increase of Internet usage increases the 
likelihood that attackers can gain unauthorised access to information by exploiting a 
user’s trust and tendency to help (Aloul, 2012). Security awareness courses and training 
approaches are prominently suggested as a remedial attempt to reduce IT security threats. 
Information security awareness programmes should focus more on the social and cultural 
differences and the different terms and concepts related to them (Kruger et al, 2011). 
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It is clear that sharing sensitive information is a social vulnerability which can be easily 
exploited using social engineering attack. As a result, the damage can have an impact on 
both individuals and organisations. However, dealing with the above factors separately 
can lead to unexpected human reaction. Instead, looking for an effective solution that 
takes into consideration every contributing factor (causes and impacts) of the sharing 
phenomena and then combining these factors to design the solution (cost, ease, and 
efficiency) can bring about the required results. 
4.1.1.3 Hypothesis 2: Users’ attitudes in GCC Countries and the UK 
Proposition 2 relates to a comparative investigation between two different cultural 
backgrounds. Despite the fact that the United Kingdom is known as an individualist 
culture, where its characteristics are different than GCC countries, the aim of this study 
was to identify any similarities or differences between the two cultures in relation to the 
sharing preferences with friends and family members.  
4.1.1.3.1 Results and analysis (GCC and UK) 
Data Summary 
The following table summarises the results obtained from the questionnaire that targeted 
90 private individuals (white English) who work in Council departments in the UK: 
Table 11: Sensitive information sharing in the UK 
Are you willing to share the following information with or allow access to people (i.e. relatives, close friends or 
friends of friends)? 
* Please indicate your country, age and sex first 
* All questions require answers 
Location Age Groups Sex 
90 respondents (White English) 
34 (37.8 %) between 23 and 34  
29 (32.2%) between 35 and 44 
27 (30%) over 44 
42 (46.7%) male 
48 (53.3%) female 
 Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1. Access to personal PC 25 (27.78%) 34 (37.78%) 7 (7.78%) 10 (11.11%) 14 (15.56%) 
2. Work email content 5 (5.56%) 12 (13.33%) 7 (7.78%) 19 (21.11%) 47 (52.22%) 
3. Credit card details 4 (4.44%) 5 (5.56%) 3 (3.33%) 25 (27.78%) 53 (58.89%) 
4. Work email password 3 (3.33%) 4 (4.44%) 1 (1.11%) 25 (27.78%) 57 (63.33%) 
5. Personal email password 6 (6.67%) 9 (10%) 8 (8.89%) 23 (25.56%) 44 (48.89%) 
6. Confidential work 
information 0 (0%) 4 (4.44%) 4 (4.44%) 24 (26.67%) 58 (64.44%) 
7. Current location 16 (17.78%) 33 (36.67%) 14 (15.56%) 16 (17.78%) 11 (12.22%) 
8. Work-related documents 1 (1.11%) 4 (4.44%) 6 (6.67%) 28 (31.11%) 51 (56.67%) 
9. Personal mobile phone's 3 (3.33%) 10 (11.11%) 14 (15.56%) 16 (17.78%) 47 (52.22%) 
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password 
10. Access to work PC 3 (3.33%) 8 (8.89%) 4 (4.44%) 18 (20%) 57 (63.33%) 
11. Past finished work-related 
papers/products 2 (2.22%) 9 (10%) 10 (11.11%) 21 (23.33%) 48 (53.33%) 
12. Social media password 
(Facebook, Twitter) 4 (4.44%) 5 (5.56%) 10 (11.11%) 25 (27.78%) 46 (51.11%) 
13. Personal email content 5 (5.56%) 13 (14.44%) 13 (14.44%) 23 (25.56%) 36 (40%) 
14. Online banking details 2 (2.22%) 5 (5.56%) 3 (3.33%) 20 (22.22%) 60 (66.67%) 
15. Access to personal mobile 
phone 8 (8.89%) 19 (21.11%) 18 (20%) 15 (16.67%) 30 (33.33%) 
16. Access to personal USB 
memory drive 6 (6.67%) 15 (16.67%) 18 (20%) 19 (21.11%) 32 (35.56%) 
17. Access to a work USB 
memory drive 2 (2.22%) 5 (5.56%) 6 (6.67%) 20 (22.22%) 57 (63.33%) 
18. Access to other personal 
mobile devices (laptop, 
tablet, PDA, etc.) 
9 (10%) 20 (22.22%) 13 (14.44%) 17 (18.89%) 31 (34.44%) 
As opposed to the table obtained from the three GCC countries surveyed, it can be seen 
that respondents in the UK are less inclined to share information that is regarded sensitive 
from an information security perspective. The results can be better seen in Figure 6.  
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Figure 7: Sharing information which may lead to information security breach (UK) 
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The difference between the two groups may be better observed if the figures are placed 
next to each other as shown in Figure 4. 
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GCC UK 
Figure 8: Inferential analysis of the differences between the two regions (GCC and the UK) 
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To maintain that the difference in the results between the two groups, the three GCC 
countries and the UK, was not due to chance, statistical testing was used on the results. 
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test was used to compare the two groups. The 
Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to evaluate whether there exists a statistically 
significant difference in information security preferences between the two groups. The 
null hypothesis is stated below: 
H0: There is no significant difference between the two groups 
The Mann-Whitney U test supports the conclusion that the difference indicated in the 
above tables and figures are actually significant. The table below shows the results of 
Mann-Whitney U One-Way ANOVA. As can be seen, the two groups show a different 
behaviour in all questions towards information sharing. 
Table 10 - Results of Mann-Whitney U One-Way ANOVA 
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The distribution of Q1 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q2 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q3 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q4 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q5 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q6 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q7 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q8 is the same across categories Independent- .000 Reject the 
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Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
of Group Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q9 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q10 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q11 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q12 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q13 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q14 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q15 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q16 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q17 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q18 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05. 
4.1.1.4 Discussion 
As indicated above, there is a significant difference between the GCC and UK 
respondents in terms of sensitive information sharing in all of the answers collected. The 
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results show that there are culture-related differences regarding perspectives to 
information security and privacy. However, there is a further result to note in this respect. 
Despite the fact that people of the GCC countries share sensitive information among their 
family members and friends more commonly than their UK counterparts, UK people 
show risky behaviour in some scenarios, which may result in threats to the authentication 
mechanism and consequently to digital accounts that require a credential pass. Several 
studies conducted in the UK addressing the extent of social engineering attacks and its 
impact on information security show that many users fall victim to social engineering 
attacks (Robila & Ragucci, 2006; Aburrous et al, 2010; Dimensional Research, 2011). It 
is believed that such attacks are possible only because of posting of personal information 
on social networking websites, as well as lack of awareness of fraud and phishing attacks.  
Governments worldwide try to reduce the impact of computer crimes by raising user 
education and information security awareness. For example, the UK cybersecurity 
strategy of 2011 alludes to the risk of social engineering attacks and the need to enhance 
the individual’s skills through security education. Moreover, the UK strategy aims to 
improve cybersecurity education at all levels using different approaches of user 
awareness in the public and private sector. It aims to provide Internet users with a 
complete understanding of cybersecurity risks associated with using Internet social 
media. 
Although it happens on a smaller scale in comparison to the GCC countries, the results of 
this study imply that the UK cybersecurity strategy may also need to consider the sharing 
preference of private information publically when designing information security 
education courses. Due to the potentially significant results of sharing sensitive 
information, it is important for the UK cybersecurity to put more effort into this aspect. 
For example, the UK cyber strategy recommends some websites designed to educate 
online users such as www.getsafeonline.org and make them aware of the actual risks of 
information security. These online resources may need to include sharing sensitive 
information and the impact of this activity on online users as indicated this study. 
The prevalence of social media websites makes it easier for attackers to accumulate, 
compare and analyse people’s personal information and then start implementing an 
attack. For example, a telephone number sent to a Facebook user with a fake profile can 
be verified using a real caller application (another social media source) in order to 
retrieve some information about the user. Internet users must therefore be educated about 
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real breaches as this will make them aware of the threat that is inherent in online 
activities. The same topic is further discussed in a study conducted in the healthcare 
domain. The study asserts that awareness and training of end users should focus on their 
behaviour, in particular password sharing, which may lead to a breach (Ferreira et al, 
2010). 
In respect of the GCC countries, it is extremely important that they carefully consider the 
problem of sensitive information sharing. The problem is rooted in the culture of trust and 
sharing sensitive information among friends and family members. Therefore, any 
information security strategy in these countries must consider trust and social influences 
of Arab culture when designing security courses. 
4.2. Conclusion 
The weakest link is the preferable place for hackers to penetrate any authentication 
controls. It is believed that humans are this link as rather than system security. In this 
Chapter the challenges to the information security triad have been linked to human 
behaviour based on cultural attributes. A culture of trust allows sharing sensitive 
information which may lead to compromised digital authentication and consequently 
potential harm to both individuals and organisations.  
A questionnaire consisting of 18 questions was administered to test information-sharing 
attitudes of a sample of 180 employees in UAE, Oman, KSA and the U.K. The questions 
were related to direct and indirect aspects which lead to compromising digital 
authentication. Based on social engineering threats and user behaviour on the Internet, a 
questionnaire was designed particularly to investigate the sharing preferences to the first 
security control: the authentication mechanism. The data collected were focused on areas 
in a cultural context such as: personal belongings, work belongings and trust and social 
influences towards family members and friends. 
The results indicate that there are similarities among the 3 countries in most questions, 
showing similar attitudes towards sharing sensitive information in the 3 GCC countries 
and this is believed to have a strong relation with the cultural and social background.  
This chapter also presented a comparison between the UK and the GCC (Gulf 
Cooperation Council) countries in terms of attitude and behaviour towards information 
sharing. The data analysis showed that there is a significant difference between GCC and 
the UK cultures in terms of information sharing. This chapter also discussed the actual 
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and potential threats associated with the phenomenon of sharing sensitive information 
with family and friends. 
Certain social and cultural backgrounds of employees may represent a threat to the 
organisation when those backgrounds inherently conflict with information security 
awareness, which may consequently breach the criteria used for information security 
compliance. This aspect of conflict may be, and usually is, exploited by social 
engineering, which manipulates users to bypass the security controls instead of using 
technical skills. Social engineering attacks have proven effective resulting in serious 
damage to both individuals and organisations. The damage that could potentially occur 
due to the sharing of sensitive information among individuals because of cultural traits is 
extended to the law enforcement community. Law enforcement bodies find it extremely 
difficult to deal with identity theft if it occurs as a result of information sharing. Social 
engineers use different approaches to gather a victim’s personal information which can be 
a key element for the next hacking stages. The threat of social engineering is strong as 
shown in the scenarios provided by this study. The behaviour of employees should be in 
line with the information security policy of the organisation in order not to become a 
victim of such social engineering.  
The results show the need for information security awareness and education in the GCC 
region. It is observed that in order to reduce the impact of these threats, it is strongly 
recommended to consider the root causes of the problem which stem from cultural factors 
and the lack of information security awareness. Looking for a different solution to each 
factor of the cause will not lead to the desired results of information security. This may be 
referred to as a culture-integrated information security solution. 
It was shown that, despite the fact that people of the GCC countries share sensitive 
information among their family members and friends more significantly than those of the 
UK, UK people show risky behaviour in some scenarios, which may comprise potential 
threats to the authentication mechanism and consequently to other digital accounts that 
require a credential pass. 
Account access is meant to be the account owner’s sole right and the owner should be 
aware of the consequences that may result from sharing this right with others.  
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CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL 
ENGINEERING ATTACK 
MITIGATION 
In the previous chapter it was indicated that there is a cultural difference towards sharing 
of sensitive information between the GCC countries and the UK. People of the GCC 
countries share sensitive information among their family members and friends more 
commonly than those in the UK. This social attribute forms a threat such as a privacy 
attack or a social engineering attack. Similarly, sharing of sensitive information was also 
identified in health care institutions (Medlin et al, 2008; Ferreira et al, 2010) which can 
also be used to execute using social engineering attacks.  
Although the results obtained call for a mitigation of information security awareness and 
education in the GCC region, there are some other mitigation measures which could help 
to reduce the threat of social engineering attacks. According to several studies (for 
example Baker et al, 2005; Ferreira et al, 2010) combating social engineering attacks can 
be performed through the following measures: 
 Legislation 
 Technology  
 Education and Awareness 
Based on the outcomes of the previous chapter, the lack of information security 
awareness and the cultural impact are behind the sharing phenomena among family 
members and friends. This chapter provides several mitigation measures as candidates for 
further implementation plans that cover both the cultural influence and the lack of 
information security awareness. 
5.1. Legislation Measures 
According to the Science and Technology Committee (2007), a law requiring 
organisations to notify their clients whenever there is a breach of data security should be 
the first step towards promoting personal security and privacy on the Internet. In the U.S., 
such laws are commonplace, with at least 45 states having adopted data breach disclosure 
laws by the end of 2009. Ideally, data breach disclosure laws are meant to help people 
mitigate the consequences of their personally identifiable information (PII) being 
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disclosed to third parties. According to Romanosky et al. (2010) such laws are motivated 
by the concept that if corporate organisations and government bodies are required by law 
to disclose any information security breaches, they will realise that such disclosures will 
have negative publicity for them. Consequently, they will improve their security 
measures and rid themselves of substandard security practices. The Ponemon Institute 
(2005) supports the previous argument by indicating that a significant number of 
consumers have been found to lose confidence in firms that suffer information security 
breaches.  
Although no country has fully tapped into the legal approach of creating consequences 
for perpetrators of social engineering attacks, Lewis (2014) notes that attribution of such 
attacks is not too complicated nowadays. In other words, it is not easy to pinpoint who the 
perpetrator is in a social engineering attack. Lewis (2014) notes that the absence of 
criminal or civil consequences for perpetrators means that they can escape responsibility 
for the attack. Admittedly, pursuing a perpetrator who may reside in a different 
geographical area may be expensive and difficult. However, governments can use 
legislation to ensure people found engaging in social engineering attacks will pay for 
their crimes.  
The challenge with identity theft can be extended to law enforcement too. The 
investigator must provide rigorous evidence to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the 
suspect was the person who was in control of the device when the actions took place. 
This can be difficult especially when the case is related to passwords and tokens, as they 
could have been obtained and used by someone else (Jones & Martin, 2010). 
Lewis (2014) further argues that legislation needed to establish how much is too much 
when companies or governments retaliate (e.g. by hacking back). The author argues that 
placing false information on one’s network is one way which companies can mislead 
hackers. However, companies, individuals and/or governments should avoid going out of 
their own network. If a company goes into another company’s network, with the intention 
of retaliating against alleged social engineering attacks, Lewis (2014) argues that then 
becomes a matter that needs to be handled by the law. Unfortunately, not enough 
legislative measures are in place to provide the necessary deterrent measures to such 
retaliatory attacks.  
From the literature, it would appear that most efforts to address social engineering are 
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based in the US. For example, the US enacted the Identity Theft and Assumption 
Deterrence Act in 1998, which made it a felony to:  
Knowingly transfer, possess or use, without lawful authority, a means of identification of 
another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that 
constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable 
state or local laws (Scheb & Scheb , 2011).  
Other countries are yet to catch up, despite their populations being equally susceptible to 
social engineering attacks. In an effort to curb identity theft, the US established the 
Identity Theft Task Force (ITTF), whose mandate was to examine the use of legislative 
measures in investigating, prosecuting and recovering proceeds obtained by criminals 
who carry out identity theft (Ryder, 2011). Another mandate of the ITTF is to suggest 
policies and safety mechanisms which can enhance people’s security and privacy of 
information. ITTF recommend that: People’s social security numbers should be used by 
federal agencies (or corporate organisations) only when necessary, national standards 
requiring corporate organisations to safeguard PII, and give notice to consumers 
whenever there is a breach need to be established; federal agencies need to create 
awareness among consumers, the public and private sectors on defending themselves 
against detecting and deterring perpetrators of social engineering; and that a law 
enforcement centre, with a specific responsibility to coordinate information and efforts on 
curbing social engineering, should be established (Ryder, 2011). Despite the apparent 
support from US legislature, some authors such as Lafferty (2007), indicate that there is 
still no law enforcement on the ground. Consequently, Lafferty (2007) suggests that most 
of the war against social engineering will have to be fought by individual organisations 
and professionals.  
At the European level, the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC is cited as a leading 
legislative instrument in combating social engineering attempts. The directive indicates 
that anyone who violates its legal requirements, which make it unlawful for people to 
unlawfully acquire and use personal data, can be prosecuted (Robinson et al, 2011). 
Another policy that has been suggested by Robinson et al (2011) is a requirement for 
biometrics to be produced by users of PII. Such a requirement, it has been argued, would 
make it impossible for hackers to fraudulently benefit from the PII obtained about people. 
For example, without being able to match victims’ biometrics, their names, addresses, 
date of birth, financial and insurance details, a perpetrator, who wanted to use them for 
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financial gain, would not benefit (Robinson et al, 2011). However, this proposal remains 
only a proposal to date. Even if it were made into a legislative instrument, it is argued that 
corporate organisations that stand the risk of losing their trade and competitive 
information to hackers would not benefit much from the proposal. Notably however, such 
a policy measure would safeguard the interests of millions of private citizens whose 
vulnerability to social engineering attacks costs them a great deal of money annually and 
subjects them to distress.  
Alder (2006) cites that many of the recent statutes, regulations and court cases 
demonstrate regulatory requirements for security that closely resemble established 
information security standards. Abu Dhabi Police Department has recently faced a case of 
fraud, theft and seizure by a police sergeant who was made redundant in 1999 after being 
diagnosed unfit for service due to ill-health. The prosecutors accused the former 
policeman of breaking into the electronic system of the Ministry of Interior as an official 
and promoting himself to Captain and to Major eight months after. Having no evidence of 
breaking into the system, the judge could not reach a verdict on the policeman being 
guilty on the grounds of UAE criminal law. 
Edward Snowden, the former US NSA contractor, obtained several login access details 
from employees working at NSA (Reuters). Snowden successfully used a social 
engineering attack to trick between 20 and 25 fellow workers at the NSA regional 
operations centre into giving their passwords to allow access to classified information, 
which he later leaked to the media. Most interestingly, NSA was not clear what 
regulations the employees had broken by giving Snowden their password login details 
which allowed him to access classified data. 
Overall, it would appear from the analysis above that, legislative measures for curbing 
social engineering attacks are still an area that needs to be developed. As Robinson et al 
(2011) note, effective legislation would require governments to work together to provide 
punitive and deterrence measures that are not only applicable in one geographical 
jurisdiction, but also across borders. This is informed by the fact that social engineering 
attacks are not limited by geographical locations. A perpetrator in China can, for 
example, wage attacks on British citizens or on UAE citizens. 
5.2. Technological Measures 
Although there are several techniques that offer solutions to the problem of privacy attack 
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and social engineering attack, such as cryptography, digital certificates, biometrics, etc, 
these solutions involve a danger that implementations will ignore the realities of how 
users and administrators behave. Implementations of technology should have reasonable 
expectations about what the user can and will do (Cox et al, 2001). The same point is 
addressed by (Inthiran & Seddon, 2007) who claim that although technological measures 
may add to the strength of policies and technological devices may increase the immunity 
of the organisation, organisations have to realise that having policies does not guarantee 
protection of its resources and reputation without the entire cycle of conceptualisation and 
employee involvement.  
Bjork (2005) noted that “it doesn’t matter what technology you have – there is no 
technology that can protect you against human beings” (p. 186). While the truth of this 
statement is arguable, the statement holds some sense in that social engineering attacks do 
not target the technological aspect of an organisation. Rather, it targets the individuals 
within it, with the aim of obtaining information that will enable perpetrators to gain 
access to the system. However, the foregoing does not mean that technology measures are 
completely irrelevant. Technical controls such as routers, encryption, antivirus software, 
firewalls, smart cards, alarms and alerts, biometrics, and dial-up call-back systems, 
amongst others, can be used to protect information in a manner that ensures that 
confidentiality and integrity of data is maintained. 
5.1.3 Restricting Data Access 
To succeed in restricting access to data, Davis (2014) observes that technology experts 
need to build technological features into an operating system. The features restrict access 
to information based on the user’s knowledge of a common secret or based on their 
identity. When used correctly, restricting access to data is an efficient manner of curbing 
social engineering efforts; however, and as Davis (2014) indicates, it has its limitations. 
For example, it may not prevent different users in the same network from accessing 
information stored in different computers. The implication of this is that if one computer 
is compromised, the effects can be felt in an entire network.  
5.1.4 Encrypting data  
Data encryption is another technical measure that organisations can adopt to curb social 
engineering. The primary goal of data encryption is to make data undecipherable to 
anyone who has access to it, but does not have a decryption key. Cryptography can 
protect data from being accessed by unauthorised parties, prevent data from being altered, 
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and prevent non-repudiation where the receiver would deny receiving information or the 
sender would deny ever sending it (Klingman, 2005). Using an encryption key, the person 
encrypting data converts readable text into non-readable ciphertext, and only a person 
with an encryption key can re-convert it into readable text. The challenge for 
organisations that use data encryption as a method of curbing social engineering is to 
ensure that the decryption key is well hidden and that no unauthorised persons can access 
or control the same (Davis, 2014). It has been argued that encrypting data merely 
transforms problems associated with data protection into problems “of protecting 
cryptographic keys” (Davis, 2014,).  
5.1.5 Data Hiding  
Also known as security through obscurity, data hiding strives to store sensitive 
information in a place where people cannot easily find it. Some of the places where 
information is hidden include the application source code, Windows registry and 
configuration files (Davis, 2014). It is however suggested that social engineers can easily 
detect when data is hidden, particularly with utilities such as diskmon, filemon, and 
regmon (Davis, 2014). Data hiding can be done by embedding secret messages on 
images, in video sequences, audio sequences, and even in IPv4 headers (Kayarkar & 
Sanyal, 2012). The latter is especially useful when transmitting data over networks, and 
involves fragmenting data into different sizes and appending each fragment with a 
message authentication code (MAC). For the recipient to decipher the information, he or 
she needs to have the message authentication code. In other words, the sender and the 
recipient need to have pre-shared the MAC in the same sequences that the messages were 
sent (Davis, 2014). 
5.1.6 Controlling System Access 
Controlling access to information by layering the clearance levels is also cited as a 
measure through which social engineering can be reduced. For example, an organisation 
may require people to use passwords, a personal identification number (PIN), or 
biometric identifiers before accessing specific information. Of these, biometric identifiers 
are the most efficient, yet the most expensive to run (Siddiqui & Muntjir, 2013). In 
biometrics, the system captures a person’s unique biometric identifiers, processes them, 
and stores them. During verification, the specific biometric identifier is captured, 
processed, compared with what is in the system and either accepted or denied depending 
on whether a match was found. Some of the biometric measures available include face 
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recognition, voice analysis, signature biometrics, vein geometry, iris scan, retina scan and 
geometry of the hand (Siddiqui & Muntjir, 2013). One of the advantages of using 
biometrics is that they cannot be easily mimicked or stolen. The downside of biometrics, 
however, is that for it to work it has to first gather and store someone’s intrinsic 
information. To people of different cultures and religious persuasions, obtaining and 
using such intrinsic information is contrary to their privacy expectations (Smart Card 
Alliance, 2003).  
5.1.7 Updating Software 
It is said that social engineers often seek to ascertain whether an organisation is running 
out-of-date or unpatched software, because such information gives them a window to 
exploit the system (Granger, 2002). The challenge for the technical experts in charge of 
running a system is in ensuring that the software is up-to-date, because as Tornikoski 
(2014) indicates, “your software is like the front door to your PC”. If the software is out-
of-date, the system is prone to all kinds of attacks. For instance, even banner ads which 
run on a website could pose a danger to the system because most are built to take 
advantage of different plug-ins (e.g. flash and Java) in order to access data.  
Overall, although technological measures provide the basic infrastructure from which 
information protection is carried out, there is overwhelming evidence in the literature 
(Nohlberg, 2008; Granger, 2002; Mitneck & Simon, 2002) that human beings are always 
the greatest source of risk for information exposure. As such, one can conclude that 
technological measures alone cannot succeed in curbing social engineering; rather, for 
relative success to be achieved, organisations would need to combine both technological 
and human aspects. Specifically, and as discussed below, organisations would need to 
educate and create awareness among employees regarding the value of the information 
they have access to, how to protect it, and how to react in cases in which the information 
is inadvertently exposed.  
5.3. Education and Awareness 
The literature on social engineering seems to agree about the absence of an overall 
solution to the problem. Education and awareness is recommended as the most desirable 
way through which social engineering attack vulnerabilities can be reduced (Mitneck & 
Simon, 2002; Granger, 2002). It has been argued that an educated and informed 
population would be knowledgeable about the kinds of attacks that could occur, ways of 
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detecting such attacks and how to react when an attack is suspected to have occurred 
(Mitneck & Simon, 2002). One of the biggest lessons in education and awareness is 
related to letting employees know that no one (not even a fellow employee, but mostly 
not a remote caller) can be trusted with sensitive information such as passwords.  
The weakest link in an organisation (and the most likely target for social engineering 
attacks) are those employees, managers, or business owners who are unaware of the value 
of the information contained in the system; people who have special privileges (e.g. 
system administrators); specific departments who hold potentially valuable information 
(e.g. human resource, accounting etc); and manufacturers or vendors who supply an 
organisation with software and hardware (Mitneck & Simon, 2002). It has been found 
that in most organisations, people have a certain degree of security awareness. However, 
their knowledge on security matters is often inadequate, and even where it is adequate, it 
is overshadowed by paranoia, caution, gullibility, and a level of suspicion. 
Education and awareness should address a number of issues. According to Nohlberg 
(2008), corporate policies are the first step about which employees need to be educated. 
By understanding such policies, employees would be better positioned to understand what 
is considered right or wrong in an organisation. Next are security issues, which include 
personal safety and collective organisational safety. Again, understanding security issues 
would enable employees to understand when they are secure, and when their security is 
compromised. Employees also need to be educated about their role. According to 
Nohlberg (2008), understanding one’s role enables the employee to know what to do or 
how to react when something that is out of the ordinary is suspected. Finally, the 
employees need to be educated about reporting and responding. In general terms, this 
means that employees need to be empowered with knowledge that would enable them to 
know how to report a suspected breach in security. Nohlberg (2008) argues that every 
organisation needs to ask itself if its employees would become suspicious and report, in 
the appropriate manner and to the right person, an unknown person who enters the office, 
sits on a computer and starts working on it. If the answer is in the negative, the 
organisation needs to educate its employees further, because they would easily fall prey 
to social engineering attacks. In relation to awareness creation, employees need to know: 
the information that has value (and therefore needs to be protected); that their friends are 
not necessarily the organisation’s friends (hence the need to keep trade secrets secret and 
sensitive organisational information confidential); that passwords are personal and should 
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not be shared even with their colleagues at work; and that knowing each other and 
identifying strangers who have not been introduced to them as co-workers is vital for 
their own security and for security of the organisation (Nohlberg, 2008). 
Granger (2002) further notes that social engineering attacks are conducted either in the 
physical aspect (e.g. an imposter calls, visits an organisation, or dumps a malware-laden 
flash drive in a strategic place near the organisation where he or she is almost certain an 
employee will pick it up and use it in the office); or in the psychological aspect (i.e. 
friendliness, conformity, ingratiation, impersonation, and persuasion). If employees are to 
help in the fight against social engineering, it is important for them to understand the 
form of social attacks that can target them. Additionally, employees need to understand 
that they should protect themselves even outside the organisational environment. For 
example, carrying flash drives that have sensitive company information is risky in that the 
flash drive can be stolen or lost. Additionally, particularly for those who take work home, 
employees need to be educated that they cannot share their laptops or PCs with their 
friends. Picked up flash drives (especially those that are unusually marked (e.g. with a 
mark indicating some strange content inside) should be avoided even in home computers.  
As not every employee will abide by everything they are told, organisations also need to 
put in place security policies which every employee will have to adhere to. According to 
Granger (2002), organisations need to develop policies that are neither too general nor too 
specific. This is informed by the idea that policy enforcers (employees) would need some 
flexibility, but would also need some limits in their daily practices to avoid being too 
complacent. Overall, it would appear that education and awareness play a critical role in 
averting or reducing social engineering exposure. It has been argued that the human link 
is easier to use when seeking to access information as opposed to penetrating a system 
through hacking. As such, it is important that employees are made to understand the value 
of the information they hold, the possible attacks that might come their way, the form that 
such attacks may take, and how and who to report suspected social engineering attacks to. 
Overall, it can be argued that education empowers people by making them more aware, 
not only of the physical social engineering attacks, but also about the psychological 
attacks, which may not seem or even feel like attacks when being executed. The 
psychological social engineering attacks are manipulative, friendly, and meant to source 
information from unsuspecting employees without raising eyebrows.  
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5.4. Cultural Change 
As illustrated in the previous Chapter, there exists an information security problem whose 
solution may lie in a particular cultural environment. 
Certain cultural attributes must be changed in order to prevent information sharing and 
eventually achieve information security. However, the ability to do so involves a long 
process.  
According to Haviland et al. (2010), cultures have always changed over time. Changes 
take place in response to certain events, such as population growth and technological 
innovation. Hence, it is possible to change culture after a significant event. Among the 
triggering events, according to Haviland et al. is technological innovation, such as the 
growth in use and capability of ICT. They further assert that people growing up in 
modern industrial and post-industrial societies generally value personal freedom, 
individuality, and privacy as essential in their pursuit of happiness. Hence, they maintain 
that valuing privacy is an aspect of post-industrial societies, which is still not common for 
Arabs at the current stage of their development. 
Naylor (1996) argues that changing a culture requires changing the people, their beliefs or 
behaviours. Determining whether you need to do this is the first step. Legislative 
accountability is not a particularly useful strategy for changing ideas. Legislating change 
has been shown to be of limited value in any culture change (Naylor, 1996). Coercion 
through the promise of punishment will fare no better; experience has shown this 
generally results in only superficial change. Kotter and Schlesinger (2008) argue that 
using coercion is a risky process because inevitably people strongly resent forced change.  
Although integrating change can be a long and demanding process, it is still possible. 
Furthermore, the required change is clear and identified, namely, sensitive information 
sharing. Naylor (1996) maintains that education is perhaps the best defence against 
resistance to cultural change.  
The need for effective user privacy education has been discussed in several respects. For 
example, Aloul (2012) conducted research on information security in the UAE and came 
to the conclusion that users should be educated against the risk of information sharing, 
which can be exploited by social engineering attacks. He also asserts that schools should 
offer security awareness courses as part of their computer course curriculum. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
Ultimately, a mixture of legislative measures, technological measures, and education and 
awareness will be needed to reduce the prevalence of social engineering attacks. At 
present, it would appear that legislative measures are underdeveloped, technological 
measures are insufficient, and education and awareness is still something that many 
organisations have not fully ensured their employees are equipped with.  
As seen in Chapter 4, lack of awareness and the cultural impact are the main issues for 
sharing sensitive information among family members and friends.  
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CHAPTER 6: NATIONAL 
CYBERSECURITY STRATEGIES: 
RESPONSE TO PASSWORD 
SHARING 
This chapter describes the background and development of an effective education and 
awareness approach. Approaches from other countries are analysed to develop a 
programme which can be adopted in the UAE in order to minimise the risk of sharing 
sensitive information. 
Although many national cybersecurity strategies are developed as a result of earlier 
national threats and risk assessments, and despite cultural, legal, and political differences 
among countries, there are some elements within these strategies that can be beneficial 
for other nations (Luiijf et al, 2013) which do not have their own cybersecurity strategy. 
This chapter considers the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries’ initiatives towards 
cybersecurity and the response to the threat of password sharing. In addition, a critical 
analysis is conducted on three national cybersecurity strategies of the USA, the UK and 
Australia in relation to security awareness and education in password sharing. The 
analysis is centred on the initiatives that target online user security education. The 
analysis also considers the awareness tools developed in these countries and the 
possibilities of adopting them to reduce the identified risks found in the UAE. 
6.1 Research Strategy 
As discussed previously, the cultural nature of the problem dictates that a proposed 
solution would have to consider the cultural basis. Such a solution would inherently result 
in resistance to change. However, studies show that education is the best defence against 
resistance to cultural change (Naylor, 1996) and which can produce effective outcomes 
(Aloul, 2012).  
Furthermore, where the risk of sharing sensitive information in the UAE is identified (e.g. 
Alkaabi & Maple, 2013; Alkaabi & Maple, 2012; Alarifi et al, 2012) a successful 
approach to producing effective information security results should consider the causes of 
risk (Blakley et al, 2001). Identifying the causes of risk can contribute to the design of 
effective information security strategies (Everett, 2011). National cybersecurity strategies 
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commonly identify and comprise elements of reducing cybersecurity threats. For 
example, the national cybersecurity strategy for the UK provides actions to reduce the 
risks that affect an individual’s personal information resulting in fraud and identity theft 
on the information security awareness website (www.getsafeonline.org). 
Accordingly, this work critically analyses three national cybersecurity strategies of the 
United Kingdom (UK), the United States (U.S.) and Australia (AUS) in order to identify 
any information security awareness education designed to educate online users about the 
risk of sharing sensitive information, including passwords. The GCC countries do not 
have national cybersecurity strategies but they refer to such practice as computer 
emergency response team (CERT). The computer emergency responses of the GCC 
countries are analysed in place of a strategy. The analysis particularly covers elements of 
the availability of information security programmes recommended by cybersecurity 
documents. 
Due to the password sharing threat found in the UAE, an investigation into password 
security awareness was conducted to critically analyse and compare the aspects designed 
by those countries to educate online users about the risk and impact of password sharing 
and its applicability to the UAE.  
Figure 9 shows the hierarchy of the investigation and the applicability to the UAE 
cybersecurity threats: 
 
Figure 9: Hierarchy of the investigation and the applicability to the UAE cybersecurity threats 
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6.2 Information Security Strategy in the GCC 
The GCC countries share the same culture of trust that stems from loyalty and religious 
attributes, which contributes to information security threats (Alkaabi & Maple, 2013). 
According to a study by Alkaabi & Maple (2013), access login sharing with co-workers 
and family members is one of the information security awareness issues that need to be 
dealt with effectively. However, strategic orientation of raising information security 
awareness is not found in the GCC. The European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security (ENISA) has listed all of the National cybersecurity Strategies in the 
world based on publicly available material. There is no national cybersecurity for any of 
the GCC countries in the list (National cybersecurity Strategies in the World — ENISA). 
Furthermore, there is also no national cybersecurity strategy beyond the Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) for some of the GCC countries according to the 
United Nation International Security Trends and Realities report (UNIDIR, 2013). 
Despite the fact that CERT is designed by a country to provide both technical and 
managerial support for cyber incidents for both organisations and online users, security 
awareness is often responsibility of the CERT team. It provides limited advice on some 
security threats for online users rather than the awareness tools recommended by the 
governmental cybersecurity strategy (for example, the UK and AUS cybersecurity 
strategies). 
Although there is no cybersecurity strategy for the GCC countries, governmental 
awareness initiatives for each country that aims to raise public information security 
knowledge and cover the risk found in the inherited culture were considered. Below are 
the findings for each GCC country: 
6.2.1 Saudi Arabia (KSA) 
Saudi Arabia has a National Information Security Strategy drafted in 2011. However, 
information security awareness and education is still a target in the KSA. Furthermore, 
the Saudi strategy does not include any information security awareness tools similar to 
those in the UK, AUS and the U.S., which provide citizens with comprehensive 
knowledge of information security risks (NISS, 2011). 
The Saudi CERT (CERT-SA) was established to play a pivotal role in increasing and 
spreading awareness, knowledge, management, detection, prevention, coordination and to 
provide responses to information security incidents at the national level. 
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However, CERT-SA also provides a limited information security awareness programme 
as it covers a limited scale of security advice. The awareness programme lists some ways 
for protecting the privacy of the individual in the digital world through sharing sensitive 
information such as passwords is not mentioned. Similarly, the information awareness 
programme focuses on the password management structure such as the length, 
complexity, different passwords for different accounts etc. whilst ignoring the issues 
password sharing. 
6.2.2 Oman 
Oman does not have a national cybersecurity strategy but does have some initiatives are 
related to cybersecurity incident recovery and public security awareness. Due to the 
necessity of addressing risks and security threats in Oman cyberspace, the government of 
Oman officially launched Oman CERT (OCERT) in April 2010 (OCERT, 2014). OCERT 
was developed to build trust between the Omani government and citizens with regards to 
e-government services. In addition, OCERT provides awareness and training services 
upon request. This initiative was introduced due to the considerable number of Omani 
citizens who are unaware of their exposure to security risks. However, there is currently 
no information security awareness advice on their website or booklet. 
6.2.3 Bahrain 
There is no cybersecurity strategy for Bahrain and no CERT to provide security 
awareness to online users. Bahrain is advised to set up a national security strategy to 
combat cyber threats according news in March 2014 (Middle East Association). 
6.2.4 Qatar 
Qatar CERT (Q-CERT) was established in December 2005 in cooperation with Carnegie 
Mellon's Software Engineering Institute. Its mission is centred on providing the nation’s 
information security needs and safeguarding local society (Q-CERT). 
National information security centres provide awareness programmes to the audience 
upon request. However, they do not have a national cybersecurity strategy based on a 
national risk assessment that aims to raise user awareness in relation to the vulnerability 
of the human factor. cybersecurity awareness designed by Q-CERT does not provide any 
security awareness advice. 
6.2.5 Kuwait 
Kuwait does not have a national cybersecurity strategy or CERT that may provide an 
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awareness mechanism.  
6.2.6 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
The UAE does not have a national cybersecurity strategy. However, the UAE CERT has 
provided several initiatives to raise public security awareness. In the security awareness 
domain provided by the CERT website, different environments have been considered 
such as home and work (aeCERT). 
The UAE CERT website also offers several types of material on security awareness such 
as posters, reminder cards, frequently asked questions and others. Password security is 
one of the security issues that the UAE is concerned about and is covered in the material. 
With regard to password sharing, the website provides advice asking citizens not to share 
passwords with others, while no discussion of the impact of password sharing is 
provided. 
Table 11 below summarises the GCC countries governmental initiatives to cybersecurity: 
Table 11: GCC countries governmental initiatives to cybersecurity 
Country/ initiatives Cybersecurity 
Strategy 
CERT 
Security 
Awareness 
Programme 
Password 
Security 
Password 
Sharing 
Saudi Arabia     
United Arab Emirates     
Bahrain     
Kuwait      
Qatar     
Oman     
 
6.3 National cybersecurity Strategies for the U.S., the UK and 
Australia 
6.2.7 United States (U.S.) 
Password creation and sharing in the U.S. was considered by Stanton & Stam (2005) in a 
study of people behaviour and attitude. The study targeted 1,167 end-users in the U.S. 
investigating their behaviour towards information security. The study revealed that 
sharing account access with a friend was the most noticeable end-user behaviour. The 
study also showed that 23% of the respondents sometimes shared their passwords with 
their work-assigned group, 7% revealed their passwords to colleagues in the company 
who did not belong to their work group, and 4.1% shared their passwords with people 
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who did not work for the same company. Stanton et al (2005) assert that considering end 
user behaviour is one of the success factors for information security compliance. The 
authors also stated that although password creation and sharing is generally poor across 
different organisation sectors such as military organisations, telecommunications, and 
others, improvements to this phenomenon are associated with training, awareness and 
education. 
Another study was conducted by Medlin et al. (2008) in the healthcare field in the U.S. to 
analyse the vulnerability of hospitals to social engineering attacks. The findings of the 
study maintained that employees reveal their passwords with co-workers and co-workers’ 
friends. Out of 118 respondents surveyed, 73% of the respondents shared their passwords. 
Such behaviour is vulnerable to social engineering whereby the trust environment among 
healthcare staff could be misused to obtain unauthorised access to patient profiles. The 
threat of social engineering to the medical system has a higher impact than that to, for 
instance, financial institutions as medical records could be tampered with resulting in life 
threatening outcomes. The study raised serious concerns about the state of employee 
security awareness and the necessity of organising initiatives to make employees aware of 
the risks of information sharing. 
The U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) has specific 
standards related to security and privacy of information to ensure the protection of health 
care information. HIPAA refers to the security and privacy measures in relationship to 
Security Management Process, Security Awareness and Training and Access Control. 
However, the behaviour practiced by healthcare employees in the U.S. clearly violates 
HIPAA’s regulations, which are definitive in terms of patient information privacy 
(Medlin et al, 2008). 
Another study in critical infrastructure sectors in the U.S. by (Moore et al, 2008) targeted 
the insider threat and the impact of employee practices on IT sabotage. The study 
revealed several cases of IT misconduct including the sharing of passwords among co-
workers. The authors proposed that such behaviour could be reduced through continuous 
security awareness training and suggested that information security policies should 
include password management that prohibits password sharing. 
President Obama has publically stated that cybersecurity is one of the most serious 
economic and national security challenges for the U.S. One of the initiatives that the U.S. 
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aims to achieve is to expand cybersecurity awareness and education from the boardrooms 
of the U.S. government sector to the classrooms (The White House). According to the 
International Strategy for Cyberspace (2011) developed by the U.S. government, making 
the end user aware of cybersecurity threats remains one of the priorities in cyberspace 
defence (The White House, 2011). The strategy covers different security threats that 
compromise end user privacy due to the country’s acknowledgment that the growth of 
social networks brings new challenges. As the citizens increasingly engage in Internet 
resources in their public and private lives, they should be aware of Internet security risks 
that could lead them to a compromise of their personal data resulting in identity theft and 
fraud, amongst others. In addition, the strategy recommends building a culture of 
cybersecurity as this increases knowledge of the cybersecurity risks among citizens.  
The cybersecurity strategy for the U.S. does not provide much information about the tools 
used to increase public information security awareness. However, the National 
cybersecurity Alliance (NCSA) is responsible for creating and implementing broad-
reaching education and awareness efforts to provide users at home, work and in school 
environments with the best prevention awareness that they need to keep themselves, their 
organisations, their systems, and their sensitive information safe and secure online and to 
encourage a culture of cybersecurity. NCSA has developed a website that helps increase 
public knowledge of cybersecurity. The website, staysafeonline.org, is an education 
source that aims to provide citizens with knowledge of common threats and the possible 
ways to protect themselves while they are online. The website covers different protection 
domains in the information security awareness field, such as personal information, work 
environment, home and mobile devices, amongst others. 
In addition, “Stop. Think. Connect.” is a national public security awareness campaign 
developed by the Department of Homeland Security in cooperation with the National 
cybersecurity Alliance (Stop.Think.Connect). This campaign provides all the tools to host 
a classroom discussion or community meeting on online safety including advice and 
suggestions to stay safe online. 
Password sharing with friends and employees is covered on these websites which clearly 
states “never share your password with any one”, and this applies to work and home, 
adults and young people. The awareness websites advise citizens to keep their social 
security numbers, account numbers, passwords, and other personal details private and 
never share them with others. The advice on passwords includes making them complex 
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and changing them regularly (Stop.Think.Connect). However, according to major cases 
which have recently affected U.S. national security (discussed below), U.S. citizens are 
still willing to share their access login details with friends and co-workers. 
According to the 2011 U.S. Verizon Data Breach Report, The spread of insider threats 
taking place as a result of password sharing has led to security breaches. Trusted insiders, 
including those who have access to sensitive information, usually steal larger quantities 
of information. The Data Breach Report also indicated that the actual number of incidents 
that occurred as a result of an insider threat almost doubled in 2010 (SANS, 2012). 
Similarly, the information available on the WikiLeaks websites comes from sensitive 
information sharing amongst insiders. The WikiLeaks cables were initiated from the 
misuse of system privileges by employees within governments, and companies from 
where the data are stolen (Verdasys, 2011). Edward Snowden, the former U.S. NSA 
contractor, obtained several login access details from employees working at NSA 
(Reuters). Snowden successfully used a social engineering attack to trick between 20 and 
25 fellow workers at the NSA regional operations centre into giving their passwords to 
allow access to classified information, which he later leaked to the media. Most 
interestingly, NSA was not clear what regulations the employees had broken by giving 
Snowden their password login details which allowed him to access classified data. 
6.2.8 United Kingdom (UK) 
According to the UK's largest NHS trust, password sharing has been discovered in 70,000 
cases of "unauthorised access" to IT systems, including medical records (Computer 
Weekly). This forms a risk to the security of patient data. For example, in 2008, password 
sharing discovered in an X-ray system at a hospital in Devon, made it difficult to identify 
which doctor wrongly authorised a treatment for a patient who died after a mistake 
(Ritter, 2008). 
However, NHS doctors say that sharing login access is a normal practice which provides 
staff with flexibility to perform their job more easily. 
The NHS trust criticises this phenomenon and aims to introduce a new security policy 
that ensures proper control over login access to NHS trust systems and data (Computer 
Weekly). 
The UK cybersecurity strategy 2011 considers information security awareness of citizens 
as one of its main goals to meet the 2015 vision of the UK cybersecurity space. 
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Prevention of identity theft and fraud attacks has been introduced within the information 
security awareness tool provided in the website Get Safe Online www.getsafeonline.org. 
The strategy also aims to improve cybersecurity education at all levels in order that UK 
citizens are well-equipped to use cyberspace safely.  
6.2.9 Australia (AUS) 
According to a study conducted in Australia by Singh et al (2007) investigating online 
banking and security rules, password sharing among family members does not meet the 
Australian government cybersecurity goals. The study showed that password sharing 
occurs due to the high trust within family relationships. The study also found that people 
with disabilities, who may need the help of others to carry out online banking, share their 
online private access. Singh et al (2007) recommended that social and cultural practices 
should be taken into account while performing information security design. They 
suggested that ignoring these two elements may lead to more violations of the 
information security policy. 
It is easier for a hacker to obtain user access credentials if the hacker knows the security 
environment and the user behaviour in an Australian community. Hackers prefer simple 
sensitive information that may be available, especially in a high trust environment, in 
order to perform their social engineering attacks and obtain such information (Singh et al, 
2006). Identity theft is a well-known social engineering attack; this kind of attack works 
on user behaviour to steal access credentials. Australia’s Internet banking system has 
been targeted by such attacks since early 2003 (McCombie & Pieprzyk, 2010). These 
attacks have resulted in the stealing of victims' personal identity data and financial 
account credentials. 
Although the Australian cybersecurity Strategy 2009 stresses the information security 
fundamentals CIA (Availability, Integrity, Confidentiality) while communicating across 
the country, social engineering attacks and other privacy attacks have been a serious 
concern in Australia’s cybersecurity strategy. The strategy also maintains in its design 
that all Australians should be aware of the cybersecurity risks and impact, and should 
protect their personal information from being compromised by identity theft attacks.  
Information security awareness is a strategic priority for the Australian government. This 
approach focuses on providing confidence and practical tools for citizens to protect 
themselves while operating in a cyber-environment. The strategic approach involves 
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educating online users on the safe ways to use cyber services and introduce the Australian 
people to the associated risks of falling victim to fraud or other attacks. The strategy also 
states that awareness is an ongoing programme, organised in partnership with businesses, 
consumer groups and community organisations, to educate online users on updated 
security risks and threat mitigations. 
The Australian cybersecurity Strategy 2009 recommends changing cybersecurity 
behaviour. This has been discussed extensively in terms of cultural change to create a 
safe environment for all Australian ICT users. Maintaining such a culture can be achieved 
through education and awareness. In addition, the Australian Government Ministry of 
Defence maintains that human behaviour plays a significant role in information security 
and when looking at this factor consideration needs to be given to the organisational 
culture, individual differences and personality traits (Parsons et al, 2010). 
To reach the target of promoting a culture of cybersecurity, the government has 
developed a single authoritative website for cybersecurity information for Australian 
home users and small businesses (http://www.staysmartonline.gov.au ). 
Although the Australian cybersecurity Strategy 2009 states “Never share your password 
with anyone”, a study of Australian attitudes toward password use and management 
shows that nearly 42% of Australians have shared their passwords with a friend, family 
member or work colleague (CIS, 2011). This sharing phenomenon has caused significant 
breaches to information security in Australia. According to SANS password sharing 
report (2012), in January 2011, Vodafone fired employees in Australia for misusing a 
privileged password or providing it to criminals, causing a breach to the database where 
sensitive customer information was stored. 
In conclusion, Australian online users are still willing to share their online access details 
with family members and friends despite the strategic initiatives to reduce online identity 
theft and raising user privacy awareness. Changing culture is another cybersecurity 
strategy that the Australian government is targeting. However, promoting a culture of 
cybersecurity among Australians is different from analysing online user behaviour and 
attitudes. This could potentially be related to the Australian culture of, and the social 
attitudes towards, information security. It is evident that information security culture 
differs from the impact of culture on information security (Glaser, 2009).  
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6.4 Analysis and Discussion 
The cybersecurity strategies detailed above consider end user awareness and education in 
their security design. Accordingly, the countries have developed some awareness tools 
(websites). These websites contain different awareness domains such as home, work 
environment and others. The aim of these awareness websites is to expand security best 
practice and make users aware of the security threats in cyberspace. Although the UAE 
does not have a national cybersecurity strategy, CERT.ae provides similar security 
awareness tools including password sharing awareness (Figure 10). However, the 
problem still exists despite the dissemination of information security awareness regarding 
password sharing. 
 
Figure 10: The strategic responses of the UK, the U.S. and Australia to sharing sensitive information compared 
to the UAE’s CERT 
The awareness websites provided by the U.S., the UK and Australia contain some 
education initiatives for several security threats in the password security domain. For 
example, the strategies maintain the importance of the selection of the password and the 
risk of choosing a weak password. However, sharing passwords with others is stated only 
as advice (as shown in Figure 6) without going into the details of the risk associated with 
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sharing passwords and the impact on both individuals and organisations.  
The possibility of adopting awareness advice without educating users will not make any 
significant difference to cybersecurity threats in the UAE, as CERT.ae provides similar 
advice without educating online users on the risk and the impact of this activity. 
Moreover, it is advisable that the U.S., the UK and Australia should enhance their 
awareness tools by providing education on sharing sensitive information including 
passwords. 
While information security awareness, training and education play a significant role in 
raising the knowledge of information security, there is a clear difference between 
awareness, training and education (Layton, 2006). Awareness is developed to be 
delivered to all users and tends to focus on global security principles whereas training 
targets a specific group to deliver knowledge of a specific topic with an expected 
outcome. Education plays a great role in theory and research by answering the question 
“why” and provides concepts in order to develop new skills and alter outcomes in some 
way (Layton, 2006). 
Generally speaking, information security awareness alone is insufficient as an element to 
reduce the impact of user behaviour on information security. Education on the other hand 
plays a significant role in creating knowledge by educating users on specific information 
security issues (McCoy et al, 2004). Education helps in changing people’s behaviour and 
will keep users aware of any new issues related to the taught subjects (Thomson et al, 
1998). Simply making end users listen to advice on not practicing behaviour against the 
information security policy will prove ineffective. Rather, organisations must further 
approach information security awareness programmes by strengthening education in 
security behaviour modification (Rhee, 2009). 
The awareness tools provided by the above countries should consider the education of 
password sharing. Therefore, education should be designed to show the risk and impact 
of sharing passwords on both organisations and individuals.  
6.5 Conclusion 
Countries have different priorities regarding raising awareness to sensitive information 
sharing. However, wider and significant security education about sharing passwords is 
required. 
In the U.S., advising the end user not to share their access control with anyone is not 
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enough. Instead, educating the end user about the risks and impacts of sharing sensitive 
information in all environments (home, work, school, etc.) is necessary for national 
security. 
Although sensitive information sharing happens in the UK it is on a smaller scale than the 
GCC countries. The UK cybersecurity strategy 2011 may also need to consider the 
sharing preferences of citizens. 
The Australian cybersecurity strategy 2009 should focus on the design of security 
awareness tools and consider the sharing of sensitive information among family members 
and friends in both home and work environments. Strategy makers should also investigate 
the sharing phenomenon and how it is related to the cultural norms, behaviour, attitudes 
and trust.  
As education contributes greatly to the change of end user behaviour, national security 
strategies should consider education as a strategy for reducing the impact of human 
behaviour on information security with regard to sensitive information sharing.  
Finally, the information security risks found in the UAE should be dealt with strategically 
in order to provide an information security education that reduces the cultural impact of 
password sharing. 
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CHAPTER 7: STRATEGIC 
INFORMATION SHARING 
SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
This chapter introduces an education strategy programme that models the needs of UAE’s 
organisational requirements in securing their information security. This strategy is to be 
implemented in the long-term by targeting the younger generation and starting with 
school students.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, awareness in itself may not achieve the required 
result of reducing the amount of password sharing among family members and friends. 
Rather, computer users should be educated about the risks in order to change their 
behaviours and attitude. This chapter provides a case study implemented in Abu Dhabi 
schools to test the efficacy of the education programme and the study will contribute to 
the design of a framework for information security education. 
The need for effective user privacy education has been discussed by several authors. For 
example, Aloul (2012) conducted research on information security practices in the UAE 
and came to the conclusion that users should be educated about the risks of information 
sharing through social engineering attacks. Aloul (2012) also asserts that schools should 
offer security awareness courses as part of their computer course curriculum. 
The intervention study proposes a strategy designed to provide information security 
education for the younger generation and the possibility to mitigate the risk of sharing 
sensitive information. 
7.1 The Intervention Study: Information Security Awareness 
Education 
Information security is based on risk management. A successful approach to information 
security should thus consider the causes of risk (Blakley et al, 2001). While risk 
management is a core element for any security strategy, it is very important to educate 
users on the associated threats and the inherited risks of their actions (Everett, 2011). 
Several studies (for example Alarifi et al, 2012 and Alkaabi & Maple, 2013) have been 
conducted in Arab countries regarding online users’ perceptions to awareness of 
information security. These studies have shown some social vulnerability in information 
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security systems with causes deeply rooted in Arab culture. Sharing security control 
credentials such as passwords or other sensitive information among family members and 
friends is something that is not unusual in Arab culture. 
The most obvious potential threat that takes advantage of information security controls is 
social engineering. Social engineering techniques obtain information by exploiting human 
behaviours, rather than technical vulnerabilities. Many studies in the literature have 
recorded the spread of social engineering and the huge destruction that results from this 
form of attack (Ferreira et al, 2010). 
The current study argues that school education can patch this social vulnerability as long 
as it is targeted appropriately, and acknowledges nuances of culture, in this case Arab 
culture. The study proposes a strategy designed to provide information security education 
for the younger generation with the aim of reducing the likelihood of sharing sensitive 
information. The solution proposed is based on the root causes of sensitive information 
sharing: the cultural impact and the lack of information security awareness (Alkaabi & 
Maple, 2013). 
The figure below (Figure 7) depicts the proposed strategy that is based on the social risk 
of sharing sensitive information with family members and friends: 
 
Figure 11: The proposed strategy  
Figure 11 shows that sharing sensitive information among others is a social vulnerability. 
This social vulnerability could potentially be exploited using the social engineering 
attack. The proposed strategy (with the green arrow) is aimed at patching this social 
vulnerability through the information security education programme. 
A strategy should be developed, for private information sharing in Arab culture, which 
aims to reduce overall information security risks. Two aspects had been taken into 
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consideration while designing the intervention study:  
 The education programme 
 The structured approach  
7.1.1 The Education Programme 
The education programme (Appendix 5) should be designed to cover the following 
aspects: 
 Differentiation between private and other information: This focuses on 
distinguishing between the different natures of information. The individual should 
be aware of this before exposing sensitive information to others. It also covers 
other information that is allowed to be shared in order to communicate with others 
over the Internet.  
 The potential risk posed by sensitive information sharing: This element focuses on 
the risk that might occur from sharing sensitive information. Such risks might be, 
for example, an outcome of matters such as accessing others’ accounts, knowing 
account passwords and accessing unauthorised accounts by using the same shared 
passwords of other authorised accounts. Unauthorised access may cause severe 
consequences to confidentiality, integrity and availability.  
 The impact of the risk as a result of the sharing phenomenon: This shows the 
consequences that might occur from sharing sensitive information with others 
such as identity theft, unauthorised access, and personal information disclosure.  
The above aspects were discussed with computer teachers in schools (under the mandate 
of Abu Dhabi Educational Council ADEC) in Abu Dhabi before running the course. The 
discussions set the basis for the educational material that covered common aspects that 
may lead to compromising digital authentication as a result of the information sharing 
phenomena. 
Therefore, the course material (Appendix 5) was designed to help students identify the 
risks of sharing sensitive information while using Internet services. Furthermore, the 
course material covered the differentiation between sensitive information that is 
commonly prohibited to be disclosed and information that is commonly permitted to be 
shared. 
7.1.2 The Structured Approach  
In order to design and implement an effective information security strategy we must 
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acknowledge the reaction of school children to the information security education 
programme and how much this can contribute to building the required strategy for Abu 
Dhabi Emirate.  
Implementing an information security awareness programme does not automatically 
guarantee that all employees understand their role in ensuring the security and 
safeguarding of information and information assets. In order for security awareness 
programmes to add value to an organisation, and at the same time make a contribution to 
the field of information security, it is necessary to follow a structured approach to study 
and measure its effect (Kruger et al, 2011). 
The study followed two approaches (quantitative and qualitative) to measure the 
awareness of social engineering attacks and the potential information sharing that leads to 
compromise of the digital authentication. Accordingly, two types of surveys were 
designed to gauge the students’ sharing preferences before and after the training 
programme took place. 
The first survey proposed for implementation used Likert scales as pre and post 
assessments of security awareness of the student groups under research. The use of Likert 
scales to assess school student has proven useful in different occasions. Benson et al. 
(2011) used Likert scale questions to assess the effectiveness of courses given to school 
on the basis of a post-course survey. Pornari & Wood (2010) used Likert scale 
questionnaire to investigate the relationship between cognitive mechanisms, applied by 
people to rationalise and justify harmful acts and engagement in traditional peer and 
cyber aggression among school children. Kubiatko & Haláková (2009) researched the 
differences between gender and age according to computer attitudes. They used a Likert 
scale questionnaire with 518 of all grade (first, second, third and fourth) students from 9 
high schools in Slovakia. Their research concluded that younger students had more 
positive attitudes towards ICT. 
The conducted questionnaire was based on a series of test-like questions before and after 
a teaching course was given. The teaching material used lessons and interactive software 
on privacy as an aspect of information security. A sample of 1200 students divided into 
age groups (11-17) and sex groups were considered in the target schools. The respondents 
were equally divided between genders and with the following age groups: 
 Less than 11 (20%) from each gender 
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 Between 11 and 13 (20%) from each gender 
 Between 13 and 15 (20%) from each gender 
 Between 15 and 17 (20%) from each gender 
 Over 17 (20%) from each gender 
The questionnaire used Likert-scale measures and 1071 responses were collected in 
December 2012. Shortly after the responses were collected, taught material was given to 
the students (1200) with the aim of raising the students’ awareness of information 
security risks. 
In February 2013, the second stage of the assessment targeted the experiment group 
(given the taught material) of 500 students of both genders of the initial 1200 
respondents, based on the same percentages as above for every age group. The approach 
used Yes/No questions with the reason of the choice, and for the aim of assessing their 
security awareness. There were 450 responses collected. 
In April 2013, the questionnaire was distributed to a group (control group) of respondents 
who had not been given the taught material. This step was been done to analyse the 
impact of teaching on students by the comparing the result obtained from the taught 
group and that from the non-taught group. There were 460 responses collected.  
In May 2013 the initial group of 1200 students were assessed using the Likert-scale 
measure in order to critically analyse the difference between the two assessments. There 
were 1053 responses collected. 
The methods also included using a questionnaire based on yes/no type answers in order to 
evaluate the gained knowledge after teaching. The answers required the students to 
explain why they chose either answer to each question. “Yes” and “no” options were 
given to each question with space for writing the reason(s) for the choice. This type of 
questionnaire is popular in the literature with young age respondents due to its simplicity 
as well as its ability to extract qualitative data from the provided explanations. Examples 
of its use with school students are numerous in the literature. For example, Iimura & 
Kimizuka (2011) undertook research to measure communication awareness and 
understanding in English of Japanese international students and used yes/no type 
questionnaires. Tuna et al. (2011) used yes/no questionnaires in some schools in Istanbul 
to measure students’ knowledge about climate change. In a similar manner, the 
Adolescent Depression Awareness Program (ADAP) in used yes/no type questions to 
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measure awareness of depression in U.S. schools. Wu et al (2010) used yes/no 
questionnaires to measure awareness of college students about copyright laws. Maftoon 
& Soroush S. (2010) utilised the analysis of social practices to raise critical language 
awareness in EFL writing courses. They also used yes/no questionnaires to measure the 
awareness levels after conducting the course. 
The yes/no survey used two groups of 500 students each. The first group (experiment 
group) was given taught material on information security threats and precautious 
measures. The other group (control group) was not given the material. 
7.2 Quantitative Study 
7.2.1 Method: Likert Scale Questions 
The method used a collection of taught material and interactive software to educate 
students on information security. There was a series of surveys conducted with a sample 
of students divided into age (11-17 years old) and sex groups. The sample considered 
1200 respondents to a questionnaire in target schools. 
The students were provided with a set of questions examining different aspects of 
security awareness. The students were evenly distributed over age groups and gender. 
The answers were based on five-point Likert scales from 1 “Strongly Agree” to 5 
“Strongly Disagree”. There were five age groups examined covering different levels and 
classes. These are depicted in the following tables: 
Table 12: Likert Scales 
Code Answer 
1 Strongly Agree 
2 Agree 
3 Neutral 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly Disagree 
Table 13: Age Groups 
Code Age Group 
1 Less than 11 
2 Between 11 and 13 
3 Between 13 and 15 
4 Between 15 and 17 
5 Over 17 
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The survey used pre and post teaching assessments. The students were initially assessed 
prior to being introduced to any teaching material. The questions (Appendix 3) covered 
different areas of information security awareness that include: sharing sensitive 
information including passwords to personal and school accounts, giving access to 
personal electronic devices such as a personal computer and mobile phone, revealing 
some sensitive information that would threaten the confidentiality of information to 
friends and family members, and so on. A list of the evaluated aspects is provided in 
Table 14. The first two statements are questions about the age group and gender. 
Table 14: Information security areas covered by the questions and their codes 
Code Description 
1 Age Group 
2 Gender 
Q3 Access to a personal computer 
Q4 Personal Email Password 
Q5 Confidential school information, such as registration details, former school records, etc. 
Q6 Current location, such as updates on social media websites 
Q7 School-related documents, such as transcripts, marks, performance, etc. 
Q8 Personal mobile password 
Q9 Access to your school computer 
Q10 Past school-related information, such as previous school marks, performance, etc. 
Q11 Social media password (Facebook, Twitter) 
Q12 Personal email content 
Q13 Access to personal mobile phone 
Q14 Access to personal USB Flash memory drive 
Q15 Access to other personal mobile devices (laptop, tablet, PDA, etc.) 
As seen in the above table, the information security awareness statements aim to assess 
how much the respondents may share or provide information about their personal and 
school matters, which is believed to be sensitive and may lead to security threats. 
7.2.2 Initial Assessment 
In the initial assessment, the material had not yet been given to the students. In December 
2012, 1200 students were asked to complete an online questionnaire available exclusively 
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for them. The students answered a set of questions evaluating security awareness as 
detailed above. 1071 respondents participated in the survey out of the sample of 1200 
students (out of 859.224 school students in the UAE according to the UAE Statistics 
Centre (Report Details, 2013)), distributed among genders and age groups. The results of 
the initial assessment organised in an age/gender matrix are shown in Table 15: 
Table 15: Results of the initial assessment organised in age and gender 
 Age Groups 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Male 
114 
(50.89%) 
(21.35%) 
103 
(49.05%) 
(19.29%) 
104 
(49.29%) 
(19.48%) 
112 
(50.91%) 
(20.97%) 
101 
(49.03%) 
(18.91%) 
Female 
110 
(49.11%) 
(20.48%) 
107 
(50.95%) 
(19.93%) 
107 
(50.71%) 
(19.93%) 
108 
(49.09%) 
(20.11%) 
105 
(50.97%) 
(19.55%) 
Total per age group 224 (20.92%) 
210 
(19.61%) 
211 
(19.70%) 
220 
(20.54%) 
206 
(19.23%) 
Total 1071 
The results of the answers to individual questions are colour-coded in Figure 12 below.  
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Figure 12: Results of the initial test in a colour-coded diagram
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As the legend to the right of the diagram shows, the light colours represent agreement 
with the statements. Each horizontal bar reflects the answers to each statement (from 3 to 
15. 1 and 2 are the gender and age group). It can be seen at a glance that the light colours 
occupy most of the area of the diagram, reflecting more willingness to share sensitive 
information under the given circumstances. 
The details of the results are shown in the table below: 
Table 16: Results of the initial test 
 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Q15 263 (24.56%) 424 (39.59%) 154 (14.38%) 120 (11.2%) 110 (10.27%) 
Q14 220 (20.54%) 461 (43.04%) 148 (13.82%) 127 (11.86%) 115 (10.74%) 
Q13 208 (19.42%) 432 (40.34%) 116 (10.83%) 134 (12.51%) 181 (16.9%) 
Q12 200 (18.67%) 437 (40.8%) 130 (12.14%) 131 (12.23%) 173 (16.15%) 
Q11 216 (20.17%) 413 (38.56%) 81 (7.56%) 127 (11.86%) 234 (21.85%) 
Q10 255 (23.81%) 538 (50.23%) 148 (13.82%) 71 (6.63%) 59 (5.51%) 
Q9 310 (28.94%) 462 (43.14%) 143 (13.35%) 98 (9.15%) 58 (5.42%) 
Q8 225 (21.01%) 407 (38%) 93 (8.68%) 131 (12.23%) 215 (20.07%) 
Q7 278 (25.96%) 525 (49.02%) 156 (14.57%) 64 (5.98%) 48 (4.48%) 
Q6 213 (19.89%) 513 (47.9%) 161 (15.03%) 111 (10.36%) 73 (6.82%) 
Q5 226 (21.1%) 512 (47.81%) 171 (15.97%) 86 (8.03%) 76 (7.1%) 
Q4 217 (20.26%) 414 (38.66%) 85 (7.94%) 132 (12.32%) 223 (20.82%) 
Q3 223 (20.82%) 525 (49.02%) 146 (13.63%) 103 (9.62%) 74 (6.91%) 
7.2.3 Post-teaching Assessment 
According to the intervention criteria, it is necessary to acknowledge the school 
children’s behaviour towards a course aimed at raising information security awareness in 
Abu Dhabi Emirate. Knowing that such information, if shared, may lead to security 
breaches, which may threaten the individual, the solution suggested was to educate the 
students about the outcomes of the actions of sharing sensitive information. The teaching 
material was discussed with the teaching team in Abu Dhabi, aimed at covering the above 
aspects. Accordingly, material was designed aimed at helping the student to identify the 
risk of sharing sensitive information while using digital devices. In addition, the course 
material covered the differentiation between the sensitive information that is prohibited 
from being shared and other information that is permitted to be shared. 
Shortly after the responses were collected, the taught material was introduced to the 
students (1200). The students were taught over the period from December 2012 to June 
2013. In May 2013 (still the teaching programme was running) the initial group of 1200 
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students were reassessed using the same questionnaire. 1053 responses were collected. 
The answers organised in an age/gender matrix are shown in Table 17: 
Table 17: Results of the second assessment organised in age and gender 
 Age Groups 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Male 
101 
(48.10%) 
(19.24%) 
96 
(45.71%) 
(18.29%) 
116 
(53.70%) 
(22.10%) 
100 
(49.26%) 
(19.05%) 
112 
(52.34%) 
(21.33%) 
Female 
109 
(51.90%) 
(20.64%) 
114 
(54.29%) 
(21.59%) 
100 
(46.30%) 
(18.94%) 
103 
(50.74%) 
(19.51%) 
102 
(47.66%) 
(19.32%) 
Total per age group 210 (19.94%) 
210 
(19.94%) 
216 
(20.51%) 
203 
(19.28%) 
214 
(20.32%) 
Total 1053 
The results obtained are depicted in the following colour code diagram (Figure 13): 
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Figure 13: Results of the second test in a colour-coded diagram
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The above diagram shows, as a percentage, the ranks of the answers to each question. The 
dark-colour shaded areas show disagreement with the given statements. The light-colour 
shaded areas represent agreement with the statements. At a glance, it can be seen that the 
dark shaded areas occupy more space in the diagram than the light shaded areas. This 
represents a higher general disagreement with the given statements in comparison to the 
results of the survey conducted prior to teaching, and hence more information security 
awareness learnt by the students. 
The details of the results are shown in the table below: 
Table 18: Results of the second test 
 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Q15 50 (4.75%) 49 (4.65%) 224 (21.27%) 277 (26.31%) 453 (43.02%) 
Q14 40 (3.8%) 58 (5.51%) 241 (22.89%) 293 (27.83%) 421 (39.98%) 
Q13 52 (4.94%) 47 (4.46%) 220 (20.89%) 274 (26.02%) 460 (43.68%) 
Q12 41 (3.89%) 59 (5.6%) 194 (18.42%) 285 (27.07%) 474 (45.01%) 
Q11 46 (4.37%) 42 (3.99%) 207 (19.66%) 285 (27.07%) 473 (44.92%) 
Q10 47 (4.46%) 115 (10.92%) 283 (26.88%) 287 (27.26%) 321 (30.48%) 
Q9 68 (6.46%) 157 (14.91%) 245 (23.27%) 267 (25.36%) 316 (30.01%) 
Q8 53 (5.03%) 48 (4.56%) 197 (18.71%) 279 (26.5%) 476 (45.2%) 
Q7 58 (5.51%) 121 (11.49%) 282 (26.78%) 276 (26.21%) 316 (30.01%) 
Q6 40 (3.8%) 84 (7.98%) 248 (23.55%) 287 (27.26%) 394 (37.42%) 
Q5 50 (4.75%) 87 (8.26%) 245 (23.27%) 267 (25.36%) 404 (38.37%) 
Q4 59 (5.6%) 49 (4.65%) 176 (16.71%) 145 (13.77%) 624 (59.26%) 
Q3 60 (5.7%) 70 (6.65%) 81 (7.69%) 187 (17.76%) 655 (62.2%) 
 
7.2.4 Results and analysis 
The two diagrams are shown next to one another in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Results and analysis 
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As can be seen in Figure 14 above, the dark shaded areas occupy more space in the post 
assessment, implying that students became more aware of the risks of sharing certain 
information which are typically believed to yield security threats. 
To verify that the results were not due to chance, statistical testing was used on the 
results. Due to the sensitivity of the information collected and the anonymity of the 
survey, comparison of individual students in the pre- and post- tests was avoided. 
Therefore, there was no way to pair individual students of the pre-test to themselves in 
the post-test. Therefore, the results of the pre-test and post-test were considered as two 
independent samples, although they are not. Although this method may result in the loss 
of some information (for example individual awareness improvement), it is common for 
it to be used in similar situations (Fallan, 1999; Reymond et al, 2005; Wonnacott & 
Wonnacott, 1990).As earlier the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test was used to 
compare students’ rankings of information sharing. 
Essentially, the Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to evaluate whether the learning 
offered to students elicits a statistically significant change in the understanding of 
information security among taught students. The hypothesis is stated below: 
H0: There is no significant difference in the group before and after learning 
The questions in the pre-teaching assessment were compared to those of the post-teaching 
assessment. 
The Mann-Whitney U test supports the same conclusion. The test results indicate an 
improvement in security awareness by students, as more students chose to share less 
information on the aspects exhibited by the questions. 
The result of the test for each question is shown in Table 19: 
Table 19: The Mann-Whitney U Test  
Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
The distribution of Q3 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q4 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q5 is the same across categories Independent- .000 Reject the 
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Null Hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
of Group Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q6 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q7 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q8 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q9 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q10 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q11 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q12 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q13 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q14 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
The distribution of Q15 is the same across categories 
of Group 
Independent-
Samples 
Mann-Whitney 
U Test 
.000 
Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05 ( (Hair et al, 2010) 
 
As shown in Table 19, the Mann-Whitney U statistics resulted in a significant difference 
in the group before and after the taught material was introduced in every question. The 
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test indicated a significant difference (p < 0.05) for each question between students’ 
willingness to share sensitive information before and after the learning programme took 
place (or taken as two independent sample groups). The results strongly suggest that the 
education programme offered to students over the indicated period had contributed to 
creating more awareness of information sharing with others, especially relatives and 
friends, which are common in Arab culture (Al-Kaabi & Maple, 2012).  
7.3 Qualitative Study 
7.3.1 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire’s design is similar to that of the quantitative questionnaire with the 
difference that, in some of the scenarios given to the students, the students were required 
to provide the reasons for their preferences of sharing (see Appendix 4). There were 20 
questions representing 20 scenarios designed to cover four classes, namely, Password 
Sharing, Device/Account Access Sharing, Personal/Confidential Information Sharing and 
Others. The questions (scenarios) are as follows: 
7.3.1.1 Password Sharing 
Question no Scenario 
4 Would you share your email password with a friend? 
11 If there is an urgent matter, would you give your password to a trusted person to 
access your computer? 
14 Would you give your email password to a person you trust? 
15 In case you shared your account password with someone, will you change it later 
on? 
18 Do you have your password(s) written somewhere? 
19 Have you ever given your password of any account to someone? 
22 Do you share any instant messenger’s passwords with others? 
 
7.3.1.2 Device/Account Access Sharing 
Question no Scenario 
7 Would you allow access to your personal computer that contains sensitive 
information to a friend or relative if requested? 
8 Would you allow access to your phone to a friend or relative if requested? 
13 Would you give access to your Facebook to a person you trust? 
17 Would you lend your USB flash memory to a friend if requested without checking 
whether it has sensitive information stored? 
 
 
7.3.1.3 Personal/Confidential Information Sharing 
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Question no Scenario 
3 May all information be shared with friends and relatives? 
5 Would you share your email content with a friend if requested? 
6 Would you share your sensitive information with a friend that you met in social 
media website (i.e. Facebook, twitter, chatting website)? 
9 Can there be serious consequences of sharing sensitive information with others? 
10 Generally, is it safe to share your email content with people you trust? 
12 Would you regularly tell where you are in your social media accounts? 
21 Do you have any shared email or other Internet accounts? 
 
7.3.1.4 Others 
Question no Scenario 
16 Do you have different passwords for different accounts? 
20 Are you careful when you open email attachments? 
 
 This assessment is necessary in order to show how much the students learn from the 
taught material and how much they are aware of the risk and impact of sharing sensitive 
information.  
7.3.2 Method: Questionnaires Based On Yes/No Questions 
A qualitative research study was conducted on two groups of 500 students each. The first 
group (the experiment group) was given taught material on information security threats 
and precautionary measures. The other group (control group) was not given the material. 
There was no pre-test conducted on either group. The main reason for omitting the pre-
test was to allow better randomisation and reduce the possible effects of pre-testing, such 
as gained awareness of the topic (Research Method Knowledge Base, 2013). Several 
authors have relied on this method in similar research studies such as Conn et al (2009) 
and Mok & Pang Woo (2004), amongst others. Therefore, as no pre-test was used, there 
can be no interaction effect on the groups. The questionnaire was completed with high 
return rates of 460/500 (92%) for the control group and 450/500 (90%) for the experiment 
group. The results of the groups are tabulated in the following tables: 
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Table 20: Experiment group 
 Age Groups 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Male 
41 
(45.56%) 
(19.07%) 
47 
(51.09%) 
(21.86%) 
38 
(44.71%) 
(17.67%) 
41 
(46.07%) 
(19.07%) 
48 
(51.06%) 
(22.33%) 
Female 
49 
(54.44%) 
(20.85%) 
45 
(48.91%) 
(19.15%) 
47 
(55.29%) 
(20.00%) 
48 
(53.93%) 
(20.43%) 
46 
(48.94%) 
(16.60%) 
Total per age group 90 (20.00%) 
92 
(20.44%) 
85 
(18.89%) 
89 
(19.78%) 
87 
(19.33%) 
Total 450 
 
Table 21: Control group 
 Age Groups 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Male 
47 
(48.96%) 
(20.43%) 
49 
(55.68%) 
(21.30%) 
39 
(42.86%) 
(16.96%) 
47 
(49.47%) 
(20.43%) 
48 
(53.33%) 
(20.87%) 
Female 
49 
(51.04%) 
(21.30%) 
40 
(45.45%) 
(17.39%) 
49 
(53.85%) 
(21.30%) 
48 
(50.53%) 
(20.87%) 
44 
(48.89%) 
(19.13%) 
Total per age group 96 (20.87%) 
89 
(19.35%) 
88 
(19.13%) 
95 
(20.65%) 
92 
(20.00%) 
Total 460 
Grounded theory was used in the research for several reasons as discussed below where it 
is compared to other qualitative analysis approaches. 
7.3.3 Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory was first introduced in 1967 by Glaser and Strauss. Essentially, it is a 
method designed to help develop ideas that provide a deeper explanation of a particular 
phenomenon investigated using a qualitative research approach. It was initially used in 
nursing research and later was adapted for use in several fields such as management, 
business, sociology and information systems (Mansourian, 2006). Goulding (2002) 
discusses how the grounded theory approach is largely undertaken to build theory from 
collected data. As such, grounded theory should be used to build theory rather than to test 
hypotheses. Goulding (2002) maintains that grounded theory is more helpful to 
researchers who are targeting peoples’ behaviours. Razavi and Iverson (2006) argue that 
the grounded theory method is one of the most appropriate methods for situations where 
the researcher is attempting to reveal user experience or design a theoretical structure 
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based on reality.  
There are three different types of analysis used in grounded theory, as suggested by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998): 
 Open coding: This type of grounded theory is used to produce codes that emerge 
from the data itself, 
 Axial coding: This type is used to combine the designed codes with sub- codes, 
 Selective coding: This type is used to generate categories that are more suitable to 
the core research from the overall categories that developed from the acquired 
data. 
Grounded theory has been widely used in areas related to information systems due to its 
success in contributing to the theoretical core of information systems (Matavire & Brown, 
2008). Baskerville and Pries-Heje (1999) argue that the wider use of the grounded theory 
in different disciplines provides a comprehensive and deeper explanation and 
effectiveness of developing context-based research.  
Qualitative methods such as positivist and interpretive case studies and grounded theory 
have proven effectiveness regarding information security risks in terms of actual 
motivations and computer users’ behaviours (Crossler et al, 2012). Due to the theoretical 
basis that can be established through the use of grounded theory, it has become 
increasingly used in information security. Essentially, the grounded theory approach 
helps reveal human behaviour in information handling practices and has particular 
pertinence particularly in matters relating to information security and privacy (Chen & 
Xu, 2013). 
Template analysis is another method that is used is as an analysis tool in qualitative 
research. However, this method is not suitable for this study due to the nature of the 
situation being analysed. In template analysis the researcher has an initial coding 
template, which is then modified or verified through data collection, while grounded 
theory starts from unstructured data in order to build a theory based on emerging answers 
to develop categories (Cassell et al., 2004).  
Grounded theory is inductive in its approach in that it starts with the data to find a pattern 
in the data rather than imposing a framework upon it. This is in contrast to the template 
analysis approach which starts deductively as the analytical frameworks are 
predetermined (Cassell et al., 2004).  
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Interpretative phenomenological analysis is another method used to analyse qualitative 
data based on lived experience. As interpretative phenomenological analysis is developed 
to offer a theoretical foundation and a detailed procedural guide for a particular case, it 
has been widely implemented in the field of health psychology (Brocki et al., 2006). 
The goal of a phenomenological study is to describe the lived experience of the 
participants and the meaning of that experience from the participants’ perspective, unlike 
the grounded theory in which the goal is targeting the user’s behaviour to build a theory 
from their experience.  
Charmaz et al (2011) assert that both interpretative phenomenological analysis and 
grounded theory start with concrete instances of human experience and their behaviour, 
however, phenomenological analysis remains descriptive and does not assemble a 
theoretical model that yields hypotheses.  
Generally speaking, the purpose of an information security education programme is to 
develop skills and provide wider knowledge of information security of the Internet 
(Armstrong & Jayaratna, 2002). Hence, this study adopted grounded theory for the 
initiated information security education programme. Essentially, two groups of school 
students were assessed. One group, the experiment group, was taught about information 
security risks and the other group, the control group, was assessed without prior teaching. 
Grounded theory was used to compare the two different groups and estimate how much 
knowledge of information security they had gained by examining the groups using open-
ended questionnaires.  
The aim of the study was to make the school students reveal their knowledge about 
information security and to produce theory from the data collected to by conduction a 
comparison between the taught and untaught groups. 
7.3.4 Results and Analysis 
Some of the students answered in English and others in Arabic. The data analysis was 
performed by considering the students’ responses and creating sentences that describe the 
responses. Each sentence is then coded by a category. Based on the answers obtained 
from the two groups, the following categories were established: 
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Table 22: categories established from answers obtained from the two groups 
 
The analysis is conducted for each question showing the differences between the taught 
and untaught groups based on the categories developed from grounded theory divided 
into the following classes:  
7.3.4.1 Password Sharing 
Questions Q4, Q11, Q14, Q15, Q18, Q19 and Q22 fall in the “Password Sharing” class. 
The results obtained are summarised in the following table in percentage based on each 
category. T and U refer to the Taught and Untaught groups, respectively. For example, 
answers of the untaught group to Q4 fall by 12% in Category 1, 13 in Category 2 and so 
on. 
Table 23: Password Sharing 
Password 
Sharing 
Q4 Q11 Q14 Q15 Q18 Q19 Q22 
U T U T U T U T U T U T U T 
Category 1 7 12 3 13 7 12 12 17 10 9 9 11 9 18 
Category 2 10 13 8 18 5 11 9 15 3 12 8 13 7 10 
Category 3 23 9 15 8 12 6 17 4 9 2 16 3 15 8 
Category 4 12 2 19 4 14 7 12 3 15 3 12 7 11 1 
Category 5 14 16 8 12 12 12 3 12 6 17 4 15 10 11 
Category 6 4 15 10 14 6 13 9 12 5 16 10 14 5 15 
Category 7 4 2 10 2 13 8 12 6 18 6 17 10 14 8 
Category 8 8 6 12 2 16 6 14 6 25 6 11 3 15 7 
Category 9 10 12 8 12 7 12 8 12 4 13 6 11 8 11 
Category 10 8 13 7 15 8 13 4 13 5 16 7 13 6 11 
 
Category Description 
1 Differentiation between private and other information 
2 Differentiation between different accounts 
3 Necessity of keeping good relationships with friends and relatives 
4 Necessity of helping others 
5 Depending on the situation and at the discretion of the respondent 
6 Awareness of risks and outcomes of cybercrimes 
7 Importance for relatives and friends to check on the respondent 
8 Belief that friends and relatives will not harm the respondent 
9 Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
10 Carefulness with online activities 
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The following is an interpretation of the results for each question in the class. 
Q4. Would you share your email password with a friend? 
The taught group showed higher awareness of protecting email passwords from being 
shared with friends and family. These are significantly apparent in the lower response of 
the taught group in Category 3 (Necessity of keeping good relationships with friends and 
relatives) by 14% and Category 4 (Necessity of helping others) by 10% than the untaught 
group to cultural traits of culture. 
Q11. If there is an urgent matter, would you give your password to a trusted person 
to access your computer? 
For the above question, the taught group revealed a significant level of awareness towards 
sharing passwords with people they trust over the untaught group, particularly in 
Category 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 10. 
Q14. Would you give your email password to a person you trust? 
The answers by the taught group reveal that the respondents were highly convinced of not 
sharing their passwords with anyone. This is particularly obvious in the significant 
difference between the two groups Category 8 as the untaught group reflected some 
extent of the belief that friends and relatives will not harm the respondent, whereas the 
taught group was more aware of the harms of sharing passwords even with people they 
trust.  
Q15. In case you shared your account password with someone, will you change it 
later on? 
The taught group showed improved recognition over the untaught group of the 
importance of changing passwords if divulged to someone including the trusted ones. 
Q18. Do you have your password(s) written somewhere? 
The reason why people write their passwords down is mainly because they think they 
may forget it or because they cannot memorise it. They also do not anticipate that by 
writing their passwords down they become under higher risk of exposing their accounts 
to others. Others may write their passwords also to allow others whom they trust to access 
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their accounts. The taught group showed stricter posture towards writing their passwords 
reflected in improved answers in almost all categories. 
Q19. Have you ever given your password of any account to someone? 
Ideally, the answer to this question from a security awareness viewpoint is no. However, 
the untaught group considered urgent matters, trust and convenience as aspects of 
possible sharing of their passwords. Although the taught group reflected that they had 
shared their passwords in urgent matters but they affirmed that they changed their 
password at the earliest opportunity after. 
Q22. Do you share any instant messenger’s passwords with others? 
The taught group showed better ability of differentiating between accounts that that of the 
untaught group and preserving their passwords even from trusted people.  
7.3.4.2 Device/Account Access Sharing 
Questions Q7, Q8, Q13 and Q17 fall in the “Device/Account Access Sharing” class. The 
results obtained are summarised in the following table in percentage based on each 
category.  
Table 24: Device/Account Access Sharing 
Device/Account 
Access Sharing 
Q7 Q8 Q13 Q17 
U T U T U T U T 
Category 1 6 10 5 12 12 12 9 13 
Category 2 5 11 12 15 5 13 10 11 
Category 3 13 7 15 9 13 4 15 8 
Category 4 15 2 14 3 14 9 12 9 
Category 5 7 14 8 14 5 13 9 15 
Category 6 5 14 6 14 7 11 4 13 
Category 7 23 7 15 1 14 7 9 6 
Category 8 17 9 14 6 16 8 17 2 
Category 9 4 12 5 12 5 12 8 11 
Category 10 5 14 6 14 9 11 7 12 
 
The following is an interpretation of the results for each question in the “Device/Account 
Access Sharing” class. 
Q7. Would you allow access to your personal computer that contains sensitive 
information to a friend or relative if requested? 
For this question, it is clear that the taught group expressed ability of differentiation of 
152 
information and refrained from allowing access to a computer containing sensitive 
information. The significant difference was in Categories 7 and 10, reflecting awareness 
of account access sharing risks even with relatives and friends and carefulness with 
possible online activities in case the computer is used by someone else. 
Q8. Would you allow access to your phone to a friend or relative if requested? 
Realising the importance of keeping the password secret even from friends and relatives, 
the taught group revealed higher awareness than that of the untaught groups particularly 
in Category 4 and 7. 
Q13. Would you give access to your Facebook to a person you trust? 
The two groups showed coherence towards the giving different accounts different 
importance as shown in Category 1. However, the taught group revealed better 
understanding that sharing one account may lead to further risks beyond the mere account 
access they might have given. 
Q17. Would you lend your USB flash memory to a friend if requested without 
checking whether it has sensitive information stored? 
There answers to this question showed a general improvement to awareness of sharing 
risks. In particular, the untaught group reflected the influence of the belief that friends 
and relatives will not cause them any harm. The taught group however realised that 
awareness is needed regardless with whom information is shared. 
7.3.4.3 Personal/Confidential Information Sharing 
Questions Q3, Q5, Q6, Q9, Q10, Q12 and Q21 fall in the “Personal/Confidential 
Information Sharing” class. The results obtained are summarised in the following table in 
percentage based on each category: 
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Table 25: Personal/Confidential Information Sharing 
Personal/Confidential 
Information Sharing 
Q3 Q5 Q6 Q9 Q10 Q12 Q21 
U T U T U T U T U T U T U T 
Category 1 7 15 8 14 4 11 8 12 5 11 9 15 7 11 
Category 2 4 12 6 15 6 23 9 11 8 11 6 14 11 13 
Category 3 16 4 15 4 16 2 12 3 16 8 16 4 17 1 
Category 4 14 6 20 3 14 2 19 8 9 8 12 4 13 7 
Category 5 5 12 10 12 10 12 2 17 9 12 4 13 2 15 
Category 6 8 11 9 11 8 11 9 14 10 14 9 15 4 14 
Category 7 17 7 9 5 11 8 15 7 20 7 19 1 16 9 
Category 8 14 7 12 7 12 10 17 5 11 8 12 5 15 6 
Category 9 9 14 6 12 9 10 4 11 6 10 5 15 7 13 
Category 10 6 12 5 17 10 11 5 12 6 11 8 14 8 11 
 
Q3. May all information be shared with friends and relatives? 
The taught group was able to provide further recognition of sensitive information as 
reflected in the higher percentage of Category 1 than that of the untaught group. The 
taught group also showed improved perception of information concepts in all other 
categories. 
Q5. Would you share your email content with a friend if requested? 
The taught group also showed better awareness of sharing presumably private 
information that the untaught group respondents said they would share mainly to help 
others (Category 4). The taught group hence refrained from sharing such information and 
considered the necessity to help others is not a relevant aspect of sharing information. 
Q6. Would you share your sensitive information with a friend that you met in social 
media website (i.e. Facebook, twitter, chatting website)? 
Differences between the two groups are particularly evident in Category 2 and 3, which 
maintain that the keeping good relations and helping others are not a solid reason for 
sharing sensitive information as regarded by the taught group, especially with social 
media acquaintances. The untaught group revealed that they might share such information 
for the sake of helping others or keeping relationships. 
Q9. Can there be serious consequences of sharing sensitive information with others? 
The answers to this question showed acquired knowledge by the taught group of the 
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consequences of sharing sensitive information. The untaught group however considered 
situational aspects and trust in friends and relatives (Category 5 and 8) as potential 
reasons for sharing sensitive information. 
Q10. Generally, is it safe to share your email content with people you trust? 
The untaught group generally claimed that sharing the email content with trusted people 
was a way to convey their trust in others, which is evident in the percentage of the 
answers falling in Category 7. The taught group however were indifferent to sharing with 
trusted people in favour of preserving private information. 
Q12. Would you regularly tell where you are in your social media accounts? 
It was evident that the untaught group paid significant attention to keeping their relatives 
and friends in touch through social media, ignoring potential security risks that might 
arise based on such behaviour. The taught group however was strictly clear about 
protecting their locations in social media, which is again reflected in the percentage of the 
answers falling in Category 7. 
Q21. Do you have any shared email or other Internet accounts? 
The untaught group showed inclination to having some shared online accounts, stressing 
the overwhelming cultural influence of sharing among close relative and friends. This 
factor is evidently less significant in the answers of the taught group, particularly in 
Category 3, 7 and 8. 
7.3.4.4 Others 
Questions Q16 and Q20 covering some further attention to cybersecurity are put in an 
individual class, called others. The results obtained are summarised in the following table 
in percentage based on each category. 
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Table 26: Others 
Others 
Q16 Q20 
U T U T 
Category 1 5 12 12 14 
Category 2 6 14 7 15 
Category 3 12 9 11 4 
Category 4 16 5 14 6 
Category 5 7 16 6 14 
Category 6 6 11 7 11 
Category 7 25 5 10 1 
Category 8 13 2 16 5 
Category 9 6 12 8 14 
Category 10 4 14 9 16 
 
Q16. Do you have different passwords for different accounts? 
The results obtained show that the untaught group consider the cultural factor of keeping 
good relations by sharing private information with close relative and friends. The 
untaught group however did not consider this as an important factor. This is reflected in 
the differences between the two groups’ answers particularly those falling in Category 4, 
7 and 8. 
Q20. Are you careful when you open email attachments? 
The taught group showed better attention to email attachments particularly with regard to 
the emails sent by close relative and friends. Whereas the untaught group held the believe 
that close relative and friends will cause them no harm, the taught group showed attention 
to the risks of email attachments regardless of the sender, and some reflected on the 
possibility that the sender might not be the one claiming to be. 
7.3.5 Summary of the results 
The taught group showed greater knowledge in the answers to questions in categories 3, 
4, 7 and 8. Those categories represent the respondents’ chosen preferences of sharing 
sensitive data with their relatives and friends. Those categories also represent the trust 
factor the respondents believe they have to have with relatives and friends. In the taught 
group, the respondents reflected a higher sense of recognition for privacy as their answers 
were directed towards keeping more information private. These respondents also 
developed more knowledge of private information, the importance of keeping certain 
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information private and not to share even with relatives or close friends. The tables above 
demonstrate more awareness of information security in the taught group. The taught 
students showed a better ability than the untaught students to differentiate between 
private and non-private information. Their answers also reflected a higher ability to 
distinguish between different accounts in terms of the sensitivity of the information that 
may be lost or stolen in the case of carelessness. The untaught group demonstrated more 
of an inclination towards showing more attachments to the family as the family may need 
to check on them through their accounts. The taught group, however, realised to a higher 
extent that although family and friends can be trusted, sharing information with them is 
still risky and perhaps more importantly, unnecessary. The taught group considered that 
certain situations may require sharing some information; they stated however that they 
will have to change the password at the next available opportunity if they had to give it to 
someone for any reason. The untaught group members did not reflect on changing the 
password in such cases. The taught students mostly understood that keeping information 
is their right and they did not have to share it. They maintained that they can keep friends 
and help them despite not telling them everything they may ask for. That was not the case 
of the untaught group as they mostly preferred to keep their relationships with relatives 
and friends than to keep some information private if they had to. The answers of the 
taught group showed more knowledge of what would happen if some information was 
shared and consequently accounts were compromised. They mentioned theft, physical 
and reputational harm, and other potential results of cyber-attacks. There was little 
evidence of knowledge of these aspects with the untaught group. The answers of the 
taught group showed more care about their online activities and what they access online 
than the untaught group. Some of the taught respondents also stated that they have 
different passwords for different accounts according to the sensitivity of the data the 
account contains. Categories of individual questions are found in Appendix 6. 
7.4 Discussion  
The aim of the study was to address the issue of sharing sensitive information in the 
settings of Arab culture, which has escalated with the increasing use of information 
technology. With the growth use of the Internet, it is more common now to have sensitive 
and private information available in digital format and in different places. Therefore, the 
vulnerability and accessibility of such information becomes higher. Furthermore, Arab 
culture is of a special nature in which private information is something that Arabs share. 
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This has been discussed in several studies conducted in the Arab region (Chadwick, 2002 
and Koocher, 2009). In particular, Al-Kaabi and Maple (2012) showed, in a survey study 
conducted in the UAE concerning the cultural impact on information security, that UAE 
citizens are more likely to share their personal information (such as email content, credit 
card number) with their family and close friends. Due to increasing Internet usage by 
children in the UAE, an important meeting was conducted by Dubai Police, Ministry of 
Interior Community Development Authority and other authorities to discuss possible 
ways to reduce the risks resulting from Internet usage by children. The meeting 
maintained that children should be monitored by their parents when using the Internet. 
Furthermore, they must be educated about the potential risks of sharing private 
information in order to follow self-discipline while they are left unattended by their 
parents. This will help the children to have knowledge about social engineering attacks 
and to reduce the likelihood of them falling victim to having people hack their computers 
and obtain personal and financial information (Aboul Hosn, 2012).  
The study aimed, therefore, to provide a strategy for UAE that helps mitigate the 
information sharing phenomenon in Arab culture by creating awareness of the 
consequences of sharing certain information. The study demonstrated that such a strategy, 
given the embedded cultural aspect, requires educating children in school about the 
dangers of information sharing and the different types of information that can and cannot 
be shared. The obtained results from both surveys showed improvements in student 
awareness of information sharing risks and the differences in information types to be 
shared or not in. The taught students revealed significant improvement in their perception 
of sharing information with their friends and relatives. The quantitative figures depicted 
overall improvement in all questions and were supported by statistical tests. The other 
survey comparing two taught and untaught groups also showed significant results of 
overall improvement. The qualitative analysis conducted revealed that the taught students 
answered the questions with more confidence about what information can be shared and 
what information should not. 
The results provide a basis, given the large number of participants in both surveys, for the 
proposed information security strategy in UAE. The strategy should embed education at 
young ages as a crucial factor for attaining information security awareness in the Arab 
culture setting. The proposed strategy also supports Abu Dhabi Information Security 
Standard (2013) requirements and goals. Their defined information security standard 
158 
clearly states that sharing private and sensitive information with others, such as 
passwords and tokens used for the system identification, is prohibited due to the risks that 
result from this phenomenon (Abu Dhabi Government, 2013). 
7.5 Sensitive Information Sharing Security Framework 
Due to the results obtained from this study with school children, the overall intervention 
study provided a basis for the information security education framework. As a result, the 
framework below (Figure 15) was designed accordingly. The framework is aimed at 
providing education to reduce the impact of sharing sensitive information among family 
members, friends, employees etc.  
The framework covers three main aspects in its design: Sharing environments, 
Information Security design structure followed by the information security education 
model. Each aspect is discussed in detail below: 
 
Figure 15: Sensitive Information Sharing Security Framework 
7.5.1 Sharing Environments 
The sharing environment can be at home, work or school and with family members, 
friends, colleagues, for example. No matter where it is occurring, the sharing of sensitive 
information in a particular environment can form a risk to any other environment. For 
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example, sharing a work email password will form a risk to your Facebook account if the 
same password is used.  
The sharing activities are divided into three parts as per the conducted study in the UAE 
schools. These activities are shared with family members, friends and employees. 
 Personal/ Confidential Information Sharing: This can be in the form of sharing 
confidential information about work, confidential information about school, etc. 
The aggregation of this information could lead to a privacy attack which is 
discussed in the questionnaire design in Chapter 4. 
 Password Sharing: This is a direct threat to the authentication mechanism and can 
potentially easily compromise the system. The risk towards this activity is 
discussed in the Questionnaire design in Chapter 4. 
 Devices/ Account Access Sharing: This is considered to be a risk to personal/work 
data. This can be in the form of personal computer access/work, USB flash 
memory, personal mobile and so forth. This kind of access sharing reveals some 
privacy issues which can potentially compromise your sensitive data through a 
number of privacy attacks.  
7.5.2 Information Security Design Structure 
After consideration of the taught material, data acquired and the statistical analysis of the 
study conducted with school children, the information security design structure has been 
developed to cover the main parts of security education. Those three parts are discussed 
below: 
 Risk: The risk component concerns highlighting the risk activities that can have an 
impact on both individual and organisations. It is shown in the above figure that 
all of these activities could lead to a risk. 
 Loss of confidentiality, Integrity and Availability: The impact of the risky 
activities could lead to a loss of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. The 
CIA is the fundamental aspect of ensuring the protection of information. This 
component should show which threat or attack can occur as a result of a particular 
risky behaviour. For example: sharing your twitter password means sharing a part 
of your identity and certainly a significant amount of personal information. 
Therefore, it is possible that modification/deletion/disclosure of your sensitive 
data could occur. 
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 Education: This is principally designed as an initiative to mitigate the risky 
activities. For every risky activity, there is an impact that could potentially lead to 
a loss. The mitigation design, therefore, should consider both the risk and impact 
of that activity in order to make the user more aware of the digital threats. For 
example, sharing current location with your Facebook friends list, could lead to a 
physical theft from your home. The way of mitigating the sharing activity may be 
done by being aware who should be in your contact list (fake profiles for 
example) and considering threat that might occur.  
7.5.3 Information Security Education Model 
All of the above information contributed to the design of a model that sought to provide 
information security education programme, a syllabus and set of guidelines to reduce the 
sharing of sensitive information. The framework is largely designed to reduce the impact 
of culture on information security, especially in a culture where sharing sensitive 
information among family members and friends is commonplace. 
Due to the increased usage of Internet services by children and the necessity of 
introducing information security education in UAE schools (Emarat Alyoum, 2013) 
(Aboul Hosn, 2012), the framework also provides a basic foundation for designing 
information security education for children since it covers basic education knowledge 
about risky behaviour that is happening around the world.  
Due to the problem of password sharing that occurs in some advanced countries (see 
Chapter 6), the framework is also beneficial for organisations that seek to reduce the 
impact of sharing sensitive information among employees and can align with the 
information security policy that is adopted in their organisation.  
7.5.4 Information Security Education guidelines 
The guidelines below summarise information security education according to the above 
framework: 
7.5.4.1 Password Sharing 
Risk/ Online activities Impact  Education 
Sharing your 
personal/school email 
password with your friend 
Accessing your sensitive data 
Deletion/Modifying/Misusing 
Accessing other accounts that 
have the same password hints 
to your password selection. 
Never share your email 
password with your friends 
In cases where you have 
shared, you should change 
it immediately with a 
different password 
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Risk/ Online activities Impact  Education 
In urgent matters, giving 
your password to someone 
you trust  
Compromising your content,  
Deletion/Modifying/Misusing 
Accessing other accounts that 
have the same password hints 
to your password selection. 
Try not to share it even if it 
is urgent,  
However, if you have 
shared it, make sure you - -
Change your password as 
soon as you can 
You should also change 
other accounts’ passwords 
and password formation 
Writing your password for 
your friend and keeping it 
somewhere 
Accessing your account, 
Deletion/Modifying/Misusing  
Accessing other accounts that 
have the same password hints 
to your password selection. 
Never write down your 
password and keep it 
somewhere and if you 
already have, try to change 
your accounts’ passwords 
and password formation 
Sharing any instant 
messenger passwords with 
others 
Accessing your sensitive data 
Deletion/Modifying/Misusing 
Accessing other accounts that 
have the same password hints 
to your password selection. 
Never share your instant 
messenger passwords with 
others 
In cases where you have 
shared it, you should 
change it immediately with 
a different password 
formation. 
Try to change all your 
accounts’ passwords and 
password formation. 
 
7.5.4.2 Devices/Accounts Access Sharing: 
Risk/ Online activities Impact  Education 
Allowing access to your 
personal computer if 
requested 
Privacy attacks such as  
 structural re-
identiﬁcation attacks,  
 inference attacks, 
 information aggregation 
attacks  
 
Remove/secure your 
sensitive information before 
you share your personal 
computer even if you trust 
the person. 
Make sure you often check 
your sensitive information 
especially if you have 
shared access (e.g. profile 
settings) 
Allowing a friend to access 
your phone if requested 
Privacy attacks such as  
 structural re-
identiﬁcation attacks,  
 inference attacks, 
 information aggregation 
attacks  
 
Try to restore your sensitive 
information before you 
share your phone 
even if you trust. 
Make sure you have a 
regular check on your 
sensitive data in the case 
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where you have shared (ex. 
profile setting). 
Before allowing, make sure 
you sign out from your 
applications that need 
password verifications (not 
in an automatic sign in 
mode). 
Sharing access to your 
Facebook account with 
someone you trust 
Deletion/ modification your 
posted information 
Privacy attacks such as  
 structural re-
identiﬁcation attacks,  
 inference attacks, 
 information aggregation 
attacks  
 
Try not to share your access 
with your friend even if you 
trust 
Make sure you have a 
regular check on your 
sensitive data in the case 
where you have shared (eg. 
profile setting). 
Lending your USB flash 
memory to a friend if 
requested 
Privacy attacks such as  
 structural re-
identiﬁcation attacks,  
 inference attacks, 
information aggregation 
attacks  
Remove/secure your 
sensitive information before 
you  lend your USB flash 
memory. 
 
7.5.4.3 Personal/Confidential Information Sharing: 
Risk/ Online activities Impact  Education 
Sharing/Posting sensitive 
information about yourself 
on an online service such as 
current location/ future 
plans/ personal activities/ 
any other sensitive 
information (Password, 
Personal Information) 
Cyber stalking 
Cyber bullying  
Harassment 
Physical theft 
Compromising your online 
account 
Privacy attacks such as  
 structural re-
identiﬁcation attacks,  
 inference attacks, 
 information aggregation 
attacks  
 
When you post any 
sensitive information about 
yourself you should first 
consider the possible 
impact of it.  
Knowing who appears on 
your list and assuring 
yourself that there is no-one 
you do not know. 
Bear in mind, that there are 
people with fake profiles 
and their intentions are to 
mislead people through the 
posted information. 
Sharing your email content 
with your friends or 
relatives, (confidential 
information, school-related 
documents etc.) 
Privacy attacks such as  
 structural re-
identiﬁcation attacks,  
 inference attacks, 
 information aggregation 
attacks  
You should know who you 
are sharing this information 
with. 
You should realise the 
possible impact of sharing 
before you share such 
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 privacy information. 
Having any shared email or 
other shared Internet 
accounts 
Privacy attacks such as  
 structural re-
identiﬁcation attacks,  
 inference attacks, 
 information aggregation 
attacks  
 
Try not to have such 
accounts but maintain your 
privacy if you have one (by 
not sharing sensitive 
information) 
 
7.5.4.4 Others (can have an impact on sharing): 
Risk/ Online activities Impact  Education 
Having one password for all 
your accounts that need 
password verification 
Compromising (putting at 
risk) other account if one 
account has been hacked 
Having different passwords 
for different accounts. 
Password formation should 
be hard to guess (should not 
be something that identifies 
you) 
Care when opening 
attachment 
Compromising your 
account,  
Putting your device at risk 
(viruses, malware etc.) 
Stealing your sensitive data 
Never share sensitive 
information (personal 
information) through 
attachments until you make 
sure who the sender is and 
why he or she is asking for 
such information  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Investment in information system security tools to protect an organisation’s assets can be 
inadequate as a strategy for reducing overall information security risks. Risk assessment 
is an important consideration to ensure the success of such a strategy. Where the risk is 
apparently as a result of a cultural and behavioural set of attitudes, causing damage to the 
information security fundamentals (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability), then the 
solution should be designed according to that cultural and behavioural background. 
Changing the culture of trust in order to be in line with best practice in information 
security can best be attained through education concerning information security. Privacy 
and security measures should be taught to school students to combat the phenomenon of 
sharing private details with family and friends. This study has demonstrated a significant 
change of attitude of sharing private information with others. Moreover, children 
recognised the risk and its impact in different scenarios that were provided in the second 
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assessment. Ultimately, the outcomes of the study are to be used to pave the way for 
decision makers and competent authorities to take appropriate measures for child 
protection over the Internet. This could further help in designing appropriate protection 
plans and measures based on children’s attitudes reflected in this study. Since the study 
covers several patterns that could potentially lead to identifying victims of social 
engineering attacks, it would be beneficial for Abu Dhabi Educational Council (ADEC) 
to design their strategic plans in order to have an efficient and effective information 
security awareness strategy. 
A framework was designed to be used as a tool for reducing the impact of culture on 
information security. The framework is also accompanied by sensitive information 
sharing education guidelines to show how the security education programme could be 
designed.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND 
FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Conclusion 
This thesis has provided a comprehensive explanation of information security threats, 
which are represented in two main fields, the human factor and the cultural background, 
from the literature. It has been shown how different security initiatives reduce the 
information security risk; however, those initiatives that consider cultural background 
usually find it difficult due to the different cultural characteristics worldwide which 
ultimately form a hurdle to information security compliance. 
In order to provide the most effective solution security issues, from previous studies 
worldwide, relating to the misuse of sensitive information such as passwords have been 
considered. Similarly, the research study has analysed in depth the impact of these 
behaviours and attitudes on the information security triad with respect to both individuals 
and organisations.  
Due to the need for an understanding in respect of the cultural impact of sharing sensitive 
information amongst family members and friends, several countries have been considered 
in this research. The cultural and social investigation considered neighbourhood countries 
such as Oman and KSA; the research also considered the UK, as a western culture.  
Due to the cultural and social nature of the problem, the research strategy proposed a 
solution that considered the cultural basis of these security issues. Such solutions often 
result in resistance to change. However, according to the literature, education is the best 
defence against resistance to cultural change (Naylor, 1996), and can produce effective 
outcomes (Aloul, 2012). 
To derive the solution governmental initiatives towards sharing sensitive information 
such as password sharing education were analysed. The governmental initiatives of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and GCC countries were critically analysed 
in order to find an educational programme to reduce the impact of sharing sensitive 
information. 
The cybersecurity strategies of the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia give 
limited reference, If any, to education regarding password sharing, whilst the GCC 
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countries do not have a cyber-security strategy. 
An educational strategy was designed to reduce this phenomenon through an intervention 
study implemented in school children to patch the social vulnerability. 
Following the positive results obtained from the intervention study in school children, the 
study provided a basis for an information security education framework. The latter has 
been designed to strategically reduce the impact of sharing sensitive information among 
family members and friends. 
The aim and objectives of this research are now considered. The aim of this research was 
to: Develop a strategic framework to minimise information security risks in the UAE. 
A strategy has been developed using the result of the intervention study that has been 
conducted with school children. The framework has been designed to model the needs of 
UAE’s organisational requirements in ensuring their information security. The framework 
was targeted to reduce the impact of culture in information security, starting with school 
children in the UAE. The strategic framework can be used to design an information 
security syllabus, security training and an information security culture programme that 
aims to reduce the threat of sharing sensitive information.  
Due to the password sharing phenomena also existing in some advanced countries, the 
strategic framework could help to design an educational programme in order to minimise 
the risk of sharing sensitive information amongst family members, friends, co-workers 
etc. in such countries. 
In order to achieve the aim of this research, several objectives were established namely: 
Objective 1: Conduct a comprehensive literature review on Arab culture (UAE country) 
and its current ICT practices, sharing sensitive information, security standards and 
policies 
This objective has been addressed in Chapters 2 and 3. The dissemination of information 
technology has rendered restriction and containment of information very difficult. The 
Arab world has not yet achieved the same level of maturity, with respect to information 
technology as the developed world. The potential and current impact of advanced 
information technology on information security in developed countries, and its 
relationship to Arab society whose culture is marked by sharing confidential information 
and it’s a lack of understanding of the actual value of that information. Information 
167 
technology in the modern age can have a substantial effect in destabilising national 
security. Therefore, everyone should know the value of information and understand 
which information should not be shared with others. The technological expansion in the 
Arab world requires the development of security policies in information technology based 
on a specific infrastructure that inhibits the cultural factor from granting individuals the 
freedom to share confidential information. 
Many cases of sharing sensitive information have led to a loss to both individuals and 
organisations. This has often been achieved through the social engineering attacks which 
manipulate human behaviour rather technology. The damage that can occur due to the 
sharing of sensitive information among individuals is extended to the law enforcement 
community. Law enforcement bodies can find it extremely difficult to identify 
perpetrators of identity theft because of information sharing.  
The information security standards failed to sufficiently consider the role of culture which 
potentially forms a threat. This has been considered through analysing various 
information security standards and policies worldwide and existing initiatives to reduce 
the impact of culture on information security. 
Objective 2: Investigate behaviours specific to Arab culture that could be pertinent to 
privacy sharing (surveys, literature review) in the UAE 
This objective has been addressed in Chapter 4 through a pilot study conducted in major 
organisations in the UAE. Two approaches have been used to provide a proper foundation 
for the cultural issue on information privacy in order to proceed to the next stages. Based 
on the results obtained from the 90 participants, people from the UAE (Arabs) were 
willing to share their sensitive information (such as email content, credit card numbers 
etc) with family members and friends. The study has been compared with a similar study 
by Olson et al (2005) on 30 people who worked at mid-sized companies in the USA and 
used computers as part of their jobs; the difference can be seen in the comparison table in 
Chapter 4. 
 Due to the need for local context investigations, interviews were conducted with 
two IT executives in Abu Dhabi. A summary of the key issues obtained from the 
interviews is as follows: 
 Internal policies and compliance to international standards are not enough to 
prevent employees from sharing sensitive information; 
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 Policies are clear on the system but it is the implementation that usually generates 
problems as it involves people; 
 There are procedures, rather than measures, that may be taken along with policies 
and standards, such as evaluation of employee awareness of information security; 
 Courses by experts have been given to employees but little progress has been 
noticed; 
 Technological development has revealed information sharing in a more obvious 
way than in the past (e.g. message broadcasts, etc); 
 Awareness is the most important factor in information security and it has to be 
continuous and assessed to confirm that people are familiar with it; 
 It has been noticed that employees from non-Arab cultures are more aware of the 
value of information and are more discreet in sharing it. This has been witnessed 
within organisations; 
 There have been clear examples of cultural differences regarding information 
handling within organisations; 
 Awareness in childhood would also mitigate the financial burdens of continuous 
yet inefficient training at a later age. 
Objective 3: Investigate behaviours and attitude towards information security in GCC 
countries 
This objective has been addressed in Chapter 4 where further countries of the GCC region 
are considered in this research. Based on information gathered in a typical social 
engineering attack, a questionnaire was devised and administrated with municipality staff 
in 3 GCC countries, Oman, KSA and UAE, which represented the majority of the GCC 
population. According to the data obtained and the Kruskal–Wallis one-way ANOVA 
test, there were similarities among the 3 countries in most questions, showing similar 
behaviour towards information-sharing these countries. The behaviour of sharing 
sensitive information, including passwords, shown in Chapter 4 has a strong relation to 
the cultural attitude. 
Objective 4: Investigate behaviours and attitude towards information security in a 
different culture than the Arab culture. 
This objective was addressed in Chapter 4 where a comparison was made between the 
UK culture and the GCC countries. The results obtained from the questionnaire, which 
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targeted 90 private individuals (white English) who work in Council departments in the 
UK, was compared with 90 people of the GCC countries. According to the Mann-
Whitney U test, there exists a statistically significant difference in information security 
preferences between the two groups. This result indicated there was a cultural difference 
between the two groups which demonstrated the impact of culture on information security 
through the sharing of sensitive information amongst family members and friends. 
Objective 5: Critically investigate and analyse the information security strategy initiatives 
to minimise the risk of the sharing of sensitive information found in the UAE  
This objective has been addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 has presented different 
security mitigations to reduce the risk of sharing sensitive information. As a result, 
education and awareness was considered to be the best solution for adoption from the 
other security mitigation measures. 
In Chapter 7, a method was designed to enable critical analysis of the existing national 
cybersecurity strategies for the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia in order 
to develop an education and awareness programme to reduce the occurrence of sharing 
sensitive information in the UAE. The analysis aimed to assess the possible adoption of 
certain elements, if any, of these strategies relating to education within the UAE.  
The awareness strategies provided by the U.S., the UK and Australia provided some 
education initiatives for security threats in the password security domain. For example, 
the strategies maintain the importance of the selection of the password and the risk of 
choosing a weak password. However, sharing passwords with others is stated only as 
advice, without giving details of the risks associated with sharing passwords and the 
impact on both individuals and organisations. Therefore, the possibility of adopting 
awareness advice without educating users will not make any difference to cybersecurity 
risks in the UAE, since CERT.ae provides similar advice to awareness strategy for the 
advanced countries. 
Finally, the information security risks found in the UAE should be dealt with strategically 
in order to significantly reduce the cultural impact.  
Objective 6: Devise a strategy for privacy sharing in Arab culture (UAE), which 
comprises a solution or a set of solutions to the problem of sharing sensitive information 
to reduce overall information security risks 
This objective has been addressed in Chapter 7. The proposed strategy was designed with 
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consideration of the social risk of sharing sensitive information with family members and 
friends. The strategy to be developed for private information sharing in Arab culture aims 
to reduce the overall information security risks.  
The strategy targets school students in the UAE and assesses their information security 
awareness based on the course material designed to reduce information security risks. 
In order to implement an effective information security education strategy, several 
aspects were taken into consideration before designing the taught materials:  
 The education programme should be designed to cover the following aspects: 
• Differentiation between private and other information 
• The potential risk posed by sensitive information sharing  
• The impact of the risk as a result of the sharing phenomenon  
 In order to design and implement an effective information security strategy that 
reduces the risk of sharing sensitive information amongst friends and family 
members, we must first acknowledge the reaction of school children to the 
information security education programme and how much this can contribute to 
building the required strategy for Abu Dhabi Emirate.  
Objective 7: Implement the strategy (taught material) on samples of students in different 
schools, age groups (11-17) and gender 
This objective has been addressed in Chapter 7. The teaching material used lessons and 
interactive software to teach about privacy as an aspect of information security. A sample 
of 1200 students, divided into groups by age and gender, was considered in the target 
schools. The respondents were equally divided between genders and with the following 
age groups: 
 Less than 11 (20%) from each gender 
 Between 11 and 13 (20%) from each gender 
 Between 13 and 15 (20%) from each gender 
 Between 15 and 17 (20%) from each gender 
 Over 17 (20%) from each gender 
The figure below shows the age and sex distributions according to the implemented 
strategy: 
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Figure 16: Teaching as a method of reducing information security risks 
Due to the sensitivity of the study conducted in the school children, no direct interaction 
occurred with the school children. Although all the schools agreed to run the Likert scale 
assessment, not all of them agreed to run the Yes/No type assessment, hence a smaller 
number of respondents (500 students) has been considered. 
Objective 8: Conduct a series of surveys to test applicability and assess the results of the 
implementation before and after the taught material 
This objective has been addressed in Chapter 7.The study followed two approaches to 
measure the awareness of social engineering attacks and the potential to which 
information sharing can lead to compromise of the digital authentication. Accordingly, 
two types of surveys (quantitative and qualitative) were designed to gauge the students’ 
sharing preferences before and after the training programme took place. 
The first approach proposed for implementation used Likert scales as pre and post 
assessments of security awareness of the student groups whereas the second approach 
was qualitative and was conducted on two groups of 500 students each. The first group 
(the experiment group) was given taught material on information security threats and 
precautionary measures (part of 1200). The other group (the control group) was not given 
the material (not part of 1200). 
The questionnaire used Likert-scale measures and 1071 responses were completed in 
December 2012. Shortly after the responses were collected, taught material was given to 
the students (1200) with the aim of raising the students’ awareness of information 
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security risks. 
In February 2013, the second stage of the assessment targeted a controlled group of 250 
of each gender from the initial 1200 respondents, based on the same percentages as above 
for every age group. The approach used Yes/No questions with the reason for the choice, 
and with the aim of assessing their security awareness. There were 460 responses 
collected. 
In April 2013, the questionnaire was distributed to a group of respondents who had not 
been given the taught material. This step was carried out in order to analyse the impact of 
teaching on students by comparing the results obtained from the taught group and those 
from the non-taught group. There were 450 responses collected.  
In May 2013 the initial group of 1200 students were assessed using the Likert-scale 
measure in order to critically analyse the difference between the two assessments. There 
were 1053 responses collected. 
8.2 Further Work 
This thesis has provided a novel contribution to the field information security, 
particularly where cultural influences form a hurdle to information security compliance 
by sharing of sensitive information. However, further research is required to gain insight 
into several aspects of sensitive information sharing based on cultural and non-cultural 
influences. 
The following limitations may be addressed by further research: 
 The thesis covered a successful implementation of an information education 
programme for school children, which was designed based on the results of an 
associated intervention study. However, due to the sensitivity of the information 
collected and the anonymity that the survey followed, a comparison of individual 
students’ performances in the pre- and post- tests was not conducted. Therefore, 
there was no way to match individual students’ pre-test results to their results in 
post-test results. This may have resulted in loss of some information, for example 
individual awareness improvement. Further research may benefit from gauging 
individual improvements in information sharing awareness provided it can devise 
appropriate tools for matching pre- and post-test results. 
 Due to time and curriculum-related constraints, the same material was designed 
and taught to all age groups of the targeted school students. Had the taught 
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material been appropriately adapted to different age groups, better performance in 
the intervention may have been achieved. Moreover, it is difficult for syllabus 
designers to know what specific content of the material suits a particular age 
group. Therefore, further research is needed in this respect, specifically to set the 
educational requirements for each age group (for example which age group should 
be educated about the risk of sharing credit card details). 
Based on this study of sensitive information sharing by school children in the UAE, it is 
evident that social networks represent a significant threat to children, in particular in 
terms of cyberstalking and cyberbullying. The study has identified the aspects of 
minimising such threats by education; however, no in-depth coverage of how this is to be 
undertaken has been conducted. Therefore, further research is required to analyse and 
manage the threats represented by cyberstalking and cyberbullying. The following are 
some suggestions as to how this may be achieved: 
 Design, implement and test for efficacy Internet safety programmes that address 
cyberbullying and cyberstalking attacks 
 Run a series of assessments that aim to identify potential risky behaviour of the 
students in terms of information sharing over online social networks. 
 Update the educational curricula according to the identified risk appropriately for 
all school levels (elementary, secondary etc.). 
 Design an educational framework that addresses the risks, anticipates the impacts 
and offers mitigation advice to minimise the risks of cyberbullying and 
cyberstalking attacks. 
Knowing that alternative security measures for mitigating social engineering attacks can 
be adopted in parallel with education, such as technical measures and legislation 
measures (mentioned in Chapter Five), further research is required in order to design a 
mitigation system that considers these measures. The following are some of the 
suggestions in this respect: 
 For technological measures, an essential aspect of reducing social engineering is 
designing and implementing a log file system that contains the user access details 
and network computer details (IP address, MAC etc.) associated with the physical 
location of that computer in a network. Combing all these elements in one log file 
provides the network administrator with deeper knowledge about the activities on 
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the network. Moreover, password sharing among employees can be identified and 
discovered by the log file system. This step will enable the system administrator 
to monitor the entire network security access and identify anything unusual 
occurring in the network, which may flag social engineering threats. For example, 
if a finance manager accesses his/her computer from his/her office in an 
organisation, this normally indicates standard access. However, if the finance 
manager is accessing a network machine (especially several times) from the 
human resources department, there may be an indication that someone else is 
using the finance manager’s credentials to log in to the system. In such cases, the 
technical measure mitigates the threat of the social engineering attack that uses 
others’ password to illegitimately access their accounts. 
The above-proposed technical measure can be part of the forensics readiness of 
the network such that the access details of the user can be used as digital evidence 
if required. 
 Legislation can play a role in minimising the risk of social engineering attacks. 
Legislation measures require that the country’s local laws be updated to consider 
sensitive information sharing. Further research is to investigate the suitable ways 
of enforcing such laws. For example, it can be set by the law that password 
sharing is an infraction and may result in legal consequences. Accordingly, the 
legal authorities will need to work closely with IT advisors in order to decide what 
counts as digital evidence and hence to be able to criminalise social engineers 
attackers. 
 Moreover, social engineering attacks across borders are a serious issue, which has 
affected many online users across the globe.  Further research is necessary to 
understand and propose how such attacks can be addressed from a legal 
perspective, and perhaps suggest laws and regulations to be followed by different 
countries in this regard in order to fight social engineering attacks more 
efficiently. 
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Qualitative Analysis: Interview Questions 
1. Is the extent of protection provided by the security policies of the organisation as 
well as by following international standards in your opinion enough to prevent 
employees from sharing sensitive information with each other or to the outside of 
the organisation? 
2. Are there any measures that can be taken along with policies and standards to 
further boost the role of information security? 
3. Do you do awareness courses on the importance of information and its security in 
the organisation? If yes, who and what are these courses usually aimed at? 
4. In your opinion, and by virtue of your experience in the organisation, do customs 
and traditions provide grounds for greater potential for sharing sensitive 
information? Have you encountered any case of the spread of sensitive 
information based on certain cultural traditions? How did you deal with such 
situations or how can you deal with it in case it happens? 
5. By virtue of being involved with staff from diverse backgrounds and cultures, 
have you noticed obvious differences characterising Arab culture in terms of 
sharing sensitive information? Have there been any certain situations 
encountered? 
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APPENDIX 2  
Questionnaire 
Hypothesis: Arabs are prone to sharing information that is typically withheld 
Are you willing to share the following information with close people (i.e. relative or close 
friends)? 
1. Access to personal PC 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
2. Work Email content 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
3. Credit card details 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
4. Work Email password 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
5. Personal email password 
a. Strongly agree 
203 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
6. Confidential work information 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
7. Current location 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
8. Work-related documents 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
9. Personal mobile password  
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
10. Access to work PC 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
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11. Past finished work-related papers, products 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
12. Social media password (Facebook, Twitter)  
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
13. Personal email content 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
14. Online banking details 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
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Form for Research Ethics Projects (Ethics Form) 
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SECTION B Check List 
Please answer the following questions by circling YES or NO as appropriate. 
Does the study involve vulnerable participants or those unable to give informed 
consent (e.g. children, people with learning disabilities, your own students)? 
YES 
NO 
Will the study require permission of a gatekeeper for access to participants (e.g. 
schools, self-help groups, residential homes)? 
YES 
NO 
Will it be necessary for participants to be involved without consent (e.g. covert 
observation in non-public places)? 
YES 
NO 
Will the study involve sensitive topics (e.g. obtaining information about sexual 
activity, substance abuse)? 
YES 
NO 
Will blood, tissue samples or any other substances be taken from participants? 
YES 
NO 
Will the research involve intrusive interventions (e.g. the administration of drugs, 
hypnosis, physical exercise)? 
YES 
NO 
Will financial or other inducements be offered to participants (except reasonable 
expenses or small tokens of appreciation)? 
YES 
NO 
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YES 
NO 
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YES 
NO 
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YES 
NO 
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ethical issues, then further ethical consideration is required. Please document carefully 
how these issues will be addressed. 
Signed (student): Ahmed 
Date: 2/7/2012 
Countersigned (Supervisor): Professor Carsten Maple 
 
Date: 4.7.12 
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APPENDIX 3 
Questionnaire (English Version) 
Information Security Awareness* 
Please read the following carefully: ﺔﻳﺎﻨﻌﺑ ﻲﻠﻳ ﺎﻣ ﺓءﺍﺮﻗ ﻰﺟﺮﻳ 
The aim of the study is to increase the awareness level of information security to 
prevent you from being a victim of computer crimes. The questionnaire in the second 
page requires you to identify the potential risks that result from certain actions. 
Pressing Agree in the box below means you accept to participate in this questionnaire.  
Please note the following points before you press Agree: 
 
▀ No personal information will be obtained from you (your personal information, your 
school name, etc.)all data are anonymised 
▀ Neither your teachers nor your parents or your classmates will have access to your 
answers 
▀ Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to 
participate or withdraw at any point by closing the page 
▀ Your answers are very valuable to the researcher for further studies 
▀ Your answer is protected and secured* 
1. If you do not wish to participate in the research study, please decline participation 
by clicking on the "disagree" button. 
 The "disagree" button.  
 ِ◌agree  
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I am you willing to share the following information with or allow access to close 
people (i.e. relative, close friends or friends of friends): 
1. Access to a personal PC 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
2. School email content 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
3. School email password 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
4. Personal email password 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
5. Confidential school information, such as registration details, performance, etc. 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
6. Current location, such as updates on social media websites 
a. Strongly agree 
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b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
7. School-related documents, such as transcripts, marks, performance, etc. 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
8. Personal mobile password  
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
9. Access to school PC 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
10. Past school-related information, such as previous school marks, performance, etc. 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
11. Social media password (Facebook, Twitter)  
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
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12. Personal email content 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
13. Access to personal mobile phone 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
14. Access to personal USB memory drive 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
15. Access to other personal mobile devices (laptop, tablet, PDA, etc.) 
a. Strongly agree 
b. Agree 
c. Neither agree nor disagree 
d. Disagree 
e. Strongly disagree 
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ﺍﻟﻬﺩﻑ ﻣﻥ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﻫﻭ ﺯﻳﺎﺩﺓ ﻣﺳﺗﻭﻯ ﺍﻟﻭﻋﻲ ﺑﺄﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻠﻭﻣﺎﺕ ﻟﺣﻣﺎﻳﺗﻙ ﻣﻥ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻛﻭﻥ ﺿﺣﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﺟﺭﺍﺋﻡ  .f
ﺍﻹﻟﻛﺗﺭﻭﻧﻳﺔ. ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺑﻳﺎﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺻﻔﺣﺔ ﺍﻟﺛﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻳﺗﻁﻠﺏ ﻣﻧﻙ ﺗﺣﺩﻳﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﺧﺎﻁﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﺣﺗﻣﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻧﺟﻡ ﻋﻥ ﺇﺟﺭﺍءﺍﺕ 
ﻟﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﺍ ﻣﻌﻳﻧﺔ. ﺍﻟﺿﻐﻁ ﺍﺧﺗﻳﺎﺭﻙ ﺍﺧﺗﻳﺎﺭﻙ "ﺃﻭﻓﻕ" ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﺭﺑﻊ ﺃﺩﻧﺎﻩ ﻳﻌﻧﻲ ﺃﻧﻙ ﻣﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍ
 ﺍﻻﺳﺗﺑﻳﺎﻥ
 
 ﻳﺭﺟﻰ ﻣﻼﺣﻅﺔ ﺍﻟﻧﻘﺎﻁ ﺍﻟﺗﺎﻟﻳﺔ ﻗﺑﻝ ﺍﻟﺿﻐﻁ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻭﻓﻕ
 
 
ﻟﻥ ﻳﺗﻡ ﺍﻟﺣﺻﻭﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻳﺔ ﻣﻌﻠﻭﻣﺎﺕ ﺷﺧﺻﻳﺔ ﻋﻧﻙ ﻣﺛﻝ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻠﻭﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺷﺧﺻﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﻙ، ﺍﺳﻡ  ▀
 ﻣﺩﺭﺳﺗﻙ، ﺍﻟﺦ ﺟﻣﻳﻊ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻠﻭﻣﺎﺕ ﺳﻭﻑ ﺗﻛﻭﻥ ﻣﺟﻬﻭﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻬﻭﻳﺔ
 ﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺇﺟﺎﺑﺗﻙﻻ ﻣﻌﻠﻣﻙ ﻭﻻ ﻭﺍﻟﺩﻳﻙ ﻭﻻ ﺯﻣﻼﺋﻙ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﺩﺭﺳﻪ ﺳﻳﻌﻠﻣﻭﻥ ﻣ ▀
ﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﺗﻙ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺛﻳﺔ ﻁﻭﻋﻳﺔ. ﻳﻣﻛﻧﻙ ﺍﺧﺗﻳﺎﺭ ﻋﺩﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻻﻧﺳﺣﺎﺏ ﻓﻲ ﺃﻱ ﻟﺣﻅﺔ  ▀
 ﻋﻥ ﻁﺭﻳﻕ ﺇﻏﻼﻕ ﺍﻟﺻﻔﺣﺔ
 ﺇﺟﺎﺑﺎﺗﻙ ﻫﻲ ﻗﻳﻣﺔ ﺟﺩﺍ ﻟﻬﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺙ ﻭﻟﻣﺯﻳﺩ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﺳﺗﻘﺑﻝ ▀
 ﺳﻭﻑ ﻳﺗﻡ ﺍﻟﻣﺣﺎﻓﻅﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺇﺟﺎﺑﺗﻙ ﻣﻥ ﺃﻱ ﻭﺻﻭﻝ ﻟﻐﻳﺭ ﺃﻏﺭﺍﺽ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺙ ▀
 ﺭﻏﺏ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻣﺷﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺩﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺑﺣﺛﻳﺔ، ﻳﺭﺟﻰ ﺇﺧﺗﻳﺎﺭ ﻻ ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﻧﺕ ﻻ ﺗ .g
  .ﻻ ﺍﻭﺍﻓﻖ
 ﺍﻭﺍﻓﻖ 
 ﺍﻻﺳﺌﻠﻪ:
      . ﺍﻟﺪﺧﻮﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺟﻬﺎﺯ ﺍﻟﻜﻤﺒﻴﻮﺗﺮ ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺼﻲ1
  ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ - ﺃ
      ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
  . ﻣﺤﺘﻮﻯ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﺪ ﺍﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺪﺭﺳﻲ :2
 ﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ ﺃﻭﺍ - ﺃ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
 212
 . ﻛﻠﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﻟﻠﺒﺮﻳﺪ ﺍﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺪﺭﺳﻲ :3
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺃ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
 . ﻛﻠﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﻟﻠﺒﺮﻳﺪ ﺍﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺼﻲ :4
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺃ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
 ﻞ , ﺍﻷﺩﺍء، ..ﺍﻟﺦ.. ﺳﺮﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺪﺭﺳﻴﺔ ﻣﺜﻞ : ﺗﻔﺎﺻﻴﻞ ﺍﻟﺘﺴﺠﻴ5
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺃ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
ﺍﻟﻤﻮﻗﻊ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻟﻲ، ﻣﺜﻞ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺜﺎﺕ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻮﺍﻗﻊ ﻭﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺍﺻﻞ ﺍﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ) ﻓﻴﺲ ﺑﻮﻙ، ﺗﻮﻳﺘﺮ، ﺑﻼﻙ ﺑﻴﺮﻱ ﻣﺴﻨﺠﺮ( . 6
 : 
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺃ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
 ، ...ﺍﻟﺦ.ﺹ ، ﺍﻟﻌﻼﻣﺎﺕ ، ﺍﻷﺩﺍء . ﺍﻟﻮﺛﺎﺋﻖ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻟﻬﺎ ﺻﻠﺔ ﺑﻤﺪﺭﺳﺘﻚ ، ﻣﺜﻞ : ﺍﻟﻨﺼﻮ7
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺃ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
 . ﻛﻠﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﻟﻠﻬﺎﺗﻒ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﻤﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺼﻲ : 8
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 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺃ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
 
 . ﺍﻟﺪﺧﻮﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻛﻤﺒﻴﻮﺗﺮ ﺍﻟﻤﺪﺭﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺹ ﺑﻚ : 9
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺃ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
 ﺳﺎﺑﻘﻪ ﺫﺍﺕ ﺻﻠﺔ ﺑﻤﺪﺭﺳﺘﻚ، ﻣﺜﻞ : ﻋﻼﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺪﺭﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﺎﺑﻘﺔ ، ﺍﻷﺩﺍء ، ..ﺍﻟﺦ. . ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ01
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺃ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
 . ﻛﻠﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﻟﻮﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﺍﻟﺘﻮﺍﺻﻞ ﺍﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ،ﻣﺜﻞ : ﺍﻟﻔﻴﺴﺒﻮﻙ ﻭﺗﻮﻳﺘﺮ .11
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺃ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
 : . ﻣﺤﺘﻮﻯ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﺪ ﺍﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺼﻲ21
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺃ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
  .h
 . ﺍﻟﺪﺧﻮﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻬﺎﺗﻒ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﻤﻮﻝ ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺼﻲ : 31
 412
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺃ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
 ( :BSU. ﺍﻟﺪﺧﻮﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺫﺍﻛﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﺰﻳﻦ ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺔ)41
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺃ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
 ﺻﻳﺔ، ﻣﺛﻝ : ﺍﻟﻛﻣﺑﻳﻭﺗﺭ ﺍﻟﻣﺣﻣﻭﻝ ، ﺍﻷﻗﺭﺍﺹ، ..ﺍﻟﺦ.. ﺍﻟﺩﺧﻭﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻏﻳﺭﻫﺎ ﻣﻥ ﺍﻷﺟﻬﺯﺓ ﺍﻟﺷﺧ51 .i
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺃ
 ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻕ  - ﺏ
 ﻣﺣﺎﻳﺩ  - ﺕ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ ﺑﺷﺩﺓ  - ﺙ
 ﺃﻋﺎﺭﺽ - ﺝ
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Ethics form  
FACULTY OF CREATIVE ARTS, TECHNOLOGIES AND SCIENCE 
Form for Research Ethics Projects (Ethics Form) 
Student Name Ahmed Alkaabi 
Student Number 0813839 
Degree Pathway PhD 
Supervisor name Prof Carsten Maple 
Supervisor Signature 
 
Title of project 
Developing a Culture-based Information Security Strategy 
for Abu Dhabi 
 
 
SECTION A Proposal 
Please summarise in the research proposal (Screening Form) the ethical issues 
involved and how they will be addressed. 
In any proposal involving human participants please provide information on how: 
• informed consent will be obtained 
• confidentiality will be observed 
• the nature of the research and the means of dissemination of the outcomes 
will be communicated to participants. 
216 
 
SECTION B Check List 
Please answer the following questions by circling YES or NO as appropriate. 
 
Does the study involve vulnerable participants or those unable to give informed 
consent (e.g. children, people with learning disabilities, your own students)? 
YES 
NO 
Will the study require permission of a gatekeeper for access to participants (e.g. 
schools, self-help groups, residential homes)? 
YES 
NO 
Will it be necessary for participants to be involved without consent (e.g. covert 
observation in non-public places)? 
YES 
NO 
Will the study involve sensitive topics (e.g. obtaining information about sexual 
activity, substance abuse)? 
YES 
NO 
Will blood, tissue samples or any other substances be taken from participants? 
YES 
NO 
Will the research involve intrusive interventions (e.g. the administration of drugs, 
hypnosis, physical exercise)? 
YES 
NO 
Will financial or other inducements be offered to participants (except reasonable 
expenses or small tokens of appreciation)? 
YES 
NO 
Will the research investigate any aspect of illegal activity (e.g. drugs, crime, 
underage alcohol consumption or sexual activity)? 
YES 
NO 
Will participants be stressed beyond what is considered normal for them? 
YES 
NO 
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Will the study involve participants from the NHS (patients or staff) or will data be 
obtained from NHS premises? 
YES 
NO 
 
If the answer to any of the questions above is “Yes”, or if there are any other 
significant ethical issues, then further ethical consideration is required. Please 
document carefully how these issues will be addressed. 
 
The research involves surveying school students on sharing information and IT related 
material will be given to them. The researcher has obtained the permission of the 
relevant authority, Abu Dhabi Educational Council, to do the survey (Available upon 
request) 
 
Signed (student): Ahmed 
Date: 26/11/2012 
 
Countersigned (Supervisor): Professor Carsten Maple 
 
Date:   
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Permission to do the study (Abu Dhabi Emirate) 
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APPENDIX 4 
Opened Ended Questionnaire (English Version) 
Information Security Awareness* 
Please read the following carefully: ﺔﻳﺎﻨﻌﺑ ﻲﻠﻳ ﺎﻣ ﺓءﺍﺮﻗ ﻰﺟﺮﻳ 
The aim of the study is to increase the awareness level of information security to prevent 
you from being a victim of computer crimes. The questionnaire in the second page 
requires you to identify the potential risks that result from certain actions. Pressing Agree 
in the box below means you accept to participate in this questionnaire.  
Please note the following points before you press Agree: 
 
▀ No personal information will be obtained from you (your personal information, your 
school name, etc.)all data are anonymised 
▀ Neither your teachers nor your parents or your classmates will have access to your 
answers 
▀ Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to 
participate or withdraw at any point by closing the page 
▀ Your answers are very valuable to the researcher for further studies 
▀ Your answer is protected and secured 
 
* 
1. If you do not wish to participate in the research study, please decline participation by 
clicking on the "disagree" button. 
 The "disagree" button.  
 ِ◌agree  
 
Questions 
1. May all information be shared with friends and relatives? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
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b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
2. Would you share your email password with a friend? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
3. Would you share your email content with a friend if requested? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
4. Would you share your sensitive information with a friend that you met in 
social media website (i.e. Facebook, twitter, chatting website) but not in 
person? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
5. Would you allow access to your personal computer that contains sensitive 
information to a friend or relative if requested? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
6. Would you allow access to your phone to a friend or relative if requested? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
7. Can it be serious consequences sharing sensitive information with others? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
8. Generally, is it safe to share your email content with close people you believe 
that they will not divulge it? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
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9. If there is an urgent matter, would you give your password to a trusted 
person to access your computer? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
10. Would you regularly tell where you are in your social media accounts? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
11. Would you give access to your Facebook to a person you trust? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
12. Would you give your email password to a person you trust? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
13. In case you shared your account password with someone, will you change it 
later on? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
14. Do you have different passwords for different accounts? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
15. Do you lend your USB flash memory to a friend if requested without 
checking whether it has sensitive information stored? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
16. Do you have your password(s) written somewhere? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
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c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
17. Have you ever given your password of any account to someone? 
a. Yes, with…………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
18. Are you careful when you open email attachments about who the sender is? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
19. Do you have any email or other Internet accounts you share with others (i.e. 
sibling, friend, parent)? 
a. Yes, I share ………………………………………with…………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
20. Do you share any instant messenger’s passwords with others? 
a. Yes, because …………………………………………………… 
b. No, because …………………………………………………….. 
c. Not sure because………………………………………………… 
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ﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻴﺔ. ﺍﻟﻬﺪﻑ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺪﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﻫﻮ ﺯﻳﺎﺩﺓ ﻣﺴﺘﻮﻯ ﺍﻟﻮﻋﻲ ﺑﺄﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﻟﺤﻤﺎﻳﺘﻚ ﻣﻦ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻜﻮﻥ ﺿﺤﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺠﺮﺍﺋﻢ ﺍﻹﻟ
ﺍﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺼﻔﺤﺔ ﺍﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻳﺘﻄﻠﺐ ﻣﻨﻚ ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﺍﻟﻤﺨﺎﻁﺮ ﺍﻟﻤﺤﺘﻤﻠﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻨﺠﻢ ﻋﻦ ﺇﺟﺮﺍءﺍﺕ ﻣﻌﻴﻨﺔ. ﺍﻟﻀﻐﻂ ﺍﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭﻙ 
 ﺍﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭﻙ "ﺃﻭﻓﻖ" ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺮﺑﻊ ﺃﺩﻧﺎﻩ ﻳﻌﻨﻲ ﺃﻧﻚ ﻣﻮﺍﻓﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺍﻻﺳﺘﺒﻴﺎﻥ
 
 ﻳﺮﺟﻰ ﻣﻼﺣﻈﺔ ﺍﻟﻨﻘﺎﻁ ﺍﻟﺘﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺍﻟﻀﻐﻂ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻭﻓﻖ
 
 
ﺃﻳﺔ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺷﺨﺼﻴﺔ ﻋﻨﻚ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﻚ، ﺍﺳﻢ ﻣﺪﺭﺳﺘﻚ، ﺍﻟﺦ ﺟﻤﻴﻊ  ﻟﻦ ﻳﺘﻢ ﺍﻟﺤﺼﻮﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ▀
 ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺳﻮﻑ ﺗﻜﻮﻥ ﻣﺠﻬﻮﻟﺔ ﺍﻟﻬﻮﻳﺔ
 ﻻ ﻣﻌﻠﻤﻚ ﻭﻻ ﻭﺍﻟﺪﻳﻚ ﻭﻻ ﺯﻣﻼﺋﻚ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺪﺭﺳﻪ ﺳﻴﻌﻠﻤﻮﻥ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺇﺟﺎﺑﺘﻚ ▀
ﺃﻱ ﻟﺤﻈﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻁﺮﻳﻖ ﻣﺸﺎﺭﻛﺘﻚ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺪﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺜﻴﺔ ﻁﻮﻋﻴﺔ. ﻳﻤﻜﻨﻚ ﺍﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭ ﻋﺪﻡ ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﺃﻭ ﺍﻻﻧﺴﺤﺎﺏ ﻓﻲ  ▀
 ﺇﻏﻼﻕ ﺍﻟﺼﻔﺤﺔ
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 ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﻨﺖ ﻻ ﺗﺮﻏﺐ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺪﺭﺍﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﺒﺤﺜﻴﺔ، ﻳﺮﺟﻰ ﺇﺧﺘﻴﺎﺭ ﻻ ﺃﻭﺍﻓﻖ
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Answers (English Version) 
3. May all information be shared with friends and relatives? 
No, only certain information can be shared. This depends on the type of information and 
necessity of sharing it. 
4. Would you share your email password with a friend? 
No, as above, in any normal case, my friend does need my email password. 
5. Would you share your email content with a friend if requested? 
No, my email contact is intended to me. If any content is for sharing, I may forward the 
email. 
6. Would you share your sensitive information with a friend that you met in social media 
website (i.e. Facebook, twitter, chatting website)? 
No, sensitive information should not be shared with those who unauthorised to have it. 
7. Would you allow access to your personal computer that contains sensitive information 
to a friend or relative if requested? 
No, sensitive information should not be shared with those who unauthorised to have it. 
8. Would you allow access to your phone to a friend or relative if requested? 
Yes, for making a call but not leave the phone with them. 
9. Can there be serious consequences of sharing sensitive information with others? 
Yes, (Slides 9, 10, 11) 
10. Generally, is it safe to share your email content with people you trust? 
No, because if you trust some people with some information, any threat happens to their 
information will happen to yours as well. (More details Slides 9, 10, 11) 
11. If there is an urgent matter, would you give your password to a trusted person to 
access your computer? 
Usually no, but discretion is used to assess urgency. If this happens, the password needs 
to be changed at the earliest opportunity 
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12. Would you regularly tell where you are in your social media accounts? 
No. This may lead to stalking, robbing, privacy compromise, etc. 
13. Would you give access to your Facebook to a person you trust? 
No, accessing Facebook is of no interest other that the profile owner. Even though 
Facebook profile may contain no sensitive information, giving access may lead to many 
issues. 
14. Would you give your email password to a person you trust? 
No, the password should not be given to anyone other than the account holder (More 
details Slides 9, 10, 11). 
15. In case you shared your account password with someone, will you change it later on? 
Yes, but I wouldn’t initially share it. 
16. Do you have different passwords for different accounts? 
Yes, it is important to have different passwords for different accounts. If one account is 
compromised, the other can still be protected. 
17. Would you lend your USB flash memory to a friend if requested without checking 
whether it has sensitive information stored? 
No, because I would not know what would happen to it. Even if I trust the friend, the 
flash memory might be lost or stolen. 
18. Do you have your password(s) written somewhere? 
No, I memorise passwords because writing them might lead to that someone finds them 
19. Have you ever given your password of any account to someone? 
No, passwords should never be given to anyone. 
20. Are you careful when you open email attachments? 
Yes, because these attachments may have hacking scripts or malicious software which 
would compromise the stored information. 
21. Do you have any shared email or other Internet accounts? 
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No, all accounts I have are mine. 
22. Do you share any instant messenger’s passwords with others? 
No, any password should never be given to anyone. 
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 ﻭﺍﻷﻗﺎﺭﺏ ؟ ﺍﻷﺻﺪﻗﺎء ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺤﺴﺎﺳﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺗﺒﺎﺩﻝ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﻫﻞ. 3
 .ﺗﺒﺎﺩﻟﻬﺎ ﻭﻫﺬﺍ ﻳﻌﺘﻤﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻮﻉ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﻭﺿﺮﻭﺭﺓ  ، ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﻣﻌﻴﻨﺔ ﻓﻘﻂ ﺗﺒﺎﺩﻝ، ﻳﻤﻜﻦ  ﻻ
 ﺻﺪﻳﻖ ؟ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻲ ﻟﻠﺒﺮﻳﺪ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﻛﻠﻤﺔ ﺗﺘﺸﺎﺭﻙ . ﻫﻞ4
 . ﺒﺮﻳﺪ ﺍﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺹ ﺑﻲﻟﻠﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﻛﻠﻟﻪ ﻟﻤﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺃﻱ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﺻﺪﻳﻘﻲ ﻻ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﻭ،  ، ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻨﺤﻮ ﺍﻟﻮﺍﺭﺩ ﺃﻋﻼﻩ ﻻ
 . ﻫﻞ ﺗﺘﺸﺎﺭﻙ ﻣﺤﺘﻮﻯ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﺪ ﺍﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺹ ﺑﻚ ﻣﻊ ﺻﺪﻳﻖ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻁﻠﺐ ﻣﻨﻚ ؟5
ﻻ ، ﻓﻤﺤﺘﻮﻯ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﺪ ﺍﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻲ ﺧﺎﺹ ﺑﻲ ﻭﺃﻧﺎ ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺼﻮﺩ ﺑﻪ ، ﺇﺫﺍً ﻓﺄﻱ ﻣﺤﺘﻮﻯ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻟﻠﺘﺒﺎﺩﻝ ﺳﻮﻑ ﺃﻗﻮﻡ ﺑﺈﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﺗﻮﺟﻴﻪ 
 ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﺪ ﺍﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻲ. 
 ﺍﻻﺗﺼﺎﻝ ﺍﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻣﻮﺍﻗﻊ ﺍﺟﺘﻤﻌﺖ ﻭﺗﻌﺮﻓﺖ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼﻝ ﺻﺪﻳﻖ ﻣﻊ ﺑﻚ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ ﺎﺳﺔﺍﻟﺤﺴ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺗﺘﺒﺎﺩﻝ . ﻫﻞ6
 ؟ (ﻭﻣﻮﺍﻗﻊ ﺍﻟﺪﺭﺩﺷﺔ ﻭﺗﻮﻳﺘﺮ، )ﺍﻟﻔﻴﺴﺒﻮﻙ
 . ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺼﺮﺡ ﻟﻬﻢ ﺑﻤﻌﺮﻓﺘﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦﺍﻷﺷﺨﺎﺹ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺣﺴﺎﺳﺔ ﻣﻊ ﺃﻭﻟﺌﻚ  ﻧﺘﺒﺎﺩﻝ، ﻻ ﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ ﺃﻥ  ﻻ
 ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﻳﺤﺘﻮﻱ ﺑﻚ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺹ ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺼﻲ ﺍﻟﻜﻤﺒﻴﻮﺗﺮ ﺟﻬﺎﺯ ﺗﺴﻤﺢ ﻟﺼﺪﻳﻖ ﺃﻭ ﻗﺮﻳﺐ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻁﻠﺐ ﻣﻨﻚ ﻟﻠﺪﺧﻮﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ . ﻫﻞ7
 ﺣﺴﺎﺳـﺔ ؟ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ
 . ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺼﺮﺡ ﻟﻬﻢ ﺑﻤﻌﺮﻓﺘﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦﺍﻷﺷﺨﺎﺹ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺣﺴﺎﺳﺔ ﻣﻊ ﺃﻭﻟﺌﻚ  ﻧﺘﺒﺎﺩﻝ، ﻻ ﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ ﺃﻥ  ﻻ
 ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺹ ﺑﻚ ؟ ﺍﻟﻬﺎﺗﻒ ﻟﺼﺪﻳﻖ ﺃﻭ ﻗﺮﻳﺐ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻁﻠﺐ ﻣﻨﻚ ﻟﻠﺪﺧﻮﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺗﺴﻤﺢ . ﻫﻞ8
 . ﺍﻟﻬﺎﺗﻒ ﻣﻌﻬﻢ ﺃﺗﺮﻙ، ﻹﺟﺮﺍء ﻣﻜﺎﻟﻤﺔ ﻭﻟﻜﻦ ﻻ  ﻧﻌﻢ
 ؟ ﻥ ﺗﻜﻮﻥ ﻫﻨﺎﻙ ﻋﻮﺍﻗﺐ ﻭﺧﻴﻤﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺒﺎﺩﻝ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺤﺴﺎﺳﺔ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻵﺧﺮﻳﻦﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﺃ. 9
 (11،  01،  9ﻧﻌﻢ ، )ﺷﺮﺍﺋﺢ 
 ﺗﺜﻖ ﺑﻬﻢ ؟ ﺃﻧﺎﺱ ﻣﻊ ﺑﻚ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺹ ﺍﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻲ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﺪ ﻣﺤﺘﻮﻯ ﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭﻛﺔ ﺁﻣﻦ ﻫﻮ . ﻫﻞ01
ﻚ. )ﻟﻤﺰﻳﺪ ﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺗﻬﻢ ﺳﻮﻑ ﻳﺤﺪﺙ ﻟﻚ ﻛﺬﻟﻟﺄﻱ ﺗﻬﺪﻳﺪ ﻳﺤﺪﺙ ﻓ،  ﺒﻌﺾ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕﻟﺑﻌﺾ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﻓﻲ ، ﻷﻧﻪ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﻨﺖ ﺗﺜﻖ  ﻻ
 .(11،  01،  9ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﻔﺎﺻﻴﻞ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﺍﺋﺢ 
 ﺍﻟﻜﻤﺒﻴﻮﺗﺮ ﺟﻬﺎﺯ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻟﻠﻮﺻﻮﻝ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻮﺛﻮﻕ ﻟﺸﺨﺺ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﻛﻠﻤﺔ ﺗﻌﻄﻲ ﻫﻞ ﻣﻠﺤﻪ ﻭﺃﻣﺮﺍً ﻋﺎﺟﻞ ، ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﻫﻨﺎﻙ ﻛﺎﻥ . ﺇﺫﺍ11
 ﺑﻚ ؟ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺹ
ﺻﺔ ﺤﺘﺎﺝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻛﻠﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺮﻭﺭ ﻓﻲ ﺃﻗﺮﺏ ﻓﺮﻧ،  ﻟﺘﻘﻴﻴﻢ ﺍﻻﺳﺘﻌﺠﺎﻝ. ﺇﺫﺍ ﺣﺪﺙ ﻫﺬﺍ ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮ ﺍﻟﻮﺿﻊ، ﻭﻟﻜﻦ ﻳﺘﻢ  ﻋﺎﺩﺓ ﻻ
  . ﻣﻤﻜﻨﺔ
 . ﻫﻞ ﺗﻘﻮﻝ ﺩﺍﺋﻤﺎ ًﺃﻧﻪ ﻟﺪﻳﻚ ﺣﺴﺎﺏ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻮﺍﻗﻊ ﺍﻻﺗﺼﺎﻝ ﺍﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ؟21
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 ﺍﻟﺦ ..... ،ﺃﻱ ﺗﻌﺮﺿﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﺨﻄﺮ  ﺨﺼﻮﺻﻴﺔﺍﻟ ﻮ، ﻭﺳﻄ ﺴﺮﻗﺔﺍﻟﻭ ﻬﺬﺍ ﻗﺪ ﻳﺆﺩﻱ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻤﻄﺎﺭﺩﺓ،ﻻ ، ﻓ
 . ﻫﻞ ﺗﺴﻤﺢ ﻟﺸﺨﺺ ﺗﺜﻖ ﺑﻪ ﻟﻠﺪﺧﻮﻝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺣﺴﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﻔﻴﺴﺒﻮﻙ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺹ ﺑﻚ ؟31
ﻣﻠﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ  ﺍﻟﻔﻴﺴﺒﻮﻙ ﻫﻮ ﺍﻟﺪﺧﻮﻝ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺔ ،ﻓﺎﻷﻛﺜﺮ ﺧﻄﺮﺍ ﻟﺴﻤﺎﺡ ﺍﻵﺧﺮﻳﻦ ﻟﺪﺧﻮﻝ ،  ﻻ
 ﻗﺪ ﻳﺆﺩﻱ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻌﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ.ﻭﻟﻜﻦ ﺍﻟﺪﺧﻮﻝ ﻭﺍﻟﻮﺻﻮﻝ ﺇﻟﻴﻪ ،  ﺤﺘﻮﻱ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺣﺴﺎﺳﺔﻳﻠﻔﻴﺴﺒﻮﻙ ﻗﺪ ﻻ ﺍﻟﺘﻌﺮﻳﻒ ﻟ
 ﺑﻪ ؟ ﺗﺜﻖ ﺷﺨﺺ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺹ ﺑﻚ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻲ ﻟﻠﺒﺮﻳﺪ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﻛﻠﻤﺔ ﺗﻌﻄﻲ . ﻫﻞ41
،  01،  9ﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﺮﻭﺭ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻱ ﺷﺨﺺ ﻏﻴﺮ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ ﺍﻟﺤﺴﺎﺏ )ﻣﺰﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺘﻔﺎﺻﻴﻞ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﺍﺋﺢ ، ﻻ ﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻌﻄﻰ ﻛﻠﻤ ﻻ
 (.11
 
 ﻻﺣﻖ ؟ ﻭﻗﺖ ﻓﻲ ﺑﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮ ﻛﻠﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﺗﻘﻮﻡ ﻫﻞ ﺳﻮﻑ ﺁﺧﺮ ، ﺷﺨﺺ ﻟﺤﺴﺎﺑﻚ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﻛﻠﻤﺔ ﺗﺘﺸﺎﺭﻙ ﻛﻨﺖ ﺣﺎﻝ . ﻓﻲ51
 ﻧﻌﻢ ، ﻟﻜﻨﻨﻲ ﻟﻦ ﺃﺗﺒﺎﺩﻟﻪ ﻣﻨﺬ ﺑﺪﺍﻳﺔ ﺍﻷﻣﺮ .
 ﺔ ؟ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔ ﻟﺤﺴﺎﺑﺎﺕ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻣﺮﻭﺭ ﻛﻠﻤﺎﺕ ﻟﺪﻳﻚ . ﻫﻞ61
ﺰﺍﻝ ﺗﻻ  ﻓﺎﻷﺧﺮﻳﺎﺕ،  ﺈﺫﺍ ﺗﻢ ﺍﺧﺘﺮﺍﻕ ﺣﺴﺎﺏ ﻭﺍﺣﺪﻓ ، ﻤﺮﻭﺭ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻟﺤﺴﺎﺑﺎﺕ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔﺍﻟﻜﻮﻥ ﻛﻠﻤﺎﺕ ﺗ، ﻓﻤﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﻬﻢ ﺃﻥ  ﻧﻌﻢ
 .ﻣﺤﻤﻴﺔ
( ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﺣﺪ ﺍﻷﺻﺪﻗﺎء ﺇﺫﺍ ﻁﻠﺐ ﻣﻨﻚ ﺩﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﺇﺫﺍ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺑﻬﺎ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ ﺣﺴﺎﺳﺔ  BSU. ﻫﻞ ﺗﻌﻄﻲ ﺫﺍﻛﺮﺗﻚ)ﺍﻟﻔﻼﺵ71
 ﻭﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻣﺨﺰﻧﺔ؟
  .ﻪﻔﻼﺵ ﺃﻭ ﺳﺮﻗﺘﺍﻟﻘﺪ ﻳﺘﻢ ﻓﻘﺪﺍﻥ ﻓ،  ﺼﺪﻳﻖﺍﻟﻓﻲ  ﺃﺛﻖﺣﺘﻰ ﻟﻮ ﻛﻨﺖ ،  ﺤﺪﺙ ﻟﻬﺎ، ﻷﻧﻨﻲ ﻻ ﺃﻋﺮﻑ ﻣﺎ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﺳﻴ ﻻ
 ﻣﺎ ؟ ﻣﻜﺎﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻚ ﻣﻜﺘﻮﺑﺔ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﻛﻠﻤﺔ ﻟﺪﻳﻚ . ﻫﻞ81
 ﻻ ، ﺃﻧﺎ ﺃﺣﻔﻆ ﻛﻠﻤﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﻷﻧﻪ ﻛﺘﺎﺑﺘﻬﺎ ﻗﺪ ﻳﺆﺩﻱ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻥ ﺷﺨﺼﺎ ًﻣﺎ ﻗﺪ ﻳﺠﺪﻫﺎ . 
 ﻱ ﺷﺨﺺ ؟. ﻫﻞ ﻗﻤﺖ ﺑﺈﻋﻄﺎء ﻛﻠﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﺍﻟﺨﺎﺹ ﺑﻚ ﻷﻱ ﺣﺴﺎﺏ ﻓﻲ ﺃﻱ ﻭﻗﺖ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻷ91
 . ، ﻻ ﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ ﺃﺑﺪﺍ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻌﻄﻰ ﻛﻠﻤﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻱ ﺷﺨﺺ ﻻ
 ﺍﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭﻧﻲ ؟ ﺍﻟﺒﺮﻳﺪ ﻣﺮﻓﻘﺎﺕ ﺑﻔﺘﺢ ﺣﺬﺭ ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﻮﻡ . ﻫﻞ ﺃﻧﺖ02
ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕ  ﻘﺮﺻﻨﺔ ﺃﻭ ﺑﺮﺍﻣﺞ ﺿﺎﺭﺓ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺷﺄﻧﻬﺎ ﺃﻥ ﺗﺆﺛﺮ ﺳﻠﺒﺎً ﺍﻟ ﻮﺹﻧﺼ ﺑﻬﺎ ﻷﻥ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﺮﻓﻘﺎﺕ ﻗﺪ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ، ﻧﻌﻢ
 ﺍﻟﻤﺨﺰﻧﺔ.
 ؟ ﺍﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﺃﺧﺮﻯ ﻣﺸﺘﺮﻛﺔ ﺣﺴﺎﺑﺎﺕ ﺃﻭ ﻭﻧﻲﺇﻟﻜﺘﺮ ﺑﺮﻳﺪ ﺃﻱ ﻟﺪﻳﻚ . ﻫﻞ12
 . ﻟﺪﻱ ﻫﻲ ﻟﻲ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ، ﺟﻤﻴﻊ ﺍﻟﺤﺴﺎﺑﺎﺕ ﻻ
 . ﻫﻞ ﺗﺒﺎﺩﻟﺖ ﻛﻠﻤﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﻷﻱ ﻣﺮﺍﺳﻼﺕ ﻓﻮﺭﻳﺔ ﻣﻊ ﺍﻷﺧﺮﻳﻦ ؟22
 ، ﻻ ﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ ﺃﺑﺪﺍ ﺃﻥ ﺗﻌﻄﻰ ﺃﻱ ﻛﻠﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺴﺮ ﻷﺣﺪ. ﻻ
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APPENDIX 6 
Categories for Individual Questions 
3. May all information be shared with friends and relatives? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 15 7 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 12 4 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 4 16 
Necessity of helping others 6 14 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 12 5 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 11 8 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 7 17 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 7 14 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
14 9 
Carefulness with online activities 12 6 
 
4. Would you share your email password with a friend? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 12 7 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 13 10 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 9 23 
Necessity of helping others 2 12 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 16 14 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 15 4 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 2 4 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 6 8 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 12 10 
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different accounts) 
Carefulness with online activities 13 8 
 
5. Would you share your email content with a friend if requested? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 14 8 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 15 6 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 4 15 
Necessity of helping others 3 20 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 12 10 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 11 9 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 5 9 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 7 12 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
12 6 
Carefulness with online activities 17 5 
 
 
6. Would you share your sensitive information with a friend that you met in social 
media website (i.e. Facebook, twitter, chatting website)? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 11 4 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 23 6 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 2 16 
Necessity of helping others 2 14 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 12 10 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 11 8 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 8 11 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 10 12 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 10 9 
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not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
Carefulness with online activities 11 10 
 
7. Would you allow access to your personal computer that contains sensitive 
information to a friend or relative if requested? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 10 6 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 11 5 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 7 13 
Necessity of helping others 2 15 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 14 7 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 14 5 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 7 23 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 9 17 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
12 4 
Carefulness with online activities 14 5 
 
8. Would you allow access to your phone to a friend or relative if requested? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 12 5 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 15 12 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 9 15 
Necessity of helping others 3 14 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 14 8 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 14 6 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 1 15 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 6 14 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 12 5 
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not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
Carefulness with online activities 14 6 
 
 
9. Can there be serious consequences of sharing sensitive information with others? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 12 8 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 11 9 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 3 12 
Necessity of helping others 8 19 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 17 2 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 14 9 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 7 15 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 5 17 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
11 4 
Carefulness with online activities 12 5 
 
10. Generally, is it safe to share your email content with people you trust? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 11 5 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 11 8 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 8 16 
Necessity of helping others 8 9 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 12 9 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 14 10 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 7 20 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 8 11 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 10 6 
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not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
Carefulness with online activities 11 6 
 
11. If there is an urgent matter, would you give your password to a trusted person to 
access your computer? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 13 3 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 18 8 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 8 15 
Necessity of helping others 4 19 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 12 8 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 14 10 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 2 10 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 2 12 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
12 8 
Carefulness with online activities 15 7 
 
12. Would you regularly tell where you are in your social media accounts? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 15 9 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 14 6 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 4 16 
Necessity of helping others 4 12 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 13 4 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 15 9 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 1 19 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 5 12 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 15 5 
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not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
Carefulness with online activities 14 8 
 
 
 
13. Would you give access to your Facebook to a person you trust? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 12 12 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 13 5 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 4 13 
Necessity of helping others 9 14 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 13 5 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 11 7 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 7 14 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 8 16 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
12 5 
Carefulness with online activities 11 9 
 
14. Would you give your email password to a person you trust? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 12 7 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 11 5 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 6 12 
Necessity of helping others 7 14 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 12 12 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 13 6 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 8 13 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 6 16 
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Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
12 7 
Carefulness with online activities 13 8 
 
 
 
15. In case you shared your account password with someone, will you change it later 
on? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 17 12 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 15 9 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 4 17 
Necessity of helping others 3 12 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 12 3 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 12 9 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 6 12 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 6 14 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
12 8 
Carefulness with online activities 13 4 
 
16. Do you have different passwords for different accounts? 
Category 
Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 12 5 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 14 6 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 9 12 
Necessity of helping others 5 16 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 16 7 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 11 6 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 5 25 
  
245 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 2 13 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
12 6 
Carefulness with online activities 14 4 
 
 
 
17. Would you lend your USB flash memory to a friend if requested without 
checking whether it has sensitive information stored? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 13 9 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 11 10 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 8 15 
Necessity of helping others 9 12 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 15 9 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 13 4 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 6 9 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 2 17 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
11 8 
Carefulness with online activities 12 7 
 
18. Do you have your password(s) written somewhere? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 9 10 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 12 3 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 2 9 
Necessity of helping others 3 15 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 17 6 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 16 5 
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Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 6 18 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 6 25 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
13 4 
Carefulness with online activities 16 5 
 
 
 
19. Have you ever given your password of any account to someone? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 11 9 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 13 8 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 3 16 
Necessity of helping others 7 12 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 15 4 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 14 10 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 10 17 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 3 11 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
11 6 
Carefulness with online activities 13 7 
 
 
 
 
20. Are you careful when you open email attachments? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 14 12 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 15 7 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 4 11 
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Necessity of helping others 6 14 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 14 6 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 11 7 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 1 10 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 5 16 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
14 8 
Carefulness with online activities 16 9 
 
21. Do you have any shared email or other Internet accounts? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 11 7 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 13 11 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 1 17 
Necessity of helping others 7 13 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 15 2 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 14 4 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 9 16 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 6 15 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
13 7 
Carefulness with online activities 11 8 
 
22. Do you share any instant messenger’s passwords with others? 
Category Taught (%) Untaught (%) 
Differentiation between private and 
other information 18 9 
Differentiation between different 
accounts 10 7 
Necessity of keeping good relationships 
with friends and relatives 8 15 
Necessity of helping others 1 11 
  
248 
Depending on the situation and at the 
discretion of the respondent 11 10 
Awareness of risks and outcomes of 
cybercrimes 15 5 
Importance for relatives and friends to 
check on the respondent 8 14 
Belief that friends and relatives will not 
harm the respondent 7 15 
Passwords are protected (i.e. passwords 
not shared, different passwords for 
different accounts) 
11 8 
Carefulness with online activities 11 6 
 
 
